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The author studies the experiences of British, German, American and Soviet
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commanders. A fortified position is a series of mutually supporting areas comprising
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Once more into the breach, dear friends
once more;
Or close the wall up with our English dead!
Shakespeare: King Henry V, Hi, 1598
It is right to learn, even from the enemy. (Fas est et ab hoste doceri.)
Ovid: Metamorphoses, iv, c. 8 A.D.
A. PURPOSE
An attacker must have the ability to conduct any type of attack, so that he can hoist
his opponent onto the "horns of a dilemma". 1 Modern commanders seek to bypass or
encircle, rather than attack, a fortified position consisting of bunkers, reinforced weapons
emplacements and entrenchments protected by mines, barbed wire and other obstacles. 2
While not advocating such assaults, the author contends that the U.S. Army must have
the ability to successfully make such an assault. Such ability forces the defender to
prepare for multiple eventualities and thus weakens him. The added doubt in a defender's
mind could contribute to his defeat. The key to developing this particular skill, which
was until very recently virtually a forgotten art in the U.S. Army, lies in the study of
historical precedents. This thesis will compare historical lessons from various armies at
1 General William T. Sherman, quoted in Sir Basil Liddell Hart and Adrian Liddell
Hart, The Sword and The Pen (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1976), 273.
2 The definition of a fortified position is paraphrased from U.S. Military Assistance
Command Vietnam (USMACV), Attack of Fortified Positions In The Jungle, Seminar
Report. (Saigon: USMACV, 2 Jan 1968), 1. Defense Technical Information Center
(DTIC) No. AD 844097.
various times and locations to find relevant similarities important to success in all times
and in all places. These lessons will then be used to examine current Army training.
This thesis hypothesizes that current methods do not take key factors into account in the
areas of tactical organization, special equipment or assault weapons. In addition, current
methods may be ineffective and too complicated when compared with combat proven
techniques. The goal of this thesis is to provide commanders and their staffs with a list
of factors that they must consider in order to properly organize their forces for the attack.
This organization will then determine the techniques of command and control necessary
to accomplish the mission. These techniques will vary from situation to situation, so this
author will merely include several techniques for others to consider.
B. BACKGROUND
A deliberate attack against a well entrenched defender protected by obstacles is
exceptionally difficult. The attacking forces must consider myriad factors of Command
and Control3 (C2) to properly synchronize available assets. For various reasons, armies
throughout history have assaulted fortified positions. Many of these assaults rank among
decisive turning points in war, for example Kursk and El Alamein in World War II.
C2 is defined as-The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and
control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities and procedures employed by a commander in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of
the mission. See JCS Pub 1
.
(Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 June 1987),
77.
C. SIGNIFICANCE
A fortified position is a series of mutually supporting areas comprising bunkers,
pillboxes, weapons emplacements, entrenchments, wire, mines and other obstacles.
Assaulting such a position held by determined defenders is a uniquely brutal and bloody
event. Deafening noise, concussion, choking dust and smoke, flame from weapons and
exploding vehicles, screams of the wounded and shouted commands are all integral
components of such an assault. Weaker forces use field fortifications to inflict casualties
and to buy time. Every campaign from WWII to the Gulf War has seen fortified
positions and such positions will continue to be used. Our forces must have the capability
to assault through these positions with few casualties. If poorly reconnoitered, planned,
equipped, led and executed, such assaults will degenerate into sickening futility. If done
properly, such attacks will break through with minimum loss of time and lives. Much
work is currently going on within the U.S. Army on the problem of assault against
fortifications. This author hopes to add significantly to the body of knowledge and help
validate certain concepts.
D. ASSUMPTIONS
The basic weapons and forces of conventional land combat will remain the same
for the foreseeable future. The tactics, techniques and equipment used by defenders and
attackers have remained little changed from WWII to the present and no great change is
forthcoming. Ditches, barbed wire, bangalore torpedoes and fascines, for example, have
changed little at all in their long history. Thus, the composition of a Soviet assault team
in 1945 in Manchuria mirrored the U.S. Marine assault team on Okinawa and should
closely resemble a U.S. Army assault team of today.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
A brief description of each chapter follows which will guide the reader through the
organization of the thesis.
1. Chapter I
This chapter offers a brief background and purpose of the thesis and addresses
the topic's importance.
2. Chapter II
This chapter gives the reader an historical overview of field fortifications and
their significance on warfare. It traces the development of means for attackers to counter
defenders' advantages. This chapter generally familiarizes the reader with the overall
subject and introduces certain concepts to facilitate understanding the body of the thesis.
3. Chapters III through VI
In this portion of the thesis, the author will analyze different armies in different
phases of WWII using a similar analysis structure. This standard analysis format will
facilitate recognition of certain constant factors and facilitate comparisons.
4. Chapter VII
Currently, much of the body of knowledge in the U.S. Army comes from its
Combat Training Centers. This chapter will look at training as it now exists and compare
it with historical lessons.
5. Chapter VIII
The final chapter will offer the author's conclusions and a summary of
findings. The results of the study will provide recommendations to assist commanders
and staffs in detenriining the organization, equipment, tactics, training and means of
control of forces in the attack against a fortified position. These recommendations will
allow the commander and his staff to choose the best techniques and technical means to
deal with the situation at hand.
n. EVOLUTION OF ASSAULTS AGAINST FORTIFIED POSITIONS
- 52 B.C. through A.D. 1939
...Then when they (the Gauls) came up closer, they were soon caught unawares on
the spurs, or sank into the pits and were impaled, or were shot by artillery pikes
from the rampart and turrets, and so perished on every side.
Julius Caesar in Bellum Gallicum
A. ALESIA: ONE HUNDRED YARDS OF HORROR
1. Background
In the spring of 52 B.C., the Gaul Vercingetorix led most of Gaul (modem
France) in revolt against Roman occupation. Caesar besieged his opponent in the town
of Alesia and began fortifying. When the relief force of Gauls arrived outside, the
Romans faced odds somewhere between 1:1 and 6:1 to the advantage of the enemy. The
Gauls, however, faced a giant fortified doughnut with the Romans inside. Around Alesia
stretched twenty five miles of ramparts (fourteen miles in the outer ring and eleven in the
inner ring), including towers and palisades, and about fifty miles of trenches. On the
outside of the perimeter, the relieving Gauls faced one hundred yards of obstacles before
they could grapple with the Romans. An attacking Gaul first encountered stimuli — ankle
high iron hooks embedded in buried wooden beams —
,
pits of wooden spikes, a double
row of sharpened branches anchored in the ground or cippi, and two trenches of fifteen
foot depth and water filled in places. After these outer works came the actual towers and
palisades containing the Romans. The towers provided launching platforms for auxiliary
slingers and archers to engage the attackers while they struggled through the obstacles.
2. Narrative
The fighting itself covered two days and included three assaults, one of them
at night. The field fortifications played the desired role. They slowed down the attackers
and enabled the Roman auxiliary "artillery" to wear down and demoralize the attackers.
The physical separation of the two Gallic forces precluded effective coordination, thus
inviting defeat in detail. Finally, the defenses enabled the Roman to hold portions with
fewer men and use other forces to counterattack. This counterattack of infantry and
cavalry under Labienus caught the outside Gauls in the flank and rear, breaking the final




Through the following centuries, field fortifications played virtually no role,
overshadowed by castles and fortified towns. While the assault of such positions makes
fascinating study, especially the part played by that initial assault party so aptly named
the "Forlorn Hope", such assault lies beyond the scope of this study.
4 The story of the siege of Alesia has been paraphrased from Robert L. Bradley,
"Designer's Notes" chapter in Alesia wargame rules, (Baltimore, MD: Avalon Hill, 1976),
11-14, and Hans Delbruck, History of the Art of War , Vol II. Trans. Walter J. Renfroe,
Jr. (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1980), 495-507.
C. 19th CENTURY: THE SPADE REDISCOVERED
In the mid-nineteenth century, the development of the rifled musket gave field
fortifications new significance. One key role of fieldworks was to give protection to
defending troops, which made their fire more effective against attackers in the open. The
extended range of infantry weapons kept enemy artillery at bay and led to brutal losses
among attacking infantry, whose fire was nullified by trenches, breastworks, and other
works. By 1864, American defensive works showed high quality, as veteran infantry
became adept at digging in.5
1. The American Civil War
During this period field fortifications,
...became an integral aspect of infantry tactics. ..It was in utilization of improvised
field fortifications that Robert E. Lee surpassed all of his contemporaries; most of
his victories were the result of his ability to use hasty entrenchments as a base for
aggressive employment of fire and movement.6
In fact, Lee became known as "the King of Spades" for his defenses near Richmond. 7
Attackers developed no new tactics or equipment to overcome these fortifications by
assault, as thousands of men, both North and South discovered.
5 John Miller, Jr. "Men, Weapons and & Tactics," Army Information Digest. August
1961: 50.
6 Trevor N. Dupuy, "The Impact on Today's Army," Army Information Digest .
August, 1961: 124.
Eugene F. Hart, "Revolution in Technology and Logistics," Army Information
Digest , August, 1961: 109.
A stunning example of what happens to attackers who practice poor scouting,
planning and tactics in attacking well entrenched defenders came on June 3, 1864 at Cold
Harbor, Virginia. Defending Confederates killed, wounded or captured 7,000 Union
attackers within eight minutes, while suffering almost no losses themselves. A blood
stained diary found on one of the dead concluded, "June 3. Cold Harbor. I was killed." 8
2. 1865 to 1914
An astute observer could already see that field fortifications played a key role
in many battles, with the defender's fires doing the significant killing, rather than the
obstacles themselves. As long as the attacker and defender are roughly equal in mobility,
protection and firepower (mostly portable), the advantage lies with the defender who is
protected by obstacles and entrenchments. Most observers discounted these lessons for
various reasons.
...Earthworks reappeared at Plevna in 1877-78, in South Africa in 1899-1900, and
in Manchuria in 1904-05, yet the number of military writers in Europe who
appreciated this phase of the Civil War could be numbered on the fingers of one
hand.9
D. A MUDDY CORNER OF HELL: THE FIRST WORLD WAR EXPERIENCE
The trench warfare of 1914-1918 on the Western Front saw the most extensive field
fortifications in history, stretching from Switzerland to the North Sea. These trenches,
8
This account of Cold Harbor is paraphrased from Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A
Narrative
. Vol. 3 Red River to Appomattox
,
(New York: Random House, 1974), 290.
9 Jay Luvass, "Influences on Foreign Army Tactics and Strategy," Army Information
Digest , August 1961, 116.
dugouts and wire gave the defenders protection, robbed attackers of mobility, and, when
coupled with machine guns, contributed to the butchery of millions.
First came the preliminary bombardment...then the attack, with perhaps a fortunate
few, generally very few, reaching the first German trenches to bayonet the survivors
there; a brief pause, then the enemy's deadly barrage on their own captured
positions, followed by the inevitable counterattack; finally, the attackers, too few
to hold their ground, driven back to their own trenches, decimated relics of the
original force; the remaining three-quarters to nine-tenths dead, or dying with their
bowels hooked on the wire of No Man's Land, knowing...there would be no truce
to collect the wounded, and hoping only to attract the merciful attention of an
enemy machine-gunner...And the only thing it had proved was that this was no way
to win a war. 10
1. The Somme
The bloodiest day of a bloody war came on 1 July, 1916 ~ the first day on the
Somme. This marvelous display of international coordination ~ the Germans provided
the machine guns and bullets, the British the targets — saw both murderous stupidity and
some significant tactical acumen. Unfortunately for the 60,000 British casualties (20,000
dead and 30,000 wounded or missing in the first hour),"stupidity predominated.
General Rawlinson, the Fourth Army Commander, endorsed a plan which supposed that
a lengthy (five days) artillery barrage would destroy all defensive works, cut the wire and
kill or numb the defenders. Rawlinson considered the new infantry — Kitchener's New
Army — incapable of anything beyond walking forward, burdened by an average load of
sixty pounds, in straight ranks. The plan called for an assault in daylight (so that the
10
Alistair Home, The Price of Glory: Verdun. 1916 (New York: Penguin, 1964), 34.
11 These figures come from Martin Middlebrook, First Day on the Somme (New
York: Norton, 1972), 148. This book makes compelling, if chilling, reading and is a main
source for many other works.
10
French could observe artillery effectiveness) and rejected Haig's suggestion that scouts
should go forward to ascertain the effect of the artillery preparation. 12 This is an
example of the commonly occurring confusion of firepower for the attacker instead of fire
effectiveness. This artillery preparation incorporated numerous failings within itself.
Though many shells were fired, many failed to explode and most (seventy five percent)
were shrapnel. Shrapnel, which burst above ground and showered metal fragments
forward in a conical pattern, l3had to be perfectly timed and precisely laid to cut wire.
With inexperienced gunners filling the new units and worn artillery tubes, the shrapnel
had little effect on the wire and even less on protected troops. 14 The shelling swept
forward in splendid isolation from reality, the gunners firing on a timetable that only the
Corps Headquarters could alter. These headquarters lay miles from the front at the wrong
end of miles of telephone wire and the critical hundreds of yards of No-Man's Land. 15
Units that followed these orders precisely met disaster.
12 The overall description of the plan of the Somme offensive is the same in all
works on the subject. These details of the why are found in A.J. P. Taylor, The First
World War (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1972), 133-136.
13 The precise description of the shrapnel burst partem is described in Shelford
Bidwell and Domenick Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War
1904-1945
.
(Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 84.
14 The composition of the barrage and the high dud rate come from Middlebrook,
First Day . 282-283.
15 The geographical locations, control measures and communication layout is found
in Martin Van Crevald, Command In War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1985), 160.
11
Even in this bleak day some units displayed a firm grasp of reality, disregarded
orders, and did their best. The 36th (Ulster) Division sent men into No-Man's Land early
and followed the barrage with a headlong Irish rush that took the first enemy trenchline.
Major General Ivor Maxse put much of his 1 8th division out early as well and employed
rushing tactics to beat the defenders to the firing step. Maxse had trained his men to
accept six percent casualties from friendly artillery to insure that they followed it closely
enough. 16
2. Deadlock: A Search For A Solution
The evolution towards the proper way to assault significant field fortifications
continued. Artillery did, when well used, cause enough losses to defenders to offset the
superior fire of the defending machine guns. This, unfortunately, remained more the goal
than the reality. If the attacking infantry could follow closely enough, it would have
protection across No-Man's Land and win the race to the parapets. Tactical mobility,
though, remained an atrocious problem. The churned up earth made rapid attack,
reinforcement, resupply or exploitation in significant numbers virtually impossible. The
rigidity of artillery fire, a product both of inflexible thinking and the very real difficulty
of communicating from the lead troops back to the guns, also remained a problem. The
British incorporated Lewis gun teams and bomb throwing teams into infantry platoons to
give more portable firepower,' 7 but the tank became the best solution to give attackers
16 Middlebrook, 284.
17 John English discusses British small unit organization in his book, On Infantry
(New York: Praeger, 1981), 58.
12
protection and the portable, responsive firepower they needed to regain offensive
movement.
3. Deadlock: The German Solution
While the British moved towards the technical solution of the trench stalemate
by developing armored vehicles, the Germans looked more towards reviving "stalking
methods." 18 The German development of what came to be known as "infiltration" tactics
was "...the product of an effective corporate effort" and the Germans emphasized the
coordination, or working together, das Zusammenwirken of all combat elements. 19
Following the fiascos of 1915, both sides had men who realized the need for
new tactics. A French Captain Laffargue wrote a pamphlet which proposed that light
cannon accompany infantry, machine guns and automatic rifles be pushed forward and
that mortars be used to suppress enemy in trenches. He suggested that patrols "creep
through" weak spots and leave strongpoints for follow up waves. The Allies ignored the
document. The Germans captured a copy, translated it and issued portions of it as a
18
English attributes this quote describing a more flexible, fieldwise, savvy style of
fighting to Sir Basil Liddell Hart. See English, Infantry . 22.
19 For an excellent overall account of German tactical doctrine's development see,
Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine
During The First World War.Leavenworth Paper No. 4 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat
Studies Institute, 1981), 8, The concept of corporate effort is found on 42-44.
13
training manual.20 German thought already leaned towards "infiltration" tactics and the
first major test of such thinking came at Verdun on 21 February, 1916.
a. Verdun
Following the first bombardment, that was more effective than British
ones because the Germans had heavier artillery and mortars than the Allies and knew high
explosive worked better than shrapnel, German patrols crept forward and sought out soft
spots. Instead of flooding through, though, they merely found where the French still held
so more shelling could pave the way for later attacks. Flamethrowers, first tested in
combat a year earlier,21 also played a key role that day, because their shock effect
seriously demoralized many defenders.22
Finally, the talents of many good officers from Captain to General
culminated in the final version of "infiltration" tactics and the quality of German non-
commissioned officers made these tactics possible. Special units of young, fit and
aggressive soldiers were formed into Sturmabteilungen — storm detachments.
20
Laffargue is discussed by English and Lupfer. See English, Infantry . 18-19, and
Lupfer, Dynamics of Doctrine , 38-39.
21 Bruce Gudmundsson, "German Flamethrowers of World War 1", [1990], pp. 1-16.







...lightweight machine-guns, light trench mortars and flamethrowers, and their duty
was to cross the trench-lines, by-pass centres of resistance and machine-gun posts
and if possible break through to attack the enemy artillery.23
Ludendorff directed that artillery must respond to the infantry and shift fire as necessary.
The immediate follow on waves comprised "battle units" of infantry, machine-gunners,
trench mortars, engineers, field artillery and ammunition carriers. All men received cross
training and firm orders to keep pushing deep. These groupings gave the attackers
significant portable firepower, but artillery remained the decisive provider of fire
effectiveness on entrenched defenders. To support these new tactics, Ludendorff listened
to a Lieutenant Colonel Bruchmiiller who used short bombardments to achieve surprise.
Bruchmuller's timing of artillery fires and heavy use of gas concentrated on disruption
of command and control and did not churn up ground so badly as to make rapid
movement impossible.24
4. Summation
When the armistice silenced the gunfire on the Western Front, both sides had
found solutions to breaking through extensive field fortifications. Neither was totally
satisfactory for a variety of reasons. Artillery could only be shifted within limited
parameters because of reliance on flares, runners, etc. Lack of mobility limited
23
Barrie Pitt, 1918: The Last Act (New York: Ballantine Books, 1962), 61.
24
Discussion of artillery and unit compositions, training and missions comes from
Pitt, 1918 . 61-65.
15
exploitation or the forward movement of artillery. Intelligent men had come up with, at
least in the formulative stages, almost every key piece of equipment and tactical
organization necessary. The interwar years would see radio improve to permit tactical use
at lower levels. The combination of aggressive, decentralized tactics, tanks and aircraft
now awaited only optimum combination and direction. Landmines would grow to be a
much greater threat.25 By 1939, however, all the major technologies and tactics sat on
the stage or in the wings. The Second World War would give modem commanders
valuable lessons in using these assets in their attacks.
25
In WWI, Germans used artillery shells as crude landmines, but they would not
play a major role until WWII. Mines are discussed extensively by Russel H. Stolfi, Mine
and Countermine Warfare In Recent History. 1914-1970. Report No. 1582. (Aberdeen
Proving Grounds, MD: Ballistic Research Laboratory, 1972), 13.
16
ID. THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE: A TRADE UNION26 APPROACH TO WAR
There is nothing certain about war except that one side won't win.
Sir Ian Hamilton: Gallipoli Diary , 1920
A. EL ALAMEIN: WORLD WAR ONE REVISITED
1. Terrain
El Alamein, itself little more than a village signpost, lay in the forty-mile wide
gap between the Mediterranean Sea on the north and the Quattara Depression on the
south. The Quattara Depression, a large expanse of virtually impassable salt marshes,
prohibited movement of any significant forces. Alexandria, with British supply depots
and ports, lay sixty miles to the east.
The ground is best described as flat, with scrub thorn in areas. Sand drifted,
but not in giant dunes of the "Beau Geste" movie image. Indeed, the barren and rocky
ground prevented deeply entrenching in most areas.27 Although the "flat" ground
actually contained folds and differing elevations, the slightness of the variations made
26 This phrase describes the narrow minded selfishness of the combat branches in the
British Army. See LTC Michael Quirk, "Assault On a Defensive Line," (National
Training Center: Observation Division, 1990), 3.
27 For the physical description of the battlefield, see: Peter Young, A Dictionary of
Battles (1816-1976)
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Figure 1: El Alamein (See Lucas, War In The Desert , 188)
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navigation exceptionally difficult. Few clearly prominent features existed, and both sides
encountered many problems with land navigation. The man made reference points, such
as Barrel Hill28
,
were critical to many movements.
...The El Alamein-Quattara Depression Line was an excellent choice of positions,
aside from being the only choice left before the Nile River. For once, there were
no flanks to turn. Rommel would have to meet the British Tommy... a dogged
defender, head on...Additionally, his long supply line lay exposed to RAF attack. 29
2. Defenders: Fighting A Battle Without Hope 30
By mid October of 1942, the Axis forces in Africa faced a grim situation. At
the end of a fragile supply line and depleted in strength after their own attacks at Alam
el Haifa at the end of July failed to dislodge the British, the Axis forces faced numerically
superior enemies without possessing enough fuel on hand fight the mobile war in which
the Germans excelled. The Italians, with the exception of the Folgore Parachute unit, had
poor equipment, leadership and morale. Rommel interspersed his German and Italian
units to bolster the latter and in so doing created "...for their defense girdle. ..a corset
28
Barrel Hill was a piece of ground with a navigation beacon, anchored by barrels,
on it and an eight digit grid coordinate painted on the barrels. Other references, such as
Trig 29, which fill Maughan's account, are map symbols showing that a certain point has
been surveyed to be the exact height shown. Some points in the desert had manmade
objects to facilitate human navigation, but accounts do not specify clearly enough which
ones had markers and which did not to stress these in the text of this report. As always,
when using a source written by a British or British Commonwealth author, one must be
careful in translating English into American.
29 Thomas B. Buell, et. 1. The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean ,
Volume 1, (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 1979), 330.
30 Erwin Rommel, quoted in Mitcham, Rommel's Desert War . 135.
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strengthened with German whale bones." 31 The Germans could only win by preventing
the British from bringing sufficient mass to bear at one place and time, and so dug into
defensive positions. German engineers uprooted old minefields in the rear areas and laid
them in new locations tied into existing ones facing the British. Rommel counted on
these "silent soldiers" to canalize the attack into small areas he could mass against and
defeat in detail.32 Artillery would also have more effect when fired against an enemy in
a small area.
Overall, the defenders occupied strongpoints spread throughout the mine belts.
This disposition would wear down the attackers and engage them throughout the full
depth of the sector. There was no one defensive line the British could mass fire on and
break through. The best term to describe the defensive disposition is "web defense".33
This overall defensive structure showed the well learned lessons of the First
World War. Rather than one main defensive line, the Axis forces occupied a number of
strongpoints. Rommel wrote,
...the defenses were so laid out that the mine-fields adjoining no-man's land were
held by light outposts only, with the main defense line, which was two to three
thousand yards in depth, located one to two thousand yards west of the first mine
belt. The panzer divisions were positioned behind the main defence line...A very




32 Mitcham, Rommel's Desert War , 135.
33 Major Ferdinand Otto Miksche, Attack: A Study of Blitzkrieg Tactics
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British intelligence summaries described,
the defence system...from 3,000 to 7,000 yards in depth. There were two main
defensive belts about 3,000 yards apart often with little between them, but with
east-west "dividing walls" of defensive positions connecting the two main north-
south belts at intervals of 4,000 to 5,000 yards, and forming a series of "hollow"
areas, ... for defensive fire tasks, and as traps for attackers, who would be exposed
to enfilade fire while in an angle of minefields formed by the junction of a dividing
wall with the second belt of defenses. 35
The disposition of the most eastward positions had some important weaknesses besides
the previously mentioned strengths. The defensive positions could not fully cover all of the mined
areas by direct fire.36 Since the "No-Man's Land" between the minebelts and the British defenses
stretched for roughly three thousand yards,"attackers could close up to and begin breaching the
minebelts free from direct fire. Once near the defenders, the attackers would be channeled into
swept lanes, but this applied only to vehicles, since only a few of the mines were antipersonnel.
The antitank mines, which made up the greatest majority of the belts and "marshes", needed heavy
weight to set them off.
Behind the infantry strongpoints and the vast majority of the minefields, Rommel
positioned his tanks and artillery. The crippling shortage of fuel forced him to disperse the armor
in groups across the front. This fuel shortage came partially from help given by Ultra (signal
intelligence from the broken German Enigma codes) which helped Allied air and naval forces to
35 Maughan, Tobruk . 644.
36 Mitcham states that General Georg Stumme ran an outpost line in front of the
mines, but offers no solid proof that the order was carried out. This outpost line is
probably really the first strongpoints within the minebelts. Mitcham also claims patrols





devastate Axis shipping. 38 The Luftwaffe yielded the sky to the RAF the majority of the time
anyway, and with this battlefield so close to the major British base in the area, German air could
not be counted on for significant assistance. Finally, Rommel himself left to return to Germany
in poor health. Ultra reported his departure from North Africa to General Sir Harold Alexander,
Montgomery's commander, on September 23rd. 39 General Georg Stumme, with Eastern Front
experience, replaced him.
3. Attackers
The British military faced strong pressure from Churchill to attack. On the eve of the
battle, Churchill telegraphed the British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, General Alexander, that
"all our hopes" rested on the outcome of the impending battle.40 The British and Commonwealth
forces had numerical superiority, but had demonstrated little tactical skill thus far in the war.
Montgomery had branches that could not work together and could not beat the Germans in mobile
combat. Playing the cards dealt to him, Montgomery planned a First World War battle with
Second World War forces and forced it upon his subordinates. An excellent deception plan,
Operation BERTRAM, kept the enemy from divining exact British intentions. The British planned
to breach the large minefields the first night and pass through large armored forces to set up hasty
defenses on the far side, consisting of tanks, infantry and anti-tank guns. Infantry "crumbling"
38 Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War , (London: Hutchinson, 1978), 264-271. Ultra
helped far more at the strategic than at the tactical level.
39 Christopher Argyle, Chronology of World War II
.
(London: Marshall Cavendish,
1980), 108. Also see Lewin, Ultra . 266-268.
40 Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisini, 2194 Days of War , trans. Hugh Young,
(New York: Gallery, 1979), 301.
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operations north and south against the static Axis infantry would force the weak armored forces
to intervene or see their infantry chewed up. "My modified plan was now to hold off, or contain,
the enemy annour, while we carried out a methodical destruction of the infantry divisions holding
the defensive system."41
When the Germans counterattacked, the British could weaken them significantly without
being drawn out into a mobile battle, which the British had no talent for. One will note however,
that this plan expected the attacking infantry and engineers to seize, and clear lanes through
defenses anywhere from six to seven kilometers deep and to allow the armor through.
...infantry attacks would start at 10 p.m. on 23rd October and were designed to overrun
the enemy's minefields and gain possession of his defenses, including the field gun
areas, so as to facilitate the passage of the armoured formations to the enemy's rear
before dawn.42
Such movements through prepared defenses could best be described as optimistic. The final line
for the armor to set up its defense by daylight was up to ten miles from friendly front lines.43
The plan called for infantry to closely follow a rigid rolling barrage and included pauses
for it to pass through follow-on units to maintain momentum. The Eighth Army engaged in
methodical rehearsals and practiced following the timetable rigidly. Units also obviously practiced
small unit "battle drills" during this time, since narratives consistently stress the rapid reactions to,
and reduction of, strongpoints during the advance.
General Sir Bernard Montgomery, Memoirs
,
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4. Narrative
Operation BERTRAM, the deception plan, preceded the main attack. Security of all
types worked well, due to diligent execution of imaginative plans and ruthless watchfulness of
security leaks and careless radio traffic.
The British barrage, involving around eight hundred guns, began firing at 2140 hours on
23 October, 1943. Operation LIGHTFOOT saw a methodical advance of four divisions abreast
behind the carefully timed artillery barrage. The engineers, though diligent and brave, could not
clear the lanes fast enough, since most of their effort was by hand. Armor displayed an amazing
reluctance to move forward and the overall attack failed to penetrate the entire defensive zone.
General Stumme, in overall Axis command, died of a heart attack trying to avoid enemy fire while
on a forward reconnaissance. The British artillery seriously hampered wire communications and
deprived the Germans of a clear picture of the battle.
Fighting continued with the Australian 9th Infantry Division doing the most in reducing
Axis positions. The attacks occurred inside the defensive fortified position because the attack
never fully penetrated the defensive network. Churchill allegedly exclaimed, "Is it really
impossible to find a General who can win a battle?". Once Rommel returned, the Germans
counterattacked throughout the 27th and 28th, but attrition favored the British. Air superiority also
played a major role in breaking up Axis counterattacks.
Operation SUPERCHARGE began on the night of 1 November. The 9th Division
attacked north and reached the sea, cutting off some defenders. The New Zealanders and armor
broke through westward. On 4 November, following intervention by Hitler which delayed the
withdrawal for a critical day, Rommel began withdrawing his mobile units westward. Many
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forces, cut off, surrendered, although some intrepid officers lead their men out and escaped.
Montgomery, with good intelligence of the crippled nature of the enemy, and knowing that the
TORCH landings in the west were four days away,44 chose not to pursue aggressively and
avoided any chance of ruining his reputation as a great General. The British/Commonwealth
forces lost about 13,500 casualties in advancing the front ten miles in twelve days. Of course, the
Axis lost much more (various authors give much different numbers of Axis losses) because of the
many men captured. Although the attackers clearly won a large scale victory, they did not win
by defeating the enemy sheltered within the fortified positions. Without the massive numerical
superiority in men and machines, the British probably would have lost because of their failure to
overcome the obstacles rapidly and their laggard reduction of enemy defended localities. Thus,
although El Alamein stands as a famous victory, overwhelming numerical superiority won, rather
than skillful tactics. The military student learns from this battle more techniques that he should
not use than techniques to emulate.
5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling
The British had some excellent sources of intelligence before the battle. Besides Ultra
as a source, detailed tactical information came from the Army Air Photograph Interpretation Unit.
...Enemy forethought, however, enabled many of the inner minefields to be hidden from
the...interpreters. These fields were laid chiefly where the low "camel-thorn" scrub was
thickest and presented on air photographs a mottled pattern that hid the disturbance of the
surface.45
44
For the narrative of the overall battle, see Young, Dictionary of Battles . 456-457,







Patrols, however, did not penetrate the defenses. With no confirmation of the air
reconnaissance, planners assumed the information gathered was complete, and did not take any
other measures to confirm or deny their assumptions. Thus, the British based a large part of their
plan on breaking through the initial outpost line and then advancing against little or no resistance.
The best information came from the "Y" Service. This electronic intelligence gathering
unit gave continuous information in what is now referred to as "near real time."
Monitoring the actual battlefield conversation of German staffs and commanders, fixing
enemy locations by direction finding, and assessing the movements of units by a study of
their caUsigns and the changing volume of their radio traffic, "Y" Service provided an
extraordinary awareness of what was going on beyond the dividing minefields. (Rommel's
similar capability had been drastically reduced by the capture of his intercept unit during
the July fighting. Moreover, the documents then acquired taught the British much about
their own lack of radio security and led to a marked improvement.) Apart from the many
tactical moves during the twelveday's fighting Rommel made only two of major
significance-the transfer of 21 Panzer Division from the south to the north of his line and
his commitment during the latter stages of his last reserve, 90 Light Division...Each of
these. ..was known...through "Y" Service...46
Indeed, with the amount of excellent intelligence available to the attackers, the plan does
not seem to have been based upon this information. The broad front, timed advance sounds
uncomfortably like the Somme in 1916. Intelligence drove no special tactics or plans for reducing
obstacles and defensive positions.
6. Use of Obscuration/Smoke
The attackers used darkness to conceal themselves. The bombardment raised a large





clearing flail tanks and explosions from Gennan artillery and mines reduced visibility across much
of the area to a matter of feet.
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Smoke is mentioned in this battle only twice. On 31 October, German light tanks put
down smoke to cover their advance in a small, local counterattack. During the battle, Germans
also fired smoke at minefield gaps to silhouette emerging British tanks for easier targeting.48
The choice of a night attack to give infantry and engineers concealment and moonlight
to work by, proved very sensible. Unfortunately, no one thought that during the day some other
form of cloaking might be called for. The battle occurred in late October, and personal accounts
mention the cold after the sun went down. These conditions favored the use of smoke for
obscuration during the early morning chill, before the day's heat made dense smoke concentrations
far more difficult to achieve. Since the British knew that a defensive gun line could butcher
exposed tanks, the lack of smoke planning seems inexplicable. The enormous material advantage
held by the attacker would refute any assumption that a choice had to be made in favor of high
explosive rather than smoke.
7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation
Tank-infantry teamwork can be described, overall, only as very poor. There are very few
indications of any real planning for close cooperation. Writers stress the constant rehearsals and
47
For many first hand accounts describing the difficulties of functioning in the
choking dust see Lucas, War In The Desert , pp. 150, 165, 171, and 173. Also see Major-
General G.L. Vemey, The Desert Rats : The History of the 7th Armoured Division 1938
to 1945, (London: Hutchinson, 1954), 134.
48 Maughan, Tobruk
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claim success. But, in practice, the infantry went in alone and any tanks directed to give direct
support fell behind waiting for the engineers to clear mines.
Since the Germans and Italians planted far more antitank mines (ninety seven percent of
the total)
49
than antipersonnel mines, infantry could go through the belts without grievous losses.
Some minebelts did contain buried artillery shells with trip wires and other antipersonnel mines,
but not many. Note, for example, the following description of the situation:
"As the antitank mines were. ..in the largest numbers, the infantry were expected to take their
chance...The marching men were expected to keep marching.50
One of the truly unforgettable occurrences in this battle concerns the British "navigating
officers." With land navigation clearly a problem, each unit had a number of officers who walked
ahead with a compass on a certain azimuth and counting off paces for distance. Sergeants with
them unrolled white tape to mark the center of unit movement for follow on forces. One battalion
lost seven killed or wounded the first night.51 Since these officers preceded even the engineei
guide parties, one can only admire their nerve and hope to never have such a task.
The infantry led the way across the mines and tried to "lean-on" the barrage as closelj
as possible. Many units actually passed into or through friendly fire.52 The slow pace of th<
49
Antipersonnel mines comprised three percent of the total mines laid. See Stolfi,
Mine and Countermine Warfare , 41.





52 See Lucas, War In The Desert , 161-169. He describes several units moving
through their own fire or pausing to wait for the fire to move forward. The units that did
this tended to be the high quality Commonwealth units, although no Allied infantry units
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advance, and lack of lateral communication between leading infantry units and follow on armor
units unhinged the entire plan. When the infantry did not make the rapid gains Montgomery
ordered, the entire plan went awry. The German defenders apparendy did not understand their role
and fought well instead of surrendering or idly watching. The engineers could not clear lanes until
the infantry silenced nearby defenders, and the tankers simply sat or inched forward slowly in tight
columns waiting for the lanes to be cleared. No plan existed for the infantry or engineers to notify
tank officers of problems in a timely manner to avoid bunching up.
The cleared track was only eight yards wide, and vehicles could not pass each other...Nor
could tanks turn around...The 1st Armoured Division was stuck in its corridor, and was not
on its objective.53
Incredibly, the armored units apparently sat in the lanes in three vehicular columns side
by side in an eight yard wide gap, bunched up behind the engineer teams. In daylight, the Axis
artillery would exploit this to the full, as would direct fire according to local tactical conditions.
The British plan did take traffic control into account, but could not handle these
unexpected problems at the front edge of the battle. Problems there needed to be handled by the
junior leaders present. These leaders, very busy fighting and, in many cases, dying, could not do
it all. No previous battle had seen such dense obstacles and even good men could not anticipate
everything. Unfortunately, these leading soldiers discovered many lessons the hard way. One
contributing factor, though, was lack of coordination among branches, so that different combat
arms operated in isolation. In all the sources examined, the author could find only one real
in this batde performed less than admirably.
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example of good tank-infantry cooperation. Witliin the sector of the 20th Brigade, 9th Australian
Division, the attack failed to reach its final objectives and the infantry dug in as dawn approached.
Tanks from the 40th Royal Tank Regiment managed to get forward to help out. The infantry
pointed out enemy defenses and the tanks destroyed them.54 Defensive positions usually did not
have the firepower to hold off tanks, and armor could easily subdue such defenders to save
infantry lives.
8. Engineers
The Engineers made prodigious efforts during this operation, especially on the first night.
An idea of the scale can be seen by,
...Sappers with masses of tape (130 miles of it would be unrolled in the battle), posts and
lamps (more than 50,000 were used to illuminate the minefield gaps) and with detectors
(there were 500 brought together for the operation).55
Some flail tanks saw action but had mixed success. Barbed wire tangled the flail chains
and made them useless. Sapper P.W. Briant recalls that,
All that happened was that the chains flung the mines onto the tanks and that Jerry barbed
wire got caught up in the drums. Even the detectors were not much cop. So it was back
to bayonets.56
54 For the one bright example of tanks assisting infantry, see Maughan, Tobruk , 671.
55
Lucas, War In The Desert . 143.
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30
Some flail tanks worked with teams of 15 men. The men followed the flail tank marking the lane
with tape. If the flail broke down the men took over with detectors. 57
While flail tanks actually detonated mines to clear a lane, the so called "Polish" mine
detectors merely located mines which men then lifted by hand. After marking the mines
themselves and the marked lane boundaries, the engineers went back through on crawling on their
knees and feeling the ground to check the lane and then actually lift all the mines.58
Planners recognized the difficulties in moving up follow on forces through the many
minefields. They developed the previously described elaborate clearing procedure and an Army
wide marking procedure as well. The system used tape and lights to mark the lane. Vehicles
quickly mangled many markers on the swept lanes. Tape and poles could easily be run over and
obscured. The lights worked if not obscured by dust.
Engineers worked right up front with the infantry, but that took up all available men.
Apparently, no engineers stayed back to widen lanes or check for cleared areas between belts to
allow vehicles to deploy. The lack of engineers also meant little relief for the men doing very
stressful work. Sapper Rowlands remembered that "My hands didn't stop shaking for nearly eight
weeks." Besides clearing mines, Pioneer platoons, such as in the Black Watch (51st Highland
57 Sapper Sidney Morgan served in such a 'Lane Group' at Alamein. See George
Forty, Desert Rats At War , (London: Ian Allen, 1975), 107. After the war, Morgan
became a monk. The effect of being a Sapper on his present vocation is not described.
58
For details of lane clearing and proofing, see Majdalany, Battle , 85-86. Maughan,
Tobruk , 652, mentions the use of 'proofing vehicles', heavily sandbagged trucks which
drove up and down the lane first to check for missed mines.
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Division), also laid hasty protective minefields.59 The following account gives the reader a vivid
first hand sense of the life of an engineer that night,
For Alamein we were rehearsed in mineclearing with and without, infantry cooperation.
The RE recce party went in with the infantry. I felt sorry for the infantry boys. They had
to walk across the minefield and take up defensive positions to keep the Jerries off while
our lads got to work. Then our recce party went in to find and to fix the forward edge of
the field. Our officer then decided the area that was to be gapped. Behind the recce group
were the tape men who ran out the tape for the first narrow gap. This was eight feet wide.
The actual width of the gap when we were finished was 24 feet, and to make sure that the
width was correct two men were roped at that distance and walked on compass bearings
along the swept corridor. Then came the detector party: three sweepers who worked in
staggered formation. Each operator had a mate, a marker who fixed a white painted metal
cone over any mine that was detected in the gap. Behind the sweepers came the three-man
lifting team, who knelt down on the desert and felt around the mine to make sure that it
was a 'clean' one-that is, that it didn't have trip wires running from it or a booby trap
attached to it. That really was a dodgy operation ...Anyway, once the mine had been
defused, it was lifted out of the ground and placed outside the marking tape. The gap
markers ran out their tapes to keep pace with the lifters, pegging down the tapes into
position. Working at top speed, a team could work a two.hundred yard strip in about an
hour. The length of time taken was increased if we were under heavy shell fire; longer still
if we were under Spandau fire; and even longer if we had casualties. Everybody moved
dead slow then. Using the detectors we could stand up and operate them, but those of us
who didn't have proper detectors relied upon the bayonet prodding method, although at
Alamein my unit did no prodding. We had detectors and were standing all the time. There
was always a little group of reserves, just in case we lost men on mines or to shell or
machine gun fire. This group, only a couple of men, stayed at the gap at the edge of the
field and they used to brew up for us. It was really thirsty work in a gapping operation...60
9. Artillery
Artillery comes across as the dominant player in this battle. This is certainly
understandable considering the great similarity in style of this battle and WWI British efforts.
This, like the great First World War battles, was a sequence of sub-battles,
each with an elaborate fire-plan using two or three hundred guns...Attempts on
39
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the part of the artillery commanders of armoured divisions to dissent from
centralized control were firmly suppressed.61
Since Axis artillery posed the greatest initial threat, it became the priority target. British
gunners needed darkness to spot the muzzle flashes for counterbattery fire, so the Gunners defined
H-Hour. Fires massed on counterbattery missions first and then shifted to strongpoints. Planners
chose twenty five enemy batteries as the most critical and massed concentrations of between 10:1
and 20:1 upon them. The counterbattery caused heavy initial losses among gun crews, according
to early prisoners taken. Unfortunately, the counterbattery did not fully succeed, and defensive
artillery concentrations caused some significant losses to advancing infantry, such as the Gordon
Highlanders who had to repeatedly reorganize depleted units. A few accounts show short artillery
rounds hitting friendly troops and there is no way to know if fratricide was a significant problem.
No evidence indicates that the problem was significant. The Axis defensive fire did its damage
later in the night after friendly artillery shifted fires to the rolling barrage or was answering calls
for fire. No mention exists of a return to counterbattery missions.
Fire fell on Axis guns for fifteen minutes, then paused for five minutes before hitting
defensive positions. The barrage severed German wire communications so that commanders had
to go forward not to confirm or clarify knowledge, but to get any idea of the fight at all. The
German Panzerarmee War Diary confinns a dearth of incoming information.
Gunners fired about six hundred rounds per gun that night. The firing had pauses built
in partly to rest the guns and allow them to cool a bit to help prevent rounds exploding in the gun.
The troops in their positions fought out their own private little wars in a swirling universe of dust,
61
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noise and confusion. Higher officers could do little but wait and hope. As the fighting continued
past midnight, few noticed that it became 24 October, the feast of St. Raphael, the patron saint of
pilgrims and crusaders.
E.M. Scott, a New Zealand infantryman, wrote home that "The desert was pockmarked
every few feet with shell holes; his wire was blown to bits. ..his front line defenses were clear..."
No sources mention the effect of the artillery on the mines themselves, if any. Infantry tried to
stay two hundred yards behind its own barrage, to take advantage of its fire effectiveness and hit
defenders still groggy from the shelling.62
10. Air Support
The British did not use air support to assist the fight within the fortified position. No
accounts of this battle refer to any control parties forward to direct tactical air support.63 Air
strikes concentrated on supply lines and tank concentrations to forestall counterattacks. Defensive
air played a role as well. On 27 October, Allied fighters drove off a Stuka attack. On the 25th,
Allied bombers hit armored concentrations. By the 4th of November, Axis aircraft could no longer
use their cratered runways to even try to intervene.64
62 For details of the barrage, see Lucas, War In The Desert , 110-164. One item of
note is a passing reference that Gunners set their rounds to explode on impact. If this
was true in all cases, then the British used no delay fuzes to penetrate dugouts and other
positions.
63 The British were working on such a system, but it was not ready for El Alamein.
In the following March, when Montgomery's men attacked the Mareth Line in Tunisia,
Forward Air Controllers (FACs), enjoyed success striking retreating Axis forces. See
Bidwell, Firepower . 270-272.
64 For details on the air war, see Argyle, Chronology . 110.
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11. C2
The infantry and sappers conducted intensive rehearsals against mock defenses and
minefields. Commanders at almost all levels gave briefings over sand tables. This gave rise to
a general feeling of confidence, at least within the infantry. Men frequently commented during
the battle that it was just like an exercise.65
Symbols marked the lanes for movement up to the battle for the 9th Australian Division.
By using the names Diamond, Boomerang, Double Bar and Square, lighted signs with these
symbols cut out eliminated confusion at night 66 One Scottish unit named each known enemy
strongpoint in its sector for a town in its recruiting area.67 Such simplicity made things very
clear. Planners named known minefields.68 This also provided clarity in reporting and issuing
orders.
Visual signals played a key role in command and control. Bofors tracer round fired
every few minutes marked unit boundaries. One unit fired a certain color flare to tell all its own
men rapidly that they were on the objective and should begin digging in. Two large searchlights
in the rear shown in a large 'V to aid navigation, and swept back and forth when the barrage was
about to move to the next phase.69
65 Maughan, Tobruk , 653-654.
66 Maughan, Tobruk
. 650, and Lucas, War In The Desert , 150.
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Military Police controlled traffic at minefield gaps.70 The vehicles of the attacking
British infantry moving up to resupply troops and evacuate wounded as well as the Armored
Divisions needed to get forward. Artillery fire necessitated holding vehicles up to avoid needless
losses in lanes covered by fire. Military police doing such tasks freed up combat troops for the
attack.
7 '
12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets
New equipment, such as the Flail tank and the small number of Sherman tanks freshly
arrived, failed to live up to expectations. The British had no good means of rapidly clearing lanes
through mines, and this cost them dearly. Flail tanks could only move forward at a speed of one
and one-half miles per hour while flailing. With the spinning chains and cloud of dust, these tanks
could not use their own weapons. 72 As noted earlier, the flails themselves were vulnerable and
not universally effective.
13. Historical Lessons
This battle showed a need for a mechanical means of rapidly breaching thick minefields,
and for clearly marking them. Engineers did not work throughout the depth of the penetration, so
follow on units could not fully disperse. Engineers should be echeloned throughout the depth of
the attack to widen lanes and clear areas within the fortified position, or verify that an area is
already clear, so that follow on combat forces, artillery units, and others may spread out. If this
70
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72 Kenneth Macksey and John H. Batchelor, Tank : A History of the Armoured
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widening is not done, the whole attacking force may find itself strung out on a few cleared paths,
a potential highway to hell. Multiple lanes need to be cleared for each unit, so that existing units
and passing units can have different lanes for traffic going different ways, since walking wounded
who can escort prisoners will be moving rearward.
The infantry needed weapons light enough to carry, yet powerful enough to help reduce
entrenched defenders. Infantry had light machine guns and grenades, but no accounts mention
flame weapons or light mortars. Tanks normally filled this support role, but mines channeled their
movement and rendered them virtually useless. Without the advantages normally given by tanks,
the Commonwealth and British infantry did minimize losses by leaning closely on the barrage to
get on top of defenders quickly. Unfortunately, an inflexible rolling barrage will not allow shifting
of fires if the infantry cannot keep up. This battle showed the cost of narrow mindedness among
combat branches. If infantry must go virtually alone, infiltration tactics should be used. Such
tactics did well in the First World War and might have succeeded more effectively in this First
World War style fight. The change in thinking required by such tactics, however, proved to be
beyond British forces of the period.
Units encountered many minebelts not previously known. A system of naming obstacle
belts would assist command and control of forces. Units, for example, could name the first
minebelt M2 and other known ones in order of M10, M20, etc. As units encounter new, or odd,
obstacles, these could be named M3, M5 and so forth. 73
73 For the basis of this idea see Lieutenant Colonel Thomas V. Morley and Captain
Anthony J. Tata, "Passing Through The Eye Of A Needle: Breach and Defile Operations,"
Armor , July-August 1989, 26-32.
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Intelligence is only as good the use commanders and staffs put it to. Intelligence also
must be confirmed, preferably by scouts using direct observation. The composition of obstacles
is key to developing a plan of operations, and physical scouting is best for this.
Counterbattery fire must continue throughout the battle to be really effective. The fifteen
minutes on enemy batteries should probably have been lengthened. Fire should pinpoint known
positions to avoid wasting shells on empty desert just to have a rolling barrage. Some batteries
should remain free for opportunity fire on newly discovered positions. The barrage at El Alamein
seems far to rigid to have allowed this.
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B. OPERATION GOODWOOD: DEATH RIDE OF THE ARMOURED DIVISIONS
Monty built up 8 Corps under Dick O'Connor trying to break through. Then he had a
terrible press conference...Bloody stupid communique he read to them. We hadn't
advanced an inch. That night Dietrich smashed a bunch of our tanks.75
With the North African and Italian experience behind them, the British in the Normandy
bridgehead faced off against the 1st SS Panzer Corps and a portion of LXXXVI Corps around
Caen. This examination of the GOODWOOD attack will show that the British still had significant
problems attacking a fortified position, even one smaller and in some ways weaker than the one
at El Alamein.
74 Alexander McKee, Caen : Anvil of Victory, quoted in Carlos D'Este, Decision In
Normandy
.
(New York: E.P. Dutton, 1983), 385.
75
Brigadier Williams, quoted in D'Este, Decision . 392. While the General's
comments are not exactly accurate, they do effectively convey the feelings of most people
about the GOODWOOD debacle.
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1. Terrain: A Stamping Ground for Armour
The terrain chosen for the attack covered a box roughly eighteen square miles in size.
This box stretches three miles east to west and six miles north to south and lies east and southeast
of the city of Caen. This area is open, rolling ground covered with small farming villages which
lay in a checkerboard pattern throughout, each lying about one mile from each of its neighbors.
Each of these villages, centered on a solidly built manorial farm, lies within thick orchards. The
overall plain, free of hedgerows and streams, leads to larger open ground to the southeast and is
bordered by industrial urban areas around Caen to the west and pastoral wooded high ground to
the east. Besides the villages, the most significant features are two railway lines, some portions
of which are on embankments, which cut across the battlefield running east to west.
Another decisive factor was the area the British chose as their assembly area. The 6th
Airborne Division held a salient across the Orne River northeast of Caen. To attack southward
into the open terrain, the British had to cross a parallel canal and river to mass inside this salient
and push southward. The bridges and area would limit the ability to mass. Since the Germans
held higher ground that allowed observation of this salient, surprise relied on not massing too
soon.
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An attack down the corridor was not therefore to be a stretch of easy motoring but a
complex navigation between strongpoints, overlooked at a distance by commanding heights,
natural or man-made, still in enemy hands. 77
76
For details on terrain and Montgomery's "stamping ground" comments, see D'Este,
Decision , 359, and John Keegan, Six Annies In Normandy
.
(New York: Viking, 1982),
191-193.
77 Keegan, Six Armies , 193.
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The Germans under General Heinrich Eberbach, commander of Panzer Group West,
arrayed themselves in four defensive belts ten miles in depth. The reserve counterattack force
comprised a Panther equipped battalion from the 1st SS Panzer Division (Leibstandarte Adolf
Hitler) and two battle groups of infantry and Tiger tanks from the 1 2th SS Panzer Division (Hitler
Jugend). Within the defensive belts, the Germans positioned two infantry divisions in the first belt
and two panzer grenadier regiments of the 21st Panzer Division occupied the second belt. The
series of twelve villages previously mentioned, each garrisoned with an infantry company equipped
with three or four antitank guns and six-barreled Nebelwerfer mortars, made up the third belt. This
author could not clearly ascertain the units in the fourth belt, and the counterattack force waited
behind all the belts. Within this entire fortified position, but not directly under ground
commanders, lay approximately eighty 88mm dual-purpose guns controlled by the 3rd Luftwaffe
Flak Corps™
Of even greater significance than the numbers was the quality of the defenders. These
units were some of the very best that Germany could field. These men considered themselves
Germans first and secondly as soldiers who owed loyalty to each other. Counterattack was the
basic defense and the loyalty to other soldiers enabled different troops to rapidly coalesce into
"battle groups", or kampfgruppen. 79 Although Rommel had been seriously wounded by British
78 For information regarding the Luftwaffe units in the area and British intelligence
regarding German dispositions, see Lewin, Ultra , 330-334.
' Bidwell, Firepower , 216. Bidwell provides an excellent concise description of the
intangible quality which played such a key role in German battlefield success.
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fighter-bombers on the 17th of July, these Germans knew what to do and did not need guidance
from higher officers. Arguably, the most significant individual facing the British that day was
Oberst (Colonel) Hans von Luck. He commanded a Battle Group of the 21st Panzer on the
eastern portion of the battlefield. At 33 years of age, he was already a veteran of the Polish,
French, Russian and North African campaigns. While obviously not all defenders rivalled Luck,
many were not too different, and Luck will appear again in the narrative portion.80
3. Attackers: On The Threshold of Great Events81
As before El Alamein, pressure mounted on the British to attack. Montgomery, now
commanding all British ground forces, knew that Eisenhower and Churchill were losing faith in
him after his slow movements since D-Day. Also, the strongest German forces lay opposite the
British and continued inaction would allow the Germans to deploy more strength against the
Americans in the south, who were about to try a breakthrough. Finally, British infantry losses
could no longer be replaced. The superb Commonwealth units had gone home to fight the
Japanese. The British had reached the bottom of the barrel and would soon start disbanding units
for fillers. Tanks, however, existed in plenty and more could always be made. 82
This attack into the Caen-Falaise plain would allow the British to fully use the 2,250
medium and 400 light tanks ashore. A large strike by bomber command on German strongpoints,
80 For succinct descriptions of the German defenses, see D'Este, Decision , 368-
377,Keegan, Six Armies . 211-213, and English, Infantry . 142.
81
Lieutenant Roden Orde of the 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment, on the eve of
GOODWOOD, quoted by Keegan, Six Armies . 193.
82 For an understanding of the pressure to attack, see Keegan, Six Armies , 189-193.
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combined with the tank strength, would preserve the scarce infantry. The plan called for the three
armored divisions, the 7th, the 11th and the Guards, to assemble in the small bridgehead across
the Orne and breakout southward immediately following the bombing strikes. General Dempsey,
the actual author of the plan, anticipated that a rapid advance on the heels of the shock from the
bombing would cut through the defenders and gain the open country towards Falaise.
Additionally, units on either flank would launch supporting attacks and the Canadians would finish
taking Caen, or what was left of it.83
4. Narrative
As the day dawned bright and clear on the 18th of July, 1944, hundreds of bombers
roared in at 0530 hours and hammered the German defenders. The air forces kept their bargain and
dropped nearly 10,800,000 pounds of bombs into their target areas. The strike, in tliree waves,
continued until after 0830 hours. Artillery and naval gunfire followed with a quarter of a million
rounds. This horrific pounding buried men and equipment, drove desperate men to suicide, and
left those men who lived and maintained coherence desperately digging out weapons clogged with
dirt to meet the attack they knew would follow. It would be a question of how fast the attackers
followed up.
At 0730, the first British armor obeyed the "Move Now" in their earphones and drove
forward through the lanes in the friendly minefields. Immediately, the advance began to string out
as the first tanks followed the rolling barrage and those in the rear could not deploy rapidly enough
to keep up. The advance continued but soon the defenders lucky enough to escape the worst
83 The overview of the tactical plan is paraphrased from D'Este, Decision , 354-359.
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shelling opened fire. Artillery, constrained to the west side of the Orne river, reached the limit
of its range. The attack continued as a finger, rather than a mailed fist for two terrible reasons.
First, the limited assembly area meant most of the armor had to cross the bridges over the Ome
canal and river (basically three routes). Then vehicles had to pass through the lanes of a British
minefield, through which the engineers had not been able to clear the desired number of lanes.
About 1 100 hours, the Germans announced that they still considered that section of France to
belong to them and defensive fire began to exact its toll. Many tanks came to ruin trying to get
through the few underpasses of the railroad embankments, which the defenders covered with direct
fire. By 1430 hours, the reserve from the Leibstandarte had moved up into sunken lanes and trees
to await the British moving up the slopes toward them.
The massive traffic jams at the bridges put units such as the 7th Armoured Division
hours behind schedule. The 7th had the mission to screen the British left (the eastern side of the
box) and its absence gave the German Tiger tanks around Emieville the chance to counterattack
into troops who thought their flanks were protected.
As the British tanks advanced, scattered Germans resisted. Oberst Von Luck of the 21st
Panzer, who had just returned from leave as the bombardment finished, scraped up the tanks and
guns he could find to fight. When a Luftwaffe officer stated that his untouched 88mm guns were




This incident is recounted by D'Este, Decision . 375, and Keegan, Six Armies . 206.
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As the tanks penetrated into the fortified villages, defenders hit them from all sides.
Most antitank weapons faced to the rear of the villages. Tank crewmen tended to orient only
forward and with the armor thin in the rear of the tanks, many vehicles fell victim to German
gunners.
By the end of the day, the attack had shot its bolt. British tanks could not match German
tanks in gun duels. Nearly two hundred British tanks were destroyed or damaged and fifteen
hundred infantrymen also were casualties. The fighting continued for two more days for no
significant change, and building to a final casualty list of over 5500 men. The Canadians took all
of Caen and the Germans suffered severe losses — approximately 109 tanks and half their antitank
guns — that they could ill afford. The attack failed to break through, but did keep pressure off the
Americans preparing their own major attack.86
5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling
Ultra provided some very detailed information, including divisional boundaries and
approximate locations of the 88mm guns opposite the British. 87 Since the stabilized front allowed
use of wire communications, electronic intelligence gathering suffered. No published sources this
author checked mentioned any ground reconnaissance before the attack. Some occurred in the
85
This all-around defense information comes from a lecture given by the British
Liaison Officer at the U.S. Army Armor School at Fort Knox, KY, to the author's Armor
Officer Advanced Course Class in October, 1986.
86
Details of the battle come primarily from D'Este, Decision , 369-385, and Keegan,
Six Armies , 200-219.
87 See Lewin, Ultra , 330-334. The Luftwaffe was very good about sending in
updates on strength and position by radio.
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sectors where units held the line, of course, but no deep patrols probed the defensive belts. Scouts
went in mounted just ahead of the other tanks.88
6. Obscuration/Smoke
The large concentrations of high explosive aerial bombs raised enormous quantities of
dust and dirt within the impact areas. This obscuration made little contribution to the attackers,
since any defenders that it might have screened were more effected by the blast and concussion.
The dust and smoke dissipated rapidly enough so that other defenders not suffering from the
bombardment lost little effectiveness from it. No accounts mention the use of screening smoke
from the artillery, although the units certainly needed it at the railway embankments.
7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation
This battle saw the virtual reverse of this relationship as it existed at El Alamein. In
GOODWOOD, the armor raced forth in splendid isolation from all other supporting arms. The
infantry, engaged in slowly clearing out built up areas close to the start line, never could give
much assistance. The British also had chosen not to mount their infantry in armored carriers,89
so it could not have moved rapidly with the tanks unless it rode on the tanks themselves. Much
of the blame lies in orders by Montgomery that first priority go to securing the flanks of the attack.
This forced early commitment of the infantry to the "dog-fight" of clearing parts of Caen and
88 See Keegan, Six Armies , 203-204. This point was stressed in the lecture to the
author, as well.
89 General O'Connor, the 8th Corps commander, had ordered that a number of self-
propelled armored gun carriers be transferred from the artillery to the infantry to become
armored personnel carriers. His unorthodox actions met howling and wailing. General
Dempsey, the 2nd Army commander ordered him to reverse the decision. The infantry




Infantry could have done well against the German annor in the
sunken roads and wooded areas where fighting took place later in the day. Tanks could also do
little against the guns within the fortified villages.
8. Engineers
Since the German defenses relied on direct fire, and had not the time nor resources to
sow thick minefields, British engineers did not play the major role they had at El AJamein. They
did not accompany the tanks forward and their greatest challenge was from a friendly minefield.
Up to three nights before GOODWOOD the 51st Division had been told to hold
defensively...the mines had been laid over a ten day period. ..both anti-personnel and anti-
tank mines; the area had been heavily shelled, resulting in some being detonated, buried
or displaced.. .it was futile; the best that could be done was to clear fourteen gaps the width
of a tank plus ten yards on either side, with three more being added at the last moment. 91
Engineers should have been forward in some strength to blow gaps in the railway embankments.
This would have required significant amounts of explosives, or infiltration the night before to begin
manual reduction. None of these options was practical within the given scheme of attack.
9. Artillery
Artillery lent significant support to the attack within the limits of the gun ranges. Since
the artillery had to stay on the west side of the river, it could not fire throughout the sector. The
traffic bottleneck kept it from moving up. This made the air support essential to replace the
artillery support.
90 For a discussion of Montgomery's caution and directives to O'Connor regarding priorities,
see D'Este, Decision , 373-389.




Comments by Field Marshal Lord Carver, then a lower ranking 4th Armoured Brigade
commander,give some excellent ideas on artillery employment and the basic weaknesses of British
tactics. While his comments do not directly relate to the artillery use in GOODWOOD, they are
very useful as an alternative technique.
The failure of our tactics.. .to deal with the German layout of defense was one of the
reasons for everything coming to a halt so soon. Our plans so often laid on an immense
fire-plan to carry the leading battalions about 1,000 yards into the enemy position. In fact,
as the Germans were always prepared to sacrifice their first line, not very strongly held,
but strongly enough to demand a proper attack, including mineclearing, this attack came
to a halt just on their main position. The immense fire-plan gave them warning and the
time to move up. ..tanks and SP anti-tank guns..."
Carver states that he argued to,
...get them to design the fire-plan to deal with the anti-tank gun defence primarily, leaving
it up to the tanks to get the infantry up. This involved a fire-plan in much greater depth
and no preliminary bombardment or barrage for the infantry. I was never successful...92
10. Air Support
For an operation planned and executed within forty hours, the air support of
GOODWOOD stands up well to examination. The strikes hit on time and on target. Planners
used delay fuzes to penetrate dugouts in some areas and percussion bombs to avoid cratering in
others to facilitate friendly movement. The target areas contained most of the fortified villages
and other obvious targets. Almost the only flaw was that the ground forces could not possibly
move rapidly in enough force to fully exploit the strikes because of the monumental traffic jams
at the bridges and the minefield.
92 Lord Carver's comments are quoted in D'Este, Decision , 290.
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attacks, although since many of them "brewed-up" along with other tanks some targets avoided air
attack. This close air support is critical, although sketchy accounts make evaluation of its
effectiveness here difficult. General O'Connor, 8th Corps commander requested another large
bombing strike by the "heavies" later in the day to rejuvenate the attack, but such an operation
could not be mounted so quickly.93
11. C2
The major failure in this attack came from not massing and following the bombardment
rapidly enough. If not for the poor choice of jumping-off sites which created a host of critical
problems, GOODWOOD could have been an excellent example of how to assault a fortified
position. Planners provided the portable firepower along with means to flexibly control it (FACs).
The comments by Lord Carver sum up relevant factors as well as this author can.
12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets
Diverting heavy bombers from the strategic role paid dividends. The units directly struck
suffered horribly and the technique enables massive force to be concentrated. Unfortunately, no
good means of controlling the strikes existed to fully utilize the capabilities. Also, no follow on
strikes occurred deeper in the sector. Air power such as this offers a tantalizing glimpse of what
could be possible if proper control mechanisms can be combined with flexible thinking. There is
no firepower more portable than that which is mounted on an aircraft. It could validate the
93
Information on air support comes from D'Este, Decision , 379. Keegan, Six Armies , 212-
213, relates the story of a forward ground controller with the 23rd Hussars who tried to use the
BBC frequency to get a request through after his tank was destroyed.
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concept that "fire-power...could be concentrated to such a degree that it was possible to burst
through any purely static defensive system and then keep on attacking and advancing."94
13. Historical Lessons
The British "...did not plan GOODWOOD as the breakout but. ..hoped that a breakthrough
might result."95 The plan covered the close in enemy, but did not really plan for success. A full
breakthrough would need infantry, if not to make it happen, at least to consolidate and hold gains.
It is not too far fetched to agree with the opinion that,
Unquestionably, Operation "Goodwood" failed for lack of sufficient British infantry,
without which fortified strongpoints could not be mopped up quickly enough or German
infiltrating counteractions prevented.96
The horrible traffic problem, which tends to be omnipresent in this type of attack, limited combat
power throughout.
A force attacking through a fortified position must fight throughout the entire depth of
the penetration. The Tigers which counterattacked in the east, Luck fighting with his bypassed
forces, and the rearward facing antitank weapons in the villages are indicative of the confused and
fluid nature of these fights. Commanders must anticipate this and allocate forces, and leaders,
throughout the area to deal with these bypassed forces effectively.
94
Bidwell, Firepower . 216.
95
British Directorate of Army Training, in a film about GOODWOOD, quoted in D'Este,
Decision , 396.
96
English, Infantry . 142.
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This battle again showed the criticality of all branches working together to complement
each other's strengths. Infantry cannot fight alone, nor can tanks. Such a mesh must occur at very
low levels. Artillery or mortars must also mesh, especially to deliver responsive smoke. Good
smokescreens on the flanks might have saved many tanks picked off in the open, and would have
made a penetration a more likely possibility.
51
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IV. THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE: INTO THE CAULDRON
Gentlemen, the enemy stands behind his entrenchments, armed to
the teeth. We must attack him and win, or else perish. Nobody
must think of getting through any other way. If you don't like this,
you may resign and go home.
Frederick The Great to his officers before the battle of
Leuthen, 5 December, 1757
A. KURSK
1. Terrain
Kursk lies generally in the central region of European Russia, roughly
equidistant from Moscow and the Crimea. The larger town of Orel lies to the north and
Belgorod lies south. Kiev is about 250 miles slightly southeast. The town of Kursk itself
lay at the base of a salient extending towards the west which remained after a previous
Soviet offensive during early 1943. The terrain itself generally consists of rolling hills
and large relatively flat areas. Vegetation is fairly sparse and small villages and towns
lie scattered across the land. In some places, the ground changes from gently rolling into
deep ravines which constrained movement in good weather and especially in bad weather.
In the southern sector,
The terrain, over which the advance was to take place, was a far-flung plain, broken
by numerous valleys, small copses, irregularly laid out villages, and some rivers and
brooks: of these the Pena ran with a swift current between steep banks. The ground
97 OKH Operations Order No. 6, dtd 15 April 1943, para 2d. Quoted by Geoffrey Jukes,
Kursk: The Clash of Armour (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), 38. Sources differ in exact
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Figure 3: The Kursk Salient (See Campaign Atlas to the Second World War: Europe
and the Mediterranean (West Point, NY: USMA Department of History, 1980), Map
27.)
53
rose slightly to the north, thus favoring the defender. Roads consisted of tracks
through the sand and became impassable for all motor transport during rain. Large
cornfields covered the landscape and made visibility difficult.98
Thunderstorms the night of 4 July flooded streams and made these ravines virtually
impassable seas of mud for a significant period."
2. Defenders
The Soviets knew an attack would come against the Kursk salient and prepared
the strongest fortified position in history to meet it. They planned to make history by
stopping "...a German strategic offensive before it had achieved tactical or operational
success."
100 By 1943, German attacks had taught the Soviets many valuable lessons
concerning defensive preparations and tactics. Soviet tactical defenses assumed the nature
of dense, deeply echeloned trench systems which sheltered infantry and allowed
repositioning of forces and weapons. Depth replaced width as the key consideration.
German armor comprised the greatest threat and the Soviets took several measures to
combat it.
Antitank strongpoints (ATSPs) and antitank regions (ATRs) integrated antitank fire
and the fire of infantry and artillery cloaked within the protection of engineer
defenses. The ATSPs were formed in company defensive regions and combined
their fires with those of rifle company heavy weapons and antitank rifles. An
98 Major General Friedrich Wilhelm Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study of the
Employment of Armor in the Second World War (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,
1956), 218-219.
99 For one of many sources mentioning the rain and the ravines, see Martin Caidin, The Tigers
Are Burning (New York: Hawthorn, 1974), 165.
100 Colonel David M. Glantz, Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk. July 1943 . CSI Report No.
11 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1986), 25.
54
ATSP normally consisted of four to six antitank guns, six to nine antitank rifles.
two to tliree heavy machine guns, and three to four light machine guns. Troops
with automatic weapons and sappers with antitank mines supported the antitank
gunners of each strongpoint. 101
Armored and self-propelled gun reserves conducted local counterattacks or deployed as
firing points to bolster sectors. Mobile obstacle detachments of engineers laid hasty
minefields during fighting in response to changing situations. Divisions defended
frontages of six to nine kilometers in width. This meant tactical densities of "... .7 to 1.5
rifle battalions, 18 to 30 guns and mortars, and 2 to 4 tanks per kilometer of front.""72
Detailed citation of unit strengths, guns, mines and the like overwhelms a
reader with a mass of data. This author will attempt to highlight key points of the
defensive works within some manageable context. Two Soviet Army Groups defended
the 550 kilometer long front line of the salient itself. The Steppe Army Group deployed
behind these two and gave the entire position a depth from west to east of 250 to 300
kilometers. Overall strengths of combat and support forces approached 1,910,000 men.
28,320 guns and mortars, 4930 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 2,650 aircraft. The
Soviets planned to first stop the German breakthrough through attrition and then launch
a major counterattack.
In fact, Soviet planners integrated two planned counterstrokes into their strategic
defensive plans. The first would occur against Gennan forces in the Orel salient
north of Kursk while the Gennan offensive was still in progress. The second would
101 Glantz, Soviet Tactics , 23. Note the large number of antitank rifles, which had little effect.
102
This description of Soviet defensive style is paraphrased from Glantz, Soviet Tactics . 12-13.
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strike German forces south of Kursk once the German advance in that region had
stalled.
103
This analysis will concentrate on the portion of the southern flank defended
by the XXIII Guards Rifle Corps where the decisive actions took place. Here,
The main defensive area, about 20 kilometers deep, was arranged in two fortified
zones, each five to seven kilometers deep, the two zones separated by about five
kilometers. Each fortified zone contained three successive defensive positions.
Each of these positions had two or three lines of trenches, as well as minefields,
antitank ditches, pillboxes, bunkers, and barbed wire obstacles. The first position
of the first zone probably constituted the strongest part of the main defensive area.
Behind the main defensive area, for a depth of about 15 kilometers, obstacle centers
were built. Covering from two to five kilometers each, these were placed in areas
most vulnerable to potential Gennan penetrations.' 04
After the third defensive line came and went, a common German comment was
"Goddamn it, how many do they have?" 105
Mines played a large role in the defense, but most accounts are very unclear
and lead the reader to believe that every square foot of open Soviet soil contained a mine.
...an average density in the most vulnerable areas of 1,500 antitank and 2,000
antipersonnel mines per kilometer of frontage. The mines were laid six to ten
meters apart in irregular rows 15 to 40 meters apart, to a depth of at least 100
103
Glantz, Soviet Tactics , 29.
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Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), The Value of Field Fortifications
in Modem Warfare Volume 1. (Dunn Loring, VA: HERO, 1979), 23.
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First person material concerning the German combat troops at Kursk and the 2d SS Panzer
Grenadier Division Das Reich overall comes from interviews this author conducted by phone and
tape with Mr. Arnold Friesen. Mr. Friesen fought at Kursk as a 17 year old Oberjunker (SS
Officer Candidate) Tiger tank platoon leader. Officer Candidates had to prove themselves in
combat prior to commissioning. All subsequent references will be cited as Friesen, Interview and
the date the topic was discussed. Thus, this citation is Friesen, Interview, 30 Nov 90 and 23 Feb
91.
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meters apart in irregular rows 15 to 40 meters apart, to a depth of at least 100
meters. A continuous antipersonnel minefield was laid in front of the first line of
defense, and antitank mines and other tank obstacles were laid along segments of
roads and all bridges. ,06
Thus, in the heaviest mine densities, a sector one kilometer wide by twenty kilometers
deep might have an average mine density as low as one mine every 33 square yards or
as high as one every 8 square yards. Even this is not quite correct, since the defenders
laid the mines in certain areas and not uniformly throughout the entire defensive sector.
3. Attackers: Cold Blood and Warm Underwear 107
Gennans relied on the high quality of their leadership, especially at lower
levels, and training coupled with the adaptability of their soldiers to retain the critical
edge over the Soviets. In fact,
The Gennans couldn't afford not to train (and train well) their soldiers. All that
was standing between Gennany and the massive armies of Russia was a thin grey
line of well trained soldiers. 108
This reliance on training paid great rewards but exacted a high price as well.
German units as far down as the platoon level were equipped with a multiplicity of
different weapons. This gave these units much greater flexibility, although such
106
Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) Historical Evaluation of Barrier
Effectiveness (Dunn Loring, VA: HERO, 1974), 112.
The title of this section comes from a phrase Friesen's Platoon Sergeant used to describe
necessary characteristics of a tank commander. Friesen, Interview, 30 Nov 90.
108 James F. Dunnigan, The Russian Front: Gennany 's War in the East, 1941-1945 (London:
Arms and Armour Press, 1978), 111.
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units took much longer to train and required much better educated individuals and
more highly trained instructors to begin with. 109
In the summer of 1943, the Russo-German conflict was still too close to call. On the
offensive, the Gentians had never really been defeated, especially in their summer
offensives, but the victories alone could not guarantee overall success, and ultimately,
The German Army would die in Russia-die of neglect in those vast open spaces that
had earlier devoured other famed invading armies. Unlike other armies, however,
it would not disintegrate, but rather slowly bleed to death after winning a series of
spectacular mobile victories..."""
The fighting at Kursk actually saw the Gentians break through the formidable defenses
in places. This study will concentrate primarily on the 2d SS Panzer Grenadier Division
Das Reich 1 u and the southern pincer of the German offensive.
The Soviet Winter offensive of 1942-43 left the front lines in open country and
gave the Germans no river line to anchor their defenses upon. The Gentian High
Command also expected the Soviets to launch another offensive later that summer out of
the Kursk salient. To forestall this offensive and to gain more suitable terrain, the
109 Dunnigan, Russian Front , 136. One facet of this style manifested itself in selecting men
for military specialties based upon civilian experience. Mechanics became either mechanics or
tank drivers. Men with some electronic aptitude became radio operators. Friesen, Interview, 14
Nov 90.
110
S.J. Lewis, Forgotten Legions: German Army Infantry Policy 1918-1941 (New York:
Praeger, 1985), 128.
111 Das Reich (and its sister units) was a Panzer Grenadier unit from November 1942 until
January 1944, when it was designated a Panzer Division. Friesen, Interview, 5 Mar 91.
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The objective of this offensive is to encircle enemy forces deployed in the Kursk
area by means of an extremely concentrated thrust conducted mercilessly and
swiftly by one assault army each from the areas of Belgorod and south of Orel, to
annihilate the enemy in a concentric attack. In the course of this offensive, a
shortened new front which will save strength will be gained... 113
A large pail of the power of the southern pincer lay in the 2d SS Panzer Corps
made up of three SS divisions. The 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Division Leibstandarte
Adolf Hitler (LAN) took the left and tied in with the 48th Panzer Corps. The 2d SS
Panzer Grenadier Division Das Reich, which made the deepest gains of the battle, fought
in the center. On the right, 3d SS Panzer Grenadier Division Totenkopf tied into Armee
Abteilung Kempf (Army Detachment Kempf), which itself fonned the right flank of the
Gennan attack.
A detailed knowledge of the Das Reich's composition will facilitate
understanding of later sections. The division took its name from the SS Panzer Regiment
#2 Das Reich, the one tank regiment in the division. The other two regiments were
panzer grenadier units: Regiment Deutschland (SSD) and Regiment Der Feuhrer (DF).
SS Artillery Regiment #2, one Aufklarungs (reconnaissance) battalion, one Kratschutzcn
112 General Theodor Busse, et al., "Zitadelle (Operation Citadel), Fourth Panzer Amiy Attack.
July, 1943", in World War II Gennan Military Studies , Volume 16, Part VH. (New York: Garland
Publishing, 1979), 64.
113 OKH Operation Order No. 6, quoted by Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Operation "Citadel": Kursk
and Orel: The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War , transl. by Michaela Nierhaus
(Novato, CA:Presidio, 1987), 41-42.
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(motorcycle) battalion and one Pioniere (engineer) regiment made up the bulk of rest of
the division. Other units of the division were the signal battalion, the antiaircraft battalion
and the antitank battalion. The engineers normally broke down with one battalion to each
regiment.
Each infantry regiment had 12 companies (four per battalion). Some situations
saw a regiment strengthened up to 16 companies. The 13th company would be a
sturmgeschiitz (assault gun) unit. The 14th and 15th were heavy duty SPWs (Shiitzen
Panzer Wagon) armored personnel carriers. The 16th might have been an engineer
company. Each battalion also normally had one Pakshutzen (antitank gun) company.
Three abteilungs (battalions) of four companies each comprised the Panzer
Regiment. The 1st and the 2d battalions had Mark IVs (even some Mark Ills in the 2d)
and the 3d battalion had assault guns. This last battalion always supported the infantry.
The regiment also had a 13th company of Tiger tanks." 4
4. Narrative: The Swan-Song of the German Armored Force115
German planning for the offensive began in April of 1943. Originally
considered for March, the start date continually slipped back. At first, the muddy
conditions forced the postponement. Later, Hitler decided to delay the operation to build
up tank strength and await the arrival of Panther and Tiger tanks and the Ferdinand or
Elephant assault guns. The Soviets, warned both by intelligence within Germany from
1.4
Friesen, Interview, 23 Feb 91.
1.5 Soviet Marshal Koniev, quoted by Mellenthin, Panzer Battles , 230.
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a spy code named "Lucy" (or possibly from Ultra) and direct observation strengthened
defenses. The Gennan forces in North Africa surrendered in May and Hitler's fears of
rapid Allied invasion coupled with the growing Soviet strength again forced a
postponement. Finally, Hitler set 5 July. 1943 as the start date of the offensive.
In the south, Soviet occupied high ground denied the attackers good
observation posts for artillery observers. To rectify this, the Germans attacked on the
afternoon of 4 July to seize the limited objective of this high ground. The
Grossdeutschland Division and the 3d Panzer Division did most of this fighting, aided by
800 aircraft. Soviet aircraft also made attacks against German ground units. The
combination of good attackers and weak defensive outposts insured success by late
evening and gave German forward observers good locations to observe fires on the main
Soviet lines of defense. Torrential rainstorms slowed movement and occupation of
forward assembly areas.
At 2300 hours on the night of 4 July, several platoons of combat engineers and
selected stosstruppen (assault detachments) from the 3d battalion of the Regiment
Deutschland (SSD) infiltrated forward and began to reduce defensive outposts. Most units
across the front used some version of infiltration tactics." 6 Engineers also began
clearing lanes in minefields. Many accounts mention the capture of some German
engineers and claim one corporal gave away the exact time of the attack which prompted
116
In the Grossdeutschland, infantry infiltrated forward to engage defensive positions in
conjunction with the lead waves of the attack. For an account of this, see Guy Sajer, The
Forgotten Soldier (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); reprint, London: Sphere Books, 1985, 209-
228 (page references are to reprint editions).
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a heavy Soviet artillery barrage on forward assembly areas. Almost every source
consulted disagrees as to the effect and even length of this fire. In the Das Reich sector,
many troops were already deep into the Soviet positions and thus escaped this fire. The
daily log of the XLVIII Panzer Corps noted Soviet artillery fire fell on forward positions
all night and some ground combat still continued all night as well. While Soviet sources
and some others claim that the Soviet fire delayed the attack for several hours, unit
records show no such effect. This author believes that most authors ignore the infiltration
and dismounted attacks, considering the attack to commence only when artillery
concentrations fall and main units move out.
Sources also disagree on the exact start of the main German attack on 5 July.
Unit reports indicate that the 2d SS Panzer Corps jumped off at 0430. The
Grossdeutschland and the 3d Panzer Division of XLVHI Corps jumped off at 0500.
Generally, after a two hour preparatory fire, the main German units jumped off to pass
through the stosstruppcn and the lanes cleared by engineers through minefields. Progress
across the front varied with terrain and the strength of the defenses. Within the SS
Panzer Corps sector, units made deep penetrations, aided by strong air support. The
northern pincer fared less well throughout the entire battle.
For seven days, the Germans slugged their way forward through the Soviet
defensive lines. Engineers and infantry went forward under cover of darkness to clear
mines when possible. During the day, tanks led the attack with mounted infantry offering
close support. The main thrust of the 2d SS Panzer Corps angled northeast, countering
Soviet expectations of a strike directly northwards and avoiding the strongest positions.
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On the first day, the Voronezh Front moved up the 1st Tank Army and a reserve Rifle
Corps to stiffen the defense. By the 12th of July, despite heavy casualties and losses of
materiel, the Germans stood poised to break through the defensive positions and shift over
to a more mobile battle. Soviet armored reserves of the 5th Guards Tank Amiy met the
advancing German troops around Prokorovka and so began the largest tank battle in
history. Losses on both sides mounted rapidly.
Other factors added into the equation. North of the Kursk salient, the Soviets
launched an offensive that threatened the rear of the northern pincer by driving towards
Orel. Earlier, on the 10th of July, Allied forces had landed in Sicily. Fighting continued
with most Germans of all ranks convinced victory was in their grasp. Finally, on 17 July
Hitler ordered the SS Panzer Corps pulled out to meet other threats and also pulled out
other armored units. This ended Operation CITADEL. The Soviets retained the
battlefield and thus German tank losses were severe, since many damaged tanks could not
be recovered for repair." 7
5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling
The location of the German 1943 Summer offensive ranks among the worst
kept secrets of all time. As early as 8 April Marshal Zhukov advised Stalin that the first
German effort would be to reduce the Kursk salient. Considering that the Feuher's order
117 For various accounts of the overall fighting, consult Dunnigan, Russian Front , 45-49,
German Military Studies , 68-81. Piekalkiewicz, Citadel , 136-215, Mellenthin, Panzer Battles , 219-
240, Jukes, Kursk , 45, and Friesen, Interview, 28 December 1990. For citations of unit records,
an excellent source is Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, A Study of Breakthrough
Operations (Dunn Loring . VA: Historical Evaluation and Research Organization. 1976). 122-123.
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cited earlier was dated 15 April, note the following passage from a Soviet report dated
12 April 1943.
The enemy's objective is to strike concentric blows from the Belgorod area to the
northeast and from the Orel area to the southeast and encircle our troops positioned
west of the Belgorod-Kursk line.. .most likely in the final days of May. 118
With large forces in close proximity to each other for long periods of time,
both sides engaged in detailed reconnaissance efforts. While this offered obvious
advantages, the long preparation period gave away any real chance at total surprise. The
scouting efforts took many forms. Aerial photography provided pictures of virtually every
foot of frontage. Both sides conducted such activity and both sides took countermeasures.
Some sources claim the Soviets dug up to 1,000 kilometers of false trenches, constructed
13 dummy airfields and took other measures. General Von Mellenthin acknowledges the
Germans underestimated Soviet strength. German countermeasures included making most
major moves at night before the battle. Throughout the war, German staffs planned and
physically monitored such movements and took great pains to insure smooth execution
thereof.
,,q
The Germans went to great lengths to gather detailed information on the
ground.
The Germans gave battlefield reconnaissance a much higher priority than did any
of the armies they faced. From the beginning they organized and trained special
118
Piekalkiewicz, Citadel , 40.
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Mellenthin, Panzer Battles , 219, Dunnigan, Russian Front , 47, Piekalkiewicz, Citadel , 40
and 81.
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reconnaissance units. ..The Germans believed in fighting for information. Thus, the
reconnaissance unit was not only very mobile and well-equipped, but also very
heavily armed. 120
These aufkldrungs battalions included eight -wheeled vehicles (Panzerspahwageri) which
could travel up to 60 miles per hour on roads and had a driver at both ends to get in and
out of trouble rapidly. Units also had motorcycles with sidecars. These sidecars had
driveshafts of their own to increase mobility through rough or plowed ground.
Units in the line constantly sent out small patrols to gather the scraps of
information that unit intelligence officers could weave together into the mosaic that would
guide detailed tactical planning and save lives. Previous experience taught the scouts
where the Soviets would probably position their forces. Scouts set up observation posts
and might lie in position for 24-48 hours observing minefields being laid or similar
activity. These so-called spah troops went out in squad size or less. Interrogation of
civilians offered other infonnation of varying quality. The Soviet deserters (Hilfswillinge)
who served the Gennans aided in deeper scouting as well as listening in on Soviet
communications. These Hi-Wis went up to 10-20 kilometers deep for 3-5 days to bring
back infonnation. Such men could pose as civilians or soldiers and could easily be
replaced when they failed to return. 121
120
Dunnigan, Russian Front , 129.
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Details of ground reconnaissance efforts come from Friesen, Interviews. 30 Nov 90, 14
Dec 90 and 28 Dec 90.
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6. Obscuration/Use of Smoke
Published accounts do not mention smoke employment and do not give night
operations their due. While details will be covered in other sections, one should note that
the main attack began shortly before midnight with major infiltration. This allowed
assault troops and engineers to subdue outposts and clear gaps {gasse, literally alleys or
lanes) in minefields under cover of darkness. Here, one should bear in mind that first
light during the Soviet summer came at around 0315, so attackers had little time to work
under cover of darkness. The subsequent jump off time was between 0430 and 0500 after
two hours of artillery fire.
The regular troops loved smoke and used it whenever possible. The 2d SS
Panzer Corps attached Nebelweifer (literally, fog-thrower) Regiments 1 and 55 to Das
Reich. Soldiers loved these multi-barreled rocket launchers which threw 150mm smoke
or high explosive shells a distance of roughly seven kilometers onto the enemy positions.
"The most important deal is to smoke the enemy... [and] they [Nebelweifers] took care of
everything, I can assure you." Standard procedure in the Division Das Reich was to put
smoke directly on the enemy and allow it to lift just as the attacking units arrived on top
of them. Tank commanders also carried many smoke grenades to throw for local
screening as needed. 122
Details of tactical smoke employment and equipment come from Friesen, Interview, 28
Dec 90. Information on first light during the batde and other information can be found in John
Lucas, Germany's Elite Panzer Force: Grossdeutschland (London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1978),
69-70. The Nebelweifer barrages produced such rapid variations in air pressure with HE warheads
that many Soviets died of internal injuries alone. Details of the Nebelweifer' s design and history
comes from James Lucas, War on The Eastern Front 1941-1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 1980),
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7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation
The German Army of 1943 employed tactics well grounded in theory and
practice. Contrary to the popular image of the German Army being virtually flawless
from the beginning to the end of the war, German officers ruthlessly examined
perfonnance early in the war and instituted needed improvements. Interestingly, many
of the disparaging comments about U.S. forces are almost exact quotes of comments
about some German units during the Polish and French campaigns. Many German
officers studied their victorious campaigns quite critically and had time to institute
improved training. In fact, many observations concerned assaulting prepared positions
and movement control. Realistic training improved this performance until later wartime
records universally cite these as significant strengths. The cohesion of units and the
Gennan style of leaving officers with their men in the units rather than rapidly shifting
from line to staff as some armies did aided these training improvements. ,2?
While many refinements occurred over the course of the war, the basic
techniques stayed remarkably constant. For instance, in France, infantry learned that
attacking fortified positions required special equipment such as explosives, grenades and
automatic weapons. A reader who examines the composition and employment of assault
161-175.
123 For examples of these weaknesses and improvements, see Lewis. Gennan Infantry , 90-1 1
1
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detachments used near Leningrad in 1941 124 will see virtually identical accounts from
Kursk in 1943.
Assault detachments normally are composed of infantry with engineers attached.
A typical assault detachment consists of the following: one officer; obstacle clearing
party, consisting of two to six men for each lane to be cleared, equipped with small
arms, wire-cutters, and bangalore torpedoes and other explosives; embrasure-blasting
party consisting of three or four men equipped with grenades and demolitions or
pole charges. This party may also include, though it may work independently, a
flame-thrower party, consisting nonnally of two men; covering parties, normally
two or three parties of varying size from three men with one light machine gun to
full platoons; smoke party consisting of two or three men equipped with smoke
candles or grenades; supply party, carrying reserves of equipment and ammunition,
their strength depending upon the size of the assault detachment. 125
These basic techniques of infantry and engineer cooperation cleared the way for the armor
to follow. Thus, while not strictly tank-infantry cooperation, the infiltration of assault
detachments during the night preceding a tank-infantry assault was a critical prerequisite.
Within the 2d SS Panzer Grenadier Division Das Reich, the schwerpunkt (main
effort) of the attack was given to the SSD. Obersturmbahnfuerher Harmel designated the
3d Battalion as the main effort within the SSD. Beginning at 2300 hours on 4 July,
specially selected infantry platoons augmented with engineers carrying heavy, medium
and light flamethrowers moved forward to engage Soviet outposts. Master Sergeants led
124 See Commander, 3d Battalion, 490th Infantry, "Attack on Fortified Positions. Rolling up
of the Outer Ring of Leningrad," Small Unit Tactics , MS#P-060a, 80-130, HeUmuth Reinhardt,
"Defense of a Dominating Height by a Russian Company," Small Unit Tactics: Infantry Part 1,
MS#P-060d, 18-24. These documents are held on file at the U.S. Anny Military History Institute
at Carlisle Barracks, PA. Also see "German Surprise Attack by Night," Night Combat DA
Pamphlet No. 20-236 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1953), 30-31.
125
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most of these detachments and infiltrated across frontages of several hundred yards to fall
upon defenders suddenly out of the darkness. Within four hours, some detachments had
penetrated 4-5 kilometers into Soviet positions. The destruction of these outposts allowed
engineers to work free from defenders' interference.
In the main attack, tanks formed the first wave and led the attack. Tank
companies usually used a standard wedge formation or on occasion a "blunt wedge"
which corresponds to the current U.S. "vee" formation. The extreme flexibility and many
tactical reorganizations during a given day meant that no one formation saw use every
battle. Individual tanks usually maintained 50 meter intervals between themselves and
often had a few infantrymen riding on the back deck of each vehicle. Panzer grenadiers
followed about 150 meters behind in their SPWs. Each of these SPWs carried some kind
of armament such as a mortar, flamethrower or 37mm cannon in addition to an infantry
squad. An average attack had equal numbers of tanks and SPWs with a battalion frontage
of 1,000-2,000 meters in breakthrough sectors. Leaders stressed speed and continued
movement.
Luckily, the low level of training in the hastily raised Soviet units usually
meant that their first antitank rounds fell short. Gennan tank commanders regularly
practiced range estimation and suppressive fire of machine guns and high explosive tank
main gun rounds usually fell accurately and quickly. If possible, tanks rolled right over
or by Soviet defensive strongpoints and engaged the next line of defense. When engaging
enemy armor, tank units used a cross fire pattern so that rounds hit enemy flanks rather
than the thick frontal armor. About one third of the infantry accompanying the attack
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would dismount and spend no more than 10-15 minutes assaulting the positions. The
firepower of SPW mounted flamethrowers and the like helped achieve fire superiority
rapidly and infantry squads carried machine guns and explosives. The tanks and
remaining infantry continued to move and these assaulting infantry later rejoined the rest
of the force. If the attack ran out of infantry because of the number of positions
encountered, the tanks would wait, continually shifting around and watching for antitank
guns and close assaulting Soviet infantry. 126
8. Engineers: The Most Dangerous Job in the German Army
Other combat troops bestowed high accolades upon the Sturm Pioniere (assault
engineers). As noted earlier, engineer detachments armed with flamethrowers and
demolitions played a critical role in the initial attacks. German assault detachments
tended to contain between 8-35 men, usually with two flamethrowers and other engineer
support (hollow charges or bangalore torpedoes) as necessary. The heavy German
emphasis on assault detachments has made written research material plentiful, but
There are hardly any photographs of assault detachments in action...The task was
too important and too dangerous, an accompanying war-correspondent or only a
camera taken along could endanger the comrades and even the whole operation. 127
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Details of tactical formations and equipment come mainly from Friesen, Interviews, 30
Nov 90, 28 Dec 90, and 23 Feb 91 as well as from United States War Department, Handbook on
German Military Forces , TM-E 30-451 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. War Department, 1945), IV-9
through IY-13.
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Since an earlier section of this chapter discussed the key engineer role during infiltration
attacks, this section will concentrate on other engineer roles.
Close behind the assault detachments the first night came engineer teams to
lift mines. This occurred each night, so often the engineers operated without as much
protection and clashed with Soviet patrols in the darkness. These engineers used mine
detectors and manual probing to detect mines for picking up or blowing in place. Once
they considered a lane cleared, engineers marked it with colored flags placed every few
meters on both sides of the lane. Some tanks had rollers mounted on them and these
vehicles "proofed" the lanes when possible. At times, engineers simply marked mines
with flags and follow on forces weaved through the minefields. One key factor in
choosing the main attack's jump-off time was to allow attacking troops to spot mines and
avoid them. No narratives mention the infantry having serious problems with mines.
During the build-up, thorough training took place so that soldiers could spot tell-tale signs
of mine positions. This training helped overcome the fear of mines that make up so much
of the effectiveness of mines.
Other mine countenneasures existed besides the engineers manually clearing
them. The Soviets developed certain habits concerning where they laid mines and with
experience many Germans could apparently discern these locations and avoid them. Units
such as the Das Reich avoided choke points and similar areas and seemingly did not
suffer greatly from mines. Not all minefields stood out, especially older ones in tall
grass. One minefield did stop the unit for several hours on the second day until engineers
could move up and clear lanes under protection of the infantry. When engineers could
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not go forward or speed was critical, the Germans directed heavy artillery concentrations
directly onto the minefields. Such techniques also gave the infantry a lot of shell holes
to use for concealment while moving forward. 128
9. Artillery
German artillery used several different techniques to support attacks. Often,
ground commanders preferred to rely on surprise and avoided preparatory fires. Another
tactic was to wait until assault troops arrived at their jump off points and called for the
fires to begin. When this call came through, the first rounds fell on the defensive
positions to cover initial forward movement. Then fires shifted to counterbattery
missions. One item of note is that the Germans did not employ artillery in the direct fire
mode as other armies did because the German infantry units already had heavy caliber
"infantry guns" organic to infantry units to do precisely that. Other artillery pieces could
still use direct fire and did at Kursk, but "infantry guns" gave the Gennans more
responsive direct fire than others could achieve.
Faced with the denser defenses at Kursk, the Germans massed large numbers
of guns to support the breakthrough, concentrating their fires on main positions and
enemy guns, rather than the lightly held outposts, which fell to infiltration. First priority
of artillery fire went to countering defending antitank weapons, along with emphasis on
128 Most of the information in this section was gleaned from Friesen, Interviews, 30 Nov 90
and 28 Dec 90. Corroboration concerning experience in spotting mines is found in Office of the
Chief of Military History, Military Improvisation During the Russian Campaign , DA PAM 20-201
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Anny, 19510, 17-19 and Pioniere , 125-131. For general
discussion of engineers, see Caidin, Tigers , 191, and Dunnigan, Russian Front , 131. Use of shell
holes for cover is discussed in War Dept., Handbook , IV-18.
72
counterbattery fires and smoke missions. To provide rapid response to forward ground
elements, each company in the breakthrough sector had a Vorgeschobene Beohaehter,
(forward observer) commonly known just as the VB. Each VB spoke directly to one
batter}', instead of through a fire direction center. Procedures existed to mass all fires if
higher commanders deemed it necessary. 12 ''
A Luftwaffe Flak division took part in the attack as regular artillery. Many of
the guns used direct fire to destroy defensive positions. Lighter Flak guns poured forth
torrents of tracers which took a heavy psychological toll of defenders as well. As enemy
artillery opened fire, heavier weapons switched to counterbattery fire. 130
10. Air Support
During the fighting across the Kursk salient, neither side established total air
superiority. Basically each side achieved parity overall and local superiority only for brief
periods. German tactical air support nevertheless played a critical role in the German
success at breaking through the actual fortified positions. All participants cite the key
role of Stuka dive-bombers. No other armies employed dive-bombers to this author's
knowledge, and no other armies received as much assistance from their air units as did
the Germans. This would tend to indicate that precision in placing the ordnance is more
important than amounts of ordnance.
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For more detail on German artillery methods, see Toppe, Night Combat . 9-11, War Dept.
Handbook , IV-13 to IV-19, and Friesen, Interviews, 30 Nov 90 and 28 Dec 90.




As early as 0300 on 5 July, Soviet aircraft attempted a surprise knockout blow
against German airfields the Soviets hoped to find crowded with loaded aircraft. German
Freya radar picked up the approaching attack and a rapid German reaction averted
disaster. German fighters even claimed 432 kills for that entire day. Soviet aircraft did
not disappear from the skies, however. With priority of the German Luftflotte 4 (4th Air
Force) effort supporting the schwerpunkt of the 2d SS Panzer Corps, other units attracted
Soviet attention. In late morning, Soviet aircraft struck concentrations of tanks and
infantry as well as the Division Command Post of the Division Grossdeutschland with
significant effect. 131
One reason for the good German air support is that each company in the
breakthrough sectors had a Flieger Verbindungs Offizier (Forward Air Controller) known
as a Flivo. These controllers, Luftwaffe lieutenants or sergeants at company level and
Captains at regimental level called in close air support within several hundred meters of
forward troops. They arrived at the ground units in kubelwagen (jeeps) and so usually
rode into battle in someone's tank and carried their radio with them to communicate with
the pilots. The Division Das Reich received good support throughout the battle, despite
shifting priorities. Even though Soviet aircraft got through on the third day and inflicted
serious losses, relations between the tankers and the air forces remained good. Part of
131 For details, see HERO, Breakthrough , 124. This document contains almost 100 pages *of
unit daily reports. It shows that the Division Grossdeutschland and the U.S. 30th Infantry Division
shared hard luck at the hands of friendly air attacks. The Germans also caught it from allied
aircraft, too.
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this is explained by the lack of fratricide from the Luftwaffe against the SS troops, unlike
the luck of some other units.
Primarily, Sfukas operated against defensive artillery units when possible,
recognizing the great threat these units posed. (Artillery caused 45% of casualties on the
Eastern Front, with heavy infantry weapons next at 35%.) In this mode, aircraft flew to
general sectors and attacked guns as they opened fire. This style of "close enough" air
support worked well. Many Stukas armed with 37mm cannon under each wing sought
out Soviet armored units moving up and engaged in "tank-busting" with great effect. On
8 July, air power alone knocked an entire Soviet tank brigade out of action before it could
hit an unsuspecting Das Reich in the flank. Aerial scouting missions also helped screen
flanks and give commanders much needed intelligence. 132
11. C2: The Nerves of an Army 133
German command and control decentralized decision making to lower levels
than other armies. This 'tactical' orientation differed from others, such as American.
Such an outlook explains the loose control of artillery and air assets noted previously.
132 For further information on Gennan and Soviet air operations, see Caidin, Tigers , 201, Von
Mellenthin, Panzer Battles
, 225, Piekalkiewicz, Citadel , 136, Busse, Gennan Military Studies , 78-
79, Dunnigan, Russian Front , 48-49 and 146, and Major Kerry Pierce, Kursk: A Study in
Operational Art (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1987), 22-23.
Details of Flivos and similar data comes from Friesen Interviews, 30 Nov 90, 14 Dec 90 and 28
Dec 90. Interesting readings of questionable exactness can be found in Paul Carell, Scorched
Earth: The Russian-German War, 1943-1944 , translated by Ewald Osers (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1970), 61-66. While Carell's writings are excellent first hand accounts, this author
does not feel Carell checked these stories closely enough for them to be used alone for academic
research.
133 Dunnigan, Russian Front , 136.
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Such an outlook explains the loose control of artillery and air assets noted previously.
One reason this system existed was that the entire overall German system supported it.
Two short examples will illustrate this point.
Officers of more junior ranks did not rotate between troop positions and staff
positions. Officers also went through a very long commissioning process. Arnold Friesen
became a Tiger tank platoon leader before Kursk at the age of 17 as an SS Officer
Candidate. He finished the war as a 1st Lieutenant two years later and never left his unit
except for some additional training. One must also recognize that Non-Commissioned
Officers filled many key tactical leadership positions. Units stressed cohesion to an
extreme degree. Tank crews remained together, period. If a man suffered wounds, a
filler from a pool kept within the unit took his place until the original man returned to his
original position. Sometimes losses required breaking up crews but this was avoided
when possible. The cohesion and experience at lower tactical levels facilitated the
repeated task organizing to meet various situations that characterized good German units.
Constant training occurred.
The training of leadership went hand-in-hand with the training of troops...Officers
and non-commissioned officers of all ranks were trained for the attack by means of
sand table exercises, map exercises, and terrain tactical orientation meetings. 134
Interestingly, this high amount of low level tactical initiative existed along with
some very centralized planning and control. The assembly of attacking forces preceding
134
Busse, German Military Studies , 67.
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the attack occurred over several nights of very short periods of darkness. Note the
following considerations,
The movement of large numbers of troops into an assembly area during a single
night requires meticulous timing and rigid traffic regulation. It is advisable to
control these movements by a special staff having the authority to regulate the
traffic and sufficient traffic control personnel at its disposal. A dense
communications network, including fully operational control points, should be
established along the approach routes to guarantee the smooth flow of movements.
Approach routes should be marked with luminous signs. Delays caused by broken
down vehicles will be avoided if POL dumps and recovery elements are placed
along the approach routes and if detour routes are designated in advance. 135
Other C2 factors included marking convoys with numbered panels to facilitate monitoring
by light aircraft and firing artillery harassment missions to mask vehicle noises.
One German veteran stated that "the most important thing in combat is
communications." The radio configurations of the tanks facilitated this. The Tigers had
a five man crew which included a bow machine gunner who operated the radio. This
radio was not the standard receiver/transmitter that the tank commander used to speak
within the unit. This radio was a Morse set with a range of almost fifty kilometers. Any
tank could, if necessary send a message all the way back to regimental or divisional
command posts. Also, higher commanders could broadcast orders to all tanks
simultaneously.
Visual signals contributed to both communications and control. Tank
commanders had flare pistols and almost all accounts relate consistent use of flares for
signalling such information as friendly and enemy positions, direction of fire, or friendly
135 Night Combat , 9.
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infantry under tank attack. These signalling colors obviously changed meanings daily and
flares also provided illumination. Visual signals, especially illumination types, aided land
navigation during limited visibility. Artillery illumination rounds, tracers and paired
searchlights in rear areas helped reconnaissance elements and others navigate in the
largely featureless terrain. Other visual signals used in stationary positions included
writing on blackboards for rear observers to read through field glassed and sending Morse
code with signal lamps. 136
12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets
Flamethrowers, especially the ones mounted in the SPWs played major roles
in killing defenders or persuading them to vacate positions. If engineers in assault
detachments carried such heavy and dangerous equipment throughout the war, there had
to be something to it. Other engineer efforts included use of the "Goliath," a small tank-
like vehicle loaded with 200 pounds of explosives. These measured four feet in length
by two feet by two feet and could be wire guided. They worked with varying success
against mines and defensive positions. A version five times larger apparently existed on
the northern front. This required human guidance part way and reportedly cleared a lane
400 yards deep with a 50% driver survival rate. This battle, delayed to wait for the
Panther tanks and the Ferdinand Assault Gun, exposed major flaws in each and
demonstrated the danger of relying on untested weapons. The Panthers, fresh from the
assembly line, suffered from normal teething problems or kinderkrankeit (child sickness).
136 For elaboration of C2 measures, peruse Dunnigan, Russian Front , 139, Night Combat ,8-l 1
and 32-33, Friesen Interviews, 30 Nov 90 and 28 Dec 90.
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Overheating caused fires in the engine compartments and knocked out one fourth of the
entire Panther force on the move up to the first battle where they stumbled directly into
a minefield. The Ferdinand came with no machine guns and thus could not defend itself
against Soviet infantry without friendly infantry to protect it. n7
13. Historical Lessons
Writers of far higher pedigree than this author have examined the fighting at




Every opportunity must be taken for reconnaissance in the air and on the
ground.
2. The armored formation carrying out the attack must be made as strong as
possible by super-heavy tanks, brought to bear in the Schwerpunkt.
3. Fire concentrations by tank guns must be rapid and effective; the armor
must keep moving and tanks should only stop to fire their guns.
4. Observers for all heavy weapons supporting the attack must travel with
the armor. Wireless communication between the tank leader and the air is
most essential.
5. Engineers in armored vehicles must follow the armor.
6. Light tanks must be at hand to exploit success.
7. Fuel and ammunition supply for the armor must be assured during the
battle for armored supply carriers. Much experience is needed to carry out
this difficult operation.
137
For discussion of the equipment unveiled at Kursk, check Carell, Scorched Earth . 42-54,
Busse, German Military Studies , 74, Caidin, Tigers , 186-189, and Friesen, Interviews 30 Nov 90
and 14 Dec 90. For good photographs and data on German flamethrowers, both man-portable and
vehicle mounted, see Pioniere , 152-154, 181, 215-230.
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8. Tanks should be supplied with smoke gear to blind enemy antitank
weapons, and with colored-smoke grenades for unit commanders to indicate
direction.
9. For night attacks tanks should be supplied with direction-finding
equipment. 138
Other sources describe the "Eastern School" of German offensive tactics.
1. It was not necessary to cover the entire sector allocated to an attacking
unit. The Russians were not apt to bother open German flanks.
2. Russian anti-tank defenses could not be breached by tanks alone. Infantry
had to do most of the work with tanks supporting.
3. Although the "attack on the move" was a German specialty, it was
avoided since even a little (a few hours' or days') preparation paid large
dividends in fewer German casualties. Russian defensive preparations were
often thorough but easier to defeat with a little preparation.
4. Tanks should attack in waves. This allows them to support each other
and makes control easier. The reinforced (with infantry, etc.) tank regiment
attacked on a one kilometer front, the panzer division on a 2-3 km front.
Once the hole was punched, it had to be exploited.
5. Infantry that were carried on tanks and other vehicles left their transport
at the last possible moment in order to keep the attack moving. All
vehicles, armored and non-armored, moved by bounds from cover to cover.
6. Artillery used smoke-shell and concentrations to screen the flanks of the
attack from enemy interference and artillery observation. 139
German training directives published in 1944 highlighted the main points for
German attacks. First, careful reconnaissance was cited as critical. Once the attack
began, artillery, air and direct fire needed to suppress the entire pakfront (integrated
138
Mellenthin, Panzer Battles , 232.
I3Q Dunnigan, Eastern Front , 141.
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system of antitank defense). This directive casually mentioned the infantry crossing the
minefield, so antipersonnel mines apparently did not seriously effect movement. Other
points highlighted included using smoke, rehearsals, attack wedges and organizing
infantry units into assault detachments. 140
A review of the material presented in this chapter highlights several factors key
to German success in penetrating the strong fortified positions. Thorough reconnaissance
helped units identify obstacles and thus avoid known trouble as much as possible.
Infiltration tactics by well equipped assault teams moving very deeply under loose control
paid great dividends and showed that tactical surprise is attainable even when strategic
surprise is thrown away. Flame weapons made great contributions in reducing defenders'
will to fight on.
Manual reduction of minefields remained the main method, with all its
attendant dangers and delays. The "Goliath" showed some promise in clearing mines
more quickly and with less cost. Artillery used to clear minefields offered a solution and
showed that heavy bombardment of some type will clear thick minefields. The most
worthwhile technique seemed to be the training given to combat troops to spot and avoid
mines. Close cooperation between tanks and infantry was absolutely essential, with tanks
leading whenever possible. Smoke should be placed directly on top of defenders and on
flanks of attacks to blind defenders but not attackers. Overall, the combination of large-
140 Army General Staff/Training, "Breaking Through a Pakfront", Training Directive No. 28
(East) (Berlin: Army Headquarters, 14 July 1944), and Army General Staff/Training, "Lessons
Learned: Attacks Against Fortified Positions," Training Directive No. 25 (West) (Berlin: Army
Headquarters, 30 April 1944).
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scale infiltration with intensive engineer preparation guided by thorough reconnaissance
broke up defenses. With this preparation, a tank led force with close air and artillery
support made great gains considering the extensive depth and strength of the defenses.
Enemy artillery, the greatest threat, had the highest priority for air attack. The
Stukas' effectiveness showed that accuracy in placing ordnance makes up for lack of
quantity. This accuracy came in some measure from the practice of placing Forward Air
Controllers down at company level in breakthrough sectors which provided more
controllers than normally existed. Artillery firing on forward positions (including the
large volumes of tracer ammunition for psychological effect) and then on counterbattery
appeared more successful than the opposite (British at El Alamein) approach. Good
radios and uses of many visual signals facilitated command and control in the confusion,
noise and horror of combat.
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V. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
As a fortifier of morale, an immediate and visible form of support
is infinitely more efficacious than a distant and unseen one.
B.H. Liddcll Hart: Great Captains Unveiled . 1927
This chapter examines the development of the American style of dealing with
fortified positions. Much of the learning came in Normandy and the later fighting against
the Siegfried Line positions showed certain refinements of the basics. Study of the
Westwall fighting is of value, but devoting an entire section to it would be overly long.
This author will, therefore, insert relevant points pertaining to the later fighting within the
appropriate subsections of section A. Analysis of the U.S. Marine experience in the
Pacific comes in section B.
A. THE NORMANDY BOCAGE: A TERRIBLE BLOOD-LETTING 141
Throughout June and July of 1944, Americans fought their way onto the European
continent and then through a section of France commonly known as the Bocage. This
section traces the development of tactics in various units to deal with terrain favoring
natural fortified positions. The "bottom-up" development of these tactics contributed to
the success of the final breakout, Operation COBRA.
141 Erwin Rommel described the Normandy campaign with the statement "It was one terrible
blood-letting." The Rommel Papers , 496, quoted in D'Este, Decision, , 508.
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Figure 4: The Bocage Country (See Blumenson, Breakout , 12)
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J. Terrain: This goddamn country 142
Allied planners focused on getting the Army ashore and basically ignored the
operational techniques, special equipment and tactical training needed to fight in
hedgerow country. The Bocage, anything but conducive to employment of tanks, is an
irregular patchwork of small fields, bordered by hedgerows and cut by sunken roads.
These hedgerows, the property markers of local farmers, are dirt embankments varying
from one to four feet in thickness and in height between three and twelve feet. On top
of the dirt is a tangle of trees and thickets, varying between one to three feet in thickness
and between three to fifteen feet in height. Overall, the Bocage covered more than 400
square miles of the province of Normandy. This type of terrain provides natural obstacles
to canalize attackers, prevents them from massing, offers cover and concealment to




Gennan defenders, outnumbered, bereft of air cover, and deficient in
transport, still held the advantage in tactical acumen. While facing long odds, they still
had advantages,
142 For the American soldiers' opinions on local geography, see Martin Blumenson, Breakout
and Pursuit
. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1961), 12.
Several sources provide descriptions of the Bocage. See English, Infantry . 141,
Blumenson, Breakout
,
10-12, and Michael D. Doubler, Busting the Bocage: American combined
Arms Operations in France, 6 June-31 July 1944 , (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute.
1988), 11-16.
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...German troops held the best positions they could hope for in France. The line
was relatively short; the terrain was naturally strong; the battlefield imposed serious
restrictions on Allied deployment. Only a small sector of open ground near Caen
was difficult to defend. With reserves on the way, the Gennans could reasonably
hope to hold out until the decisive counterattack or the miracle promised by Hitler
turned the course of the war. 144
The Americans faced the German Seventh Army, which controlled the
LXXXIV Corps and the II Parachute Corps. Overall, these units controlled around 35,000
combat troops, 50 medium tanks, 26 Panther tanks, no 88mm guns, little artillery, and no
Nebelwerfers. XAS German skill counted more than numbers at the lowest tactical levels,
although sheer mass of materiel will eventually grind up even the most skillful bodies.
Units such as the 2d SS Panzer Division Das Reich came to the Western Front from
combat in Russia. These men soon learned the war was very different against the
Americans. When fierce fighting halted to allow stretcher bearers of both sides to gather
wounded, one tank officer noted that "It was the first hint that this war would be
different...In Russia, we would have driven straight over them." 146 Iron bonds of
cohesion held German troops together and high quality, well trained junior leaders led
them in a defensive style characterized by immediate counterattacks by small groups
using infiltration tactics. Small numbers of Germans, constantly chattering to dispel
144 Blumenson, Breakout , 50.
145 The 88mm guns all belonged to the HI Flak Corps, busy against the British. The
Nebelwerfers, artillery and most tanks also faced the British in the open country to the north. See
Blumenson, Breakout , 29-31.
146 Max Hastings, Das Reich: The March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Through France (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston: 1981), 215-216. The astute reader noted that in Chapter 4 the
unit was panzer grenadier. The designation changed in January of 1944 to the one cited here.
Friesen, Interview, 5 Mar 91.
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loneliness and heighten cohesion, used high volumes of fire to "help themselves forward"
and defeat Americans in their [Americans] own minds. 147
In the Bocage, as against the British, defenses followed a fairly standard
layout. Three belts of fortified areas stretched back up to ten miles in depth. First came
the outposts, lightly manned, and employed to break up attackers with artillery and absorb
the initial bombardment in mostly empty space. The Advance Position had more wire
and mines to protect the greater numbers of infantry, the tanks, self-propelled guns and
mortars. These troops might defend, or counterattack into the outpost zone as necessary.




By this stage of the war many German troops of doubtful quality filled
hastily raised units. Many men fell during the long retreat across France. While many
good soldiers remained, they needed time to rest and refit. German commanders wisely
put the lower quality soldiers in existing defensive positions when possible. Yet, as one
American soldier noted.
147
For descriptions of German infantry qualities, see English, Infantry , 142-145. In training
at the U.S. Army's Ranger School, this author learned first hand that if soldiers can hear only
enemy fire, they will consider the fight lost, but if their own volume of fire is greater, they will
believe themselves victorious.
148
For the ground level view of the fighting in Normandy, see John Ellis, The Sharp End: The
Fighting Man in World War II
.
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), 76-77. This book is
also required reading for all men who eat quiche, can spell it without help, or pronounce it.
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I don't care if the guy behind that gun is a syphilitic prick who's a hundred years
old-he's still sitting behind eight foot of concrete and he's still got enough fingers
to press triggers and shoot bullets. 149
Another author who fought in this time period wrote,
Nevertheless, as American troops were to discover, steel and concrete can lend
backbone to a defense, even if the fortifications are outmoded and even if the
defenders are old men and cripples. 150
The pillboxes themselves provided shelter, primarily from artillery, for troops who fought
from trenches or other positions outside.
A typical pillbox was 25 feet wide, 45 feet deep, and 20 feet high, with walls and
roof of reinforced concrete form 3 to 8 feet thick. At least half the structure lay
underground. Each pillbox contained web-bottomed bunks arranged in tiers to
accommodate a usual complement of about fourteen men. Most had two firing
embrasures. Though these embrasures provided only limited fields of fire, the
pillboxes were arranged in clusters, so that guns in one could cover the approaches
to several others.
151
The Wesftvall included three zones of defense. Nearest the enemy lay the
Forward Zone (Vorfeldzone) with observation posts, trenches, wire and machine-gun
positions. The Main Defense Zone (Grosskampfzone) contained the major positions.
149
Ellis, Sharp End , 77.
150 Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign , United States Army in World War
II: the European Theater of Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Chief of Military History,
1963), 35.
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These included pillboxes, casemates, anti-tank obstacles and guns. The Rear Defense
Zone {Ruckwartige Zone) was similar to the Main positions, but was not as strong. 152
3. Attackers
One must remember that almost all the American soldiers fighting in Europe
had been civilians until eighteen months before and most had seen no combat at all.
England had little room for realistic, large scale training. The most remarkable fact is
that Americans improved so much and found solutions to the tactical problems of the
Bocage in just over a month of combat.
The Army that fought throughout the months of June and July, 1944, did have
many weaknesses. The "Ford Motor Car" mentality of interchangeable parts and mass
production raised a huge force and supplied that force along with the rest of the free
world. By its nature, however, it worked against cohesion and could not develop
consistently good junior leaders. Annies reflect their national character, and the
American troops would display great initiative and imagination in finding solutions to the
tactical problem of the hedgerows. Unfortunately, many men would die while the Army
climbed the learning curve.
Several weaknesses must be specified. American infantry did little except
conduct frontal assaults. Inexperienced officers went by the book and attacked "two up,
one back" in a linear fashion. Tanks and infantry did not cooperate well. No permanent
organizations existed with both tanks and infantry in their composition. Americans relied
152
U.S. War Department, Handbook on German Military Forces , TM-E 30-451 (Washington,
D.C.: United States War Department, 1945) V-l.
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heavily on artillery, and it usually did well, but it too had weaknesses. Although "green"
when it hit the beach, the American Army changed as it fought through the Bocage.
...The First Army that was to execute COBRA was not the same one that had
launched the July offensive. Battle had created an improved organization, and a
continuing continental build-up had strengthened it. What the army needed was the
opportunity to get rolling, and COBRA might well provide just that. l5?
4. Narrative
Early fighting in June and July highlighted the raw state of most American
divisions. One attack by the 90th Division is fairly indicative of the general state of
training. On 3 July, the unit advanced with two regiments abreast through a pouring rain.
Tanks and infantry made no real attempts to cooperate. Units went to ground
immediately upon receiving fire and the nervous men fired at anything around them. 154
Men stopped when threatened with any type of flanking fires. Normally, units making
contact pulled back and requested artillery fire on villages or assumed enemy positions.
Small numbers of defenders could hold up large American units. In this particular battle,
the 90th advanced less than a mile and lost over 600 men. All fighting had taken place
only a short distance into the German outpost line 155
153 Blumenson, Breakout , 204.
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Artillery forward observers displayed great reluctance throughout the campaign to climb
trees so that they could adjust fires. Nervous riflemen habitually shot at men in trees.
155
For details of the fighting, see Blumenson, Breakout , 64-66. Another good source for
general background is Keegan, Six Annies .
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Typically, Germans placed machine-guns at comers of hedgerow fields, dug
into the embankments themselves, and allowed American infantry to move forward in
loose skirmish formation. With tanks roadbound, when the Gennans opened up with
automatic weapons and mortars, the infantry took heavy losses and could rarely even call
in artillery because the enemy was too close and exact locations were hard to determine
in the compartmentalized terrain. The rainy conditions throughout the battle grounded
supporting aircraft much of the time. One particularly American tendency was for
infantry to wait for confirmed targets, rather than use "marching fires" to suppress likely
areas. Infantry did not follow artillery fire closely enough to get full benefit from it.
Soldiers froze under fire and initially did not know that the best tactic was to advance out
from under artillery and mortar fire. German mortar fire caused up to 75% of American
casualties in the Bocage. ]5e
Throughout July, U.S. forces developed tactics and special equipment to fight
through the Germans fortified positions. Finally, in late July, heavy bombers utilizing
carpet bombing techniques would provide the massive portable firepower needed and
assist the breakthrough in Operation COBRA. The remainder of this section will examine
the specific areas where Americans found solutions to the problems that initially
bedeviled them.
156
Doubler, Bocage , 21-29.
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5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling
a. Normandy
Tactical intelligence gathered by Americans came from two sources: aerial
photography and ground patrolling. The heavy rainfall and cloud cover prevented
constant aerial reconnaissance. Patrolling, although mentioned in records, does not seem
to have been truly extensive, and most patrols were apparently combat patrols rather than
truly scouting. 157 When patrols did go out, they did not infiltrate deeply into the
defensive positions nor did they take a great deal of time about it. One gets the
impression that scouts preceded attacks by only a few hundred yards. Since attacks often
started at first light, after only short artillery barrages, from where the previous day's
advance had stopped, little good intelligence could have been gathered.
An overall study of American documents leads to the conclusion that no
one considered deep patrolling much at all, or that scouts were not well trained enough
to successfully penetrate German positions. Planners gave units boundaries and
objectives, but never targeted specific strongpoints or positions. The inexperience of
staffs and commanders apparently precluded consideration of such techniques. For
example, one study by the G-2, Division Intelligence Office, of the 3rd Armored Division
noted with apparent approval that "...ground reconnaissance along the LD had been
effected. "[Author's italics] This same battle analysis mentioned that the "...German
ground counter-reconnaissance screen..." had prevented any accurate intelligence





gathering. This author concludes that this screen was in fact the German outpost line and
not a special screen.
158
b. Siegfried Line
The 30th Infantry Division demonstrated its appreciation of the
importance of intelligence when preparing for its attack on a section of the West Wall.
Air and ground observations combined to pinpoint an estimated three-quarters of all
pillboxes in sector. Planners targeted each known one for attention during the artillery
preparation in the days before the assault. Intensive ground patrolling and infiltration
provided precise intelligence which altered the original maneuver plan significantly. 159
6. Use of Obscuration/Smoke
a. Normandy
Americans made almost no attempts to use natural obscuration or smoke
throughout the fighting for several good reasons. First, the hedgerows limited observation
to a few hundred yards. In such a case, only smoke pots and grenades would be useful,
although mortar crews in the 29th Infantry Division did use smoke one hedgerow ahead
to screen assault teams. Second, green American troops needed to see each other as
much as possible for confidence. Also, as the force with the greatest air and artillery
158 See Colonel Charles H. Coates, "German Defense in Hedgerow Terrain (Villiers Fossard),"
U.S. Army Ground Forces Observer Board, European Theater of Operations Report No. 141,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. War Department, 1944), 2-6. These reports will hereafter be cited as
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Report No. and the individual title. These reports are filed in 6 volumes at
the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
159 Macdonald, Siegfried , 253-255.
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assets, Americans took pains to make themselves visible to preclude fratricide. I6< ' Third,
despite the massive materiel support of Allied forces, Americans found themselves shon
of white phosphorous (WP) artillery shells during this period. 161 Tanks did on occasion
use WP rounds on hedgerow intersections to bum out defenders. Tankers also praised
the WP round in tank versus tank fighting. "Its use against enemy armor is giving




Units used smoke in several ways during this phase of the war. One way
was to mark targets for close air support which helped pilots acquire the precise target
requested. Screening and blinding smoke appears in many more historical accounts. The
German 116th Panzer Division noted in its daily situation report for 14 September, 1944,
that the Americans made heavy use of artillery and smoke screens. 163
160 See English, Infantry
,
143. Arnold Friesen also discusses how Germans copied American
colored signal panels to confuse Allied pilots and avoid air attack. See Friesen, Interview, 14 Dec
90.
161 Blumenson, Breakout , 42.
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Report No. 110, "Armored Notes-Lessons from Combat in
Normandy," p. 2.
Smoke in a marking role comes from MacDonald, Siegfried , 254. The Gentian
observations are found in Lucian Heichler, "The Germans Opposite VTJ Corps in September 1944,"
in Charles B. McDonald, Operations of 7th Corps in September 1944 (Washington: Office of the




This area, initially one of the main American weaknesses, saw the greatest
improvement throughout the campaign. Combined arms training received little attention
during the build-up in England. Initial unit organizations did not include habitual tank-
infantry relationships. Written doctrine stressed tanks leading infantry or infantry leading
tanks, but nothing about compartmentalized country in which neither one could routinely
lead. The neophyte Americans did not truly understand that "...the people who really
count in battle are the commanders and fighters at battalion level and below." 164 The
nuts and bolts of communications and signals between the tanks and the foot soldiers had
not been codified. Troops learned as they went along.
Each division, after bloody initial experiences, formed its own tactics to
fight through the determined German defenders in their hedgerow positions. Tankers,
growing weary of being easy prey for Pcmzerfaust antitank weapons and antitank guns
sited along roads, developed special equipment to let them operate within the cover and
concealment of the Norman fields. Infantrymen, finding that their cotton body armor
failed to keep shrapnel and bullets out, wanted the mobile firepower of tanks to help them
achieve fire superiority in the small areas of combat. Artillery, the best mobile ground
firepower of all, needed efficient calls for fire to adequately support attacks.
Commanders decided that basic tactical principles applied,
164
English, Infantry , 146.
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The task was to pin the enemy down with a base of fire and maneuver an element
along a covered approach to assault from the flank. ..The tank-infantry team
operating toward a short objective and with a simple plan proved to be effective.
The objective was always the same, the next hedgerow. The plan was to provide
for simultaneous advance of armor and infantry and their mutual support. 165
Each division basically formed assault groups of varying composition,
stressing the paramount importance of close coordination. The lowest common
denominator in infantry divisions was that one infantry squad joined with one tank to be
the nucleus of action. The tank existed to get the infantry forward and the infantry-
protected the tank. Other branches supported this goal. 166 In the 3d Armored Division,
a tank company and infantry company operated together on a broader front. To allow
tanks to accompany infantry through the fields required a technical solution to allow tanks
to penetrate hedgerows. Communicating with the infantry would be both a technical
matter and a matter of techniques. "Dozer" tanks with blades mounted like bulldozers
could make openings in hedges, but few such vehicles existed. Field expedient methods
of welding scrap iron on to fonn cutting devices met the need. The most famous was the
"rhino" device of saw-teeth pieces of metal welded on the lower front of the hull,
enabling the tanks to saw its way through obstacles. The need for such mechanical
devices becomes clear when the reader considers that an attack going one and one-half
165 Blumenson, Breakout, 11.
166 The principles of tank-infantry cooperation are found in several sources. See AGF Obs.
Bd., ETO, Report No. 141, "German Defense in Hedgerow Terrain," Report No. 129,
"Employment of Tanks and Infantry," Report No. 121, "Fighting in Close Country-Nonnandy," and
Report No. 120, "Employment of Tanks with Infantry."
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mile forward fought through thirty-four hedgerows. If engineers placed the fifty pound
charges needed to blow paths through, each tank company would need seventeen tons of
explosives. The engineers would be exposed to mortar and machine-gun fire throughout
the process. Just as in breaching minefields, manual means are slow and costly, while
mechanical means are faster and cheaper if they work.
Most tank and infantry radios did not use the same frequencies, so
telephone handsets and visual signals took the place of radio. Smoke grenades and tracers
marked enemy positions, while standard infantry hand and arm signals did double duty
to signal such things as "commence fire" and "cease fire." These signals varied between
units, since no standard ones existed Army wide. Leaving tanks and infantry squads
together helped greatly. 167
A brief summary of the 29th Infantry Division tactics will illustrate the
use of the previously mentioned assault groups. Tanks moved up to the hedgerow
marking the start line and opened fire on the next hedgerow. Infantry moved forward
under this protection until they masked the fire of the tank and continued forward using
their own fire and movement along with 60mm mortars. Engineers, meanwhile, blew a
gap in the fust hedgerow to allow the tank to move forward and assist the infantry in
clearing the far hedgerow. 168
167 For the best overall synopsis of tank-infantry cooperation, see Doubler, Bocage , 21-37.
168 For details of the various infantry units' tactics, see Doubler, Bocage , 39-50.
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All styles got units through the Bocage, but this section will focus upon
those of the 3d Armored Division as promising faster penetration of fortified positions
with fewer casualties. These tactics also resemble those of the Germans at Kursk, and
thus will facilitate overall conclusions regarding the optimum techniques current units
should use.
...Units attacked on a front usually three fields wide and always assaulted the center
field last. The attack began as engineer teams or dozer tanks gapped the first
hedgerow and indirect fire fell on and behind the forward Gennan positions. An
entire tank platoon then attacked with one section moving forward along each
hedgerow paralleling the axis of advance. The Shermans put main-gun fire into the
hedgerow to their front and sprayed the side hedgerows with heavy machine-gun
fire. During the early phase of the assault, the tanks moved slowly enough so that
supporting infantry could move with them and provide local security. The tanks
also tried to protect themselves against German close infantry assaults by always
staying at least twenty yards from the nearest hedgerow. After reaching the main
Gennan defensive position, the tanks turned inward and worked their way toward
the center of the field, covering the hedgerows with heavy machine-gun fire.
Together, the tanks and infantry cleared the Gennan defensive position and then
prepared to continue the attack. The second phase of the assault began when
engineers or dozer tanks gapped the hedgerows bordering the center field. Assault
teams of infantry and tanks from each of the original attacking platoons then
attacked the flanks of the center Gennan position. During the second phase of the
attack, follow-on forces moved forward to occupy the hedgerow delineating the
original line of departure and provided suppressive fire with tank cannon and
machine guns. The attacking sections moved toward the center of the Gennan
position, spraying the hedgerow with machine-gun fire and rooting out any
remaining defenders. Once the final objective was secure, the companies
reorganized and prepared to continue the attack by repeating the same sequence of
events.
169
By late July, preparations for COBRA developed tactics for the more
fluid breakthrough conditions when 2d Armored Division's Combat Command A, a
169
Doubler, Bocage , 51.
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brigade sized element, attacked to exploit the carpet bombing and rupture German lines.
General Rose's CCA and the attached 22d Infantry attacked in three waves. The first
wave consisted of tanks alone using their own speed and firepower, along with artillery.
Sherman tanks with eight infantry on each one followed in the second wave. The infantry
protected their tanks and would dismount to move forward and assist the lead tanks if
necessary. The third wave had tanks and infantry to clear out bypassed enemy. The
awesome bombardment of 25 July, and the attack of the 30th Infantry Division, opened
up the first German defenses to allow commitment of the 2d Armored on the 26th.
...The combined arms team worked closely together. Artillery observers rode in the
lead tanks and brought accurate, indirect fire down on the enemy. Infantry battalion
commanders with manpack radios rode in command tanks to better coordinate
tankers and riflemen. The commander of the 22d Infantry reported that his soldiers
were enthusiastic about riding the Shemians "Russian style." The infantry found
that the tanks put the riflemen above grazing fire and gave them better observation.
Riding on tanks that moved at irregular speeds also made the infantry more difficult
targets. In two days, CCA penetrated more than six miles into the German Seventh
Army's sector. [COBRA's] preparatory bombardment, sporadic German resistance,
and the coordination and swift execution of CCA's attack resulted in light casualties
for the Americans. By nightfall of 27 July, General Rose was on his objective,
having lost only 3 tanks and less than 200 men. 170
b. Siegfried Line
By this time, the assault detachment was an ingrained element of the
assault. Artillery fire drove defenders under cover. Long range machine-gun fire aimed
at the pillbox embrasures while tanks moved up to use direct fire. Then the infantrymen
with demolitions and flamethrowers moved up to finish the job. While effective, this
approach took time. One such assault, which went just as planned, took one hour and
170
Doubler, Bocage , 58.
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fifteen minutes to reduce one pillbox. Most attacks went faster, but planners needed to
have smoke and other supplies available to cover attacks of considerable time. The
Gennans also tried to reoccupy bypassed or cleared positions when Americans moved
forward. To counter this, engineers blew up pillboxes, buried them with bulldozers, or
welded their doors shut. 171
8. Engineers
Engineers supported the tanks and infantry as mentioned earlier. Engineer
work concentrated on blasting through hedgerows and sweeping lanes for mines to move
the tanks forward. Later in July, the Rhinos and other devices enabled the tanks to cut
through hedgerows faster than the engineers could blast, so combat engineer work
lessened, while improving supply routes through the hedgerow gaps continued. Overall,
infantry units learned that the best combat team must include a squad of engineers closely
tied with tanks and infantry.
Preparing for COBRA, engineer units concentrated on road repair and clearing
bypassed minefields to facilitate the build-up. Engineer Technical Intelligence Teams
used captured mines when they trained soldiers in combat units how to clear the
171
For details of tank-infantry cooperation, see MacDonald, Siegfried . 261-272, and George
Forty, Patton's Third Army at War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), 159. To learn
more about dealing with bypassed pillboxes, see Alfred M. Beck, et al., The Corps of Engineers:
the War Against Germany , United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1985), 419.
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minefields themselves. Recovery vehicles prepared to clear roads and recover destroyed
Gennan vehicles blocking routes of movement. 172
9. Artillery
a. Normandy
Artillery played a key role throughout the campaign and had only a few
weak points. Artillery preparations usually only lasted ten to fifteen minutes. This is not
long enough to do any serious damage to a defender, and since infantry virtually never
followed the barrage closely enough, the attackers did not catch defenders sheltering in
dug-outs. 173 If the artillery is merely going to warn the enemy, it should not be fired.
In fact, Germans usually moved up close to friendly lines during shelling to avoid its
effects. Few records of good counterbattery fire stand out, and one should recall that
German indirect fires caused 75% of all U.S casualties. German artillery once reacted
so strongly to a ten-minute artillery preparation that U.S commanders called off their
attack to await an anticipated counterattack. 174
Artillery successes stand out more than failures during Bocage fighting.
One excellent aspect was the use of light planes for artillery spotting and control. Some
172
For more specifics regarding engineer work, see Beck, Engineers 377-381.
173 One notable exception was the 30th Infantry Division's attack on 7 July. Heavy artillery
fire, a rolling barrage, well rehearsed troops and extended formations made good progress. This
operation was mainly a river crossing and thus is outside the scope of this study. It does merit
mentioning, however, for the emphasis on following the rolling barrage and the overall good




For weaknesses of American artillery, see Blumenson, Breakout
, pp. 42, 58, 66, and AGF
Obs. Bd., ETO, Report No. 141, "German Defense in Hedgerow Terrain," 4.
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accounts contend that German artillery would not fire when these planes were overhead
to avoid counterbattery fires, so perhaps only the small size and the mobility of the
German mortars made counterfire against them virtually impossible. Aerial observers had
the height so critical to effective observation, at least when weather permitted flying One
infantry officer suggested that the liaison plane link directly with the lead ground unit and
the Fire Direction Center (FDC) of an artillery unit to streamline fire requests. A
particularly effective use of fires was to use "time fire" to achieve air bursting shrapnel
over defenders. Attacking tanks could advance "buttoned-up" and be on top of enemy
positions for accurate suppression while infantry closed up to clear the position. 175
b. Siegfried Line
The fighting against Westwall positions again demonstrated the necessity
of heavy artillery. Eight inch (208mm) guns and 240mm howitzers destroyed some
positions by direct hits. Even a near miss by one of these shells was a significant
emotional event for defenders. For direct fire, only the 155mm artillery piece assured
penetration of concrete pillboxes.
Overall, the artillery preparation itself also added to deception. American
units, with large numbers of artillery pieces and plentiful ammunition, fired a preparation
175
Artillery successes are found in Blumenson, Breakout , 58, and AGF Obs. Bd., ETO. Report
No. 129, "Employment of Tanks and Infantry," 1-2. Doubler notes that Germans considered
American artillery more effective than Russian artillery. Doubler, Bocage , 29. One aspect of these
studies is important to note. Blumenson and Doubler use many of the AGF reports as sources,
although Blumenson, with greater resources available, uses many unit reports as well. These
observer reports are often phrased as suggestions, rather than direct reports, and as such can lead
to some misinterpretation. A student should consult as many of the original references as possible.
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across a wide front. Wliile the penetration sector felt the heaviest pounding, the defenders
could not discern the difference quickly enough to pinpoint the objective area. The
preparation itself began by targeting German antiaircraft positions. Fires then went to
counterbattery and then fell on defensive positions themselves. 176
10. Air Support: The bomb carpets unrolled in great rectangles. 177
a. Normandy
The finest air support available throughout the campaign came from the small
artillery liaison planes already mentioned. The close nature of the terrain made close air
support very difficult, although tactical air units did devote much effort to the problem
and worked though to very effective techniques in time for COBRA. Allied air
superiority did have a decisive effect on German units moving up to the front and
wreaked havoc with supply lines and the like.
The key air support actually employed to break through the defensive
positions was the use of heavy and medium bombers in Operation COBRA.
Unfortunately, while very effective against some of the German defenders, the air attack
had some tremendous errors as well. Originally, the Army Air Corps tried to bomb on
the 24th of July. Bad weather forced cancellation, but not before 700 tons of bombs fell
176 For artillery effects on positions, see Beck, Engineers , 418, Cole, Lorraine , 584, and Staff
Group A, Section 11, CGSC Class 83-84, "Huertgen Forest-Offensive, Deliberate Attack, Forest,
16 November 1944" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), iv-55. For more on
artillery as deception and artillery targets, consult Cole, Lorraine , 591, and MacDonald, Siegfried ,
253-261.
177 General Leutnant Fritz Bayerlein, quoted in D'Este, Decision , 402.
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on both Germans and Americans. American airmen killed 25 men and wounded 131 in
the 30th Division. The key cause was the 8th Air Force's refusal to bomb parallel to the
road marking the front lines. Apparently fearing antiaircraft fire, the bombers flew
straight over friendly troops to bomb the Germans and the "creepback" that always
occurred killed American ground troops in even greater numbers on the 25th.' 7R Most
bombs did hit German held ground and inflicted catastrophic damage on some of those
units there. The commander of the Panzer Lehr Division, General Leutnant Bayerlein,
reported only thirty percent of his troops remained in action and only about fifteen tanks
(all from outside the target area). However, the Seventh Army after action reports
reported less than ten percent of personnel casualties came from the bombardment. The
truth probably lies in the middle. 179 The Americans, however, initially made little
progress, the furthest penetration being only 2300 yards. 180 and at first believed the
bombing did no good at all. The bombing wiped out some Germans but when the
survivors realized they could still fight, the resistance surprised the Americans, who had
178
Official sources list 1 1 1 killed and 490 wounded, including LTG McNair, Head of Amiv
Ground Forces. See D'Este, Decision, 401.
179
For a low estimate of the effectiveness of the COBRA bombardment from the standpoint
of killing Germans, see LTC Roy R. Stephenson, "The Impact of Massive Artillery Fires on
Command, Control, and Communications in the European and North African Theaters During
World War II," in Tactical Responses to Concentrated Artillery , CSI Report No. 13, (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, [1990?]), 61-63.
180 David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War. 1943-1945 , (New York: Random House, 1986), 350,
quoted by Stephenson, "Massive Artillery", 61.
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expected no German survivors. 181 The impact area also did not extend far enough
behind the German lines to include most of the artillery.
b. Siegfried Line
The problems with air support continued to plague air-ground cooperation
for large scale attacks. The 30th Infantry, bombed so often by friendlies that it called the
Air Force the "American Luftwaffe" tried to convince airmen to attack perpendicularly
to the front for one major assault. The airmen refused, just as in COBRA, and did not
want smoke to mark the target for fear of confusing the pilots. While the infantrymen
held their breath, the bombers attacked German pillboxes and other positions.
Fortunately, no bombs fell short that day. Unfortunately, all bombs fell behind the
Germans and many fell on Belgian civilians in a town far off target. Many Germans slept
through the bombing. Dive bombers did create shell holes the attackers used for cover
but did not hit a single pillbox. Napalm landed on wet forests where it made no
contribution. 182
11. C2
The development of tactics to overcome defenders in the Bocage highlighted
the importance of rehearsals for American units. American units, without truly habitual
relationships between the same troops of different units and fighting the individual
181 Those interested in more details of the first days of COBRA should consult D'Este,
Decision , 400-404, and Blumenson, Breakout , 239-245.
182 For observations of air strike effectiveness, see MacDonald, Siegfried , 260, and Charles
Whiting, Bloody Aachen (New York: Stein and Day, 1976), 87-90.
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replacement system as well, needed rehearsals to refine tactics and for men to learn the
capabilities of their weapons. These rehearsals allowed men to work out the nuts and
bolts problems of signalling between foot soldiers and tankers and radio modifications to
allow commanders to talk to one another. Much detailed effort resulted once men
realized that "...close coordination and complete interdependence between the infantry and
tanks is of paramount importance..." 181
A high level problem surfaced when the original bombings for COBRA did
not take the form the Army believed had been agreed upon. No means existed for ground
controllers to designate targets well or call off strikes once the bombs began falling short
Existing technology and procedures did not allow or force the bombers to execute tight,
precise strikes. Placing the ground forces outside of the danger area (3000 yards) would
not allow rapid follow up of the bombing. At this time, with these people in charge,
saturation bombing could not be adequately controlled.
The compartmentalized terrain made land navigation very difficult and this in
turn made fire support difficult. Officers and sergeants must know where their forces are
to control them well and utilize other assets for support. Part of this stemmed also from
the raw nature of the young leaders. This also contributed to the generally slow and
hesitant movement of attacking units.
Interestingly, the COBRA bombardments, which seemingly had so little direct
effect, illustrate the importance of defensive command and control. One possible
AGF Obs. Bd., ETO, Report No. 129, "Employment of Tanks and Infantry," 1
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explanation for the success of COBRA lies in "...the inability of the commanders to get
intelligence or command orders..." which directly resulted from "...the bombardment's
interdiction or disruption of the communications systems." 184 Since the Germans used
wire communications extensively and relied on rapid counterattacks as well, the disruption
of communications caused by the bombing and shelling had a significant impact.
12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets
a. Normandy
The close-in nature of the Bocage and consequent difficulty of bringing
large weapons to bear upon pillboxes and buildings made flamethrowers a useful weapon.
Although not universally used, engineer units in most divisions used flamethrowers to
reduce especially stubborn defenders. The primary asset of flame weapons was the shock
effect upon defenders. Many surrendered rapidly when faced with the prospect of burning
to death. 185
The actual destruction of pillboxes and strongpoints required distinct
cooperation of various branches and some special devices which must be fabricated or
assembled to assault such objectives.
Dive bombers and artillery drove the defenders in the outer entrenchments to seek
the shelter of the concrete. Then the infantry, covered by a light bombardment,
advanced rapidly until they were 300 to 400 yards from their objective. From there,
machine-guns and anti-tank guns directed intense fire into the embrasures while
184
Stephenson, "Massive Artillery," 63-64.
For details of flamethrower employment, see LTC Leonard McKinney, Portable
Flamethrower Operations in World War II
,
(Washington, D.C.: Chemical Corps Historical Office,
1949), 195-197.
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demolition squads worked round to the rear of the pill-box. They then dashed in
and blew down the steel door with "beehives" or "bazookas," thrust in pole charges
and phosphorous grenades and left the explosives and the choking smoke to do the
rest. It was a slow process, but it was sure and comparatively inexpensive. 186
Engineers still relied on manual probing for and lifting of mines. One
mechanical clearing technique that never fully succeeded still deserves notice. The
"Snake" consisted of metal pipes filled with explosives and fitted end to end. Once
assembled, a Sherman tank pulled up behind the pipe and men attached the "Snake" to
the tank. The tank attempted to push the device into minefields where it could later be
detonated from a distance. Obvious drawbacks included the need to assemble it close to
the enemy and the effect of rough terrain on a long, inflexible pipe being pushed. 187
b. Siegfried Line
The latter portion of the war saw American units copy the British lead
and produce a wide range of tank variants for special purposes. These machines used
Sherman tank chassis and included earth moving equipment, mine clearing equipment,
gap crossing equipment, flamethrowers and rocket launchers among others. Fascine
carriers had bundles of logs on a sloped frame. The vehicle could drive up to a ditch,
release the bundles and partially fill the gap for other vehicles to cross. The "Ark" style
machine drove itself into ditches or water. Another machine hoisted the folded ramps of
186 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe
,
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United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations,
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the "Ark" back and drove over the new "bridge." Some recovery vehicles mounted 81mm
mortars to fire smoke when required. 188
13. Historical Lessons
The first lesson relates to using large amounts of Air Force delivered ordinance
directly onto fortified defensive positions. Discussion already illustrated the necessity for
accurate targeting and rapid follow up by attacking ground troops. Those troops must be
conditioned to expect defenders to resist and to move rapidly through gaps to strike deep.
During COBRA, attacking infantry did not follow up rapidly enough, partly due to shock
and casualties from fratricide. One contributing factor to the slow advance was the wide
attack frontages used by the Americans. One infantry regiment attacked on a 2000 yard
front over fairly open terrain. When comparing this frontage to German or Russian
tactics, one can see that breakthrough attack frontages are normally much smaller. Tight
frontages for units closely following a heavy saturation bombing might enable some units
to suppress strongpoints while other units move freely through the zones of the heaviest
damage. Records do not clearly indicate how badly the bombing churned up the ground
in all sectors. Future commanders might consider leading with a tank attack such as that
of the 2d Armored CCA for more rapid exploitation of the breakthrough.
At a lower level, the Bocage fighting illustrated the criticality of combining
American firepower and aggressive maneuver of tightly knit tank-infantry teams. When
188 The Israeli Merkava tank has a 60mm mortar which is fired from inside the turret as a
standard component. For more information on tank variants, see George Forty, United States
Tanks of World War II in Action (Poole, England: Blandford Press: 1983), 120-123.
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a unit is predominately infantry, commanders broke down units below platoon level and
met success. The "assault team" was a sound concept for the decentralized "bush
warfare" of the bocage fighting. Armor heavy units could keep platoon integrity, but still
needed a form of the "assault team" to reduce defensive positions. Artillery must be fired
very close to friendly forces to achieve the desired effect.
Another idea with great merit was the tying together a lead ground unit with
a supporting artillery battery through an airborne observer. While this ties up artillery and
reduces flexibility, the resulting massing of force on a small portion of the defensive
positions should result in a rupture of the fortified position. With mortars also in support
to use air bursts to pin defenders in their shelters, a potent force emerges. The previously
mentioned difficulties with land navigation impacted upon this to a degree. Marking
targets with rockets or tank fired smoke rounds would facilitate fire support accuracy.
The decentralized nature of the German command and control system was an
important factor in German success. An attacker facing such a defense must tailor
artillery, jamming and other means of attack on lower echelon command posts than he
normally would. Destroying the ability of the key commanders, whoever they may be,
to communicate their orders or receive information from subordinates will significantly
increase chances of success.
Several techniques exist to improve control at lower tactical levels. These
techniques help commanders in compartmentalized terrain and in night attacks where
difficulty arises in locating friendly forces. If it is primarily a mounted attack,
illumination rounds fired low behind the defenders during the artillery fire aids navigation.
Ill
Before the tanks open fire, a short machine-gun burst high and right will show where
attackers are to avoid fratricide. Tracers are obviously necessary for this and defenders,
if not already suppressed by artillery, will also see where attackers are. 189
B. THE MARINE EXPERIENCE: CORKSCREW AND BLOWTORCH 190
1. Terrain
Marine experiences against fortified positions took place on the many Pacific
Islands where Japanese and Americans fought each other. In general, the small areas
involved included either thick vegetation or virtually bare sand and coral atolls.
Frequently, Marine commanders found themselves with only the option of direct frontal
assault against strong prepared defenses. This section will discuss general Marine lessons
throughout the war. For illustration, the author will also examine the fighting on
Okinawa for the so-called Shuri Line.
2. Defender
At the lower tactical levels, Japanese soldiers displayed unsurpassed courage,
tenacity, and a superb ability to construct exceptionally strong defensive positions. The
Japanese determination to fight to the death made him a rare enemy. Luckily for
Americans, the Japanese showed limited capacity to conduct efficient operations at higher
levels. Japanese artillery possessed little fire control capability and could not mass large
189 Using bursts of tracer for control comes from LTC Lowell Love, "Night Fighting With
Tanks," Armored Notes, Memorandum No. 5 ([?]: U.S. First Army, 17 April, 1945), 2-3.
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This term referred to flamethrowers burning out defensive positions, "blowtorch," and
pitching satchel charges in, "corkscrew," to police up remaining defenders.
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scale fires. Each island garrison fought out its own lonely Gotterdamerung bereft of any
significant air or naval support.
On Okinawa, Thirty-second Army defenders under General Ushijima
maximized the natural defensive strengths of the large cave network by extensive digging
and fortifying. Troops concentrated on reverse slope gun positions connected by
underground tunnels. The tunnels and caves held men, weapons, supplies, command posts
and hospitals. The Japanese also used stone burial vaults in cemeteries as shelters and
fighting positions. Soldiers sheltered underground to escape shelling and then occupied
rifle pits and trenches to support the weapons emplacements which covered almost every
foot of ground within the defensive sector. Obstcles and natural terrain channeled
attackers into engagement areas already preregistered by artillery. Camouflage included
wooden doors with dirt and vegetation on top covering the firing ports of bunkers. 191
Camouflage and reverse slope positions hindered American artillery observers in their
target acquisition. A Japanese document stated,
...In situations where island garrisons cannot expect reinforcements of troops from
rear echelons, but must carry on the battle themselves from start to finish, they
should exhaust every means for securing a favorable outcome, disrupting the
191 For descriptions of Japanese defenses on Okinawa and overall attributes, see James and
William Belote, Typhoon of Steel: The Battle for Okinawa (New York: Harper & Row, 1970),
passim, Bemis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. Victory and Occupation: History of U.S. Marine
Corps Operations in World War JJ . Volume V (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps, 1968), 48, 244,
and Dr. Thomas M. Huber, "Japanese Counterartillery Methods on Okinawa, April-June 1945,"
Tactical Responses to Concentrated Artillery . CSI Report No. 13 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat
Studies Institute, [1990?]), 99. Note that Frank cites Japanese units with a lower case letter
starting the second word (Thirty-second) and this author followed suit.
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enemy's plans by inflicting maximum losses on him, and, even when the situation
is hopeless, holding out in strong positions for as long as possible. 192
3. Attackers
By the time the Marines came to Okinawa, they had learned a great many
lessons in combat and their organizations and practices displayed this knowledge. Many
men in the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions had combat experience, with the 1st Marines
showing 205 officers on their rolls with over two years of overseas service. Knowing
that casualties would dilute unit effectiveness, Marine units attached replacements to
infantry units for preinvasion training. These men worked as shore party laborers until
needed to replace unit casualties.
Marine unit composition, tactics and equipment also reflected combat lessons.
Each squad comprised three fire teams, each built around an automatic weapon. The
three fire teams gave a squad certain advantages in close combat. Two teams could
suppress adjacent bunkers while the third moved forward. Every battalion supply section
carried twelve flamethrowers for use as ordered. To provide trained men to use them, as
well as to avoid stripping down rifle companies, each battalion included a 55-man assault
platoon. This platoon had six squads which each included a squad leader, a flamethrower
operator and assistant, a bazooka operator and assistant and two demolitions men.
Earlier fighting on New Georgia taught the Marines that infantry needed
heavier tank support and tank-mounted flamethrowers. Man-portable flamethrowers had
192
"Land Defense Doctrine (Provisional), dtd lDec44," in CinCPac-CinCPOA Bui 147-45,
Translations and Interrogations No. 32, dtd 16Jun45, p. 4, quoted by Frank, Victory . 48.
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large silhouettes and made movement through rough terrain difficult. Heavy casualties
among operators drove the decision to develop tank-mounted weapons. On Okinawa,
units had the Army HI Flamethrowing tank, a modified M4 Sherman. It carried 290
gallons of fuel, had a range of 60-80 yards and a bum time of two and one half minutes.
After the experience of Tarawa, Marines put strong emphasis on thorough coordination
of tanks, artillery, infantry, flamethrowers and demolitions to kill Japanese in fortified
positions. Units also trained all Marines in demolitions. 193
4. Narrative
Mid to late May, 1945, saw two of the bloodiest weeks of fighting during the
Okinawa campaign. Japanese defenders held the Shuri line as Marines and Army troops
tried to drive south and break the stubborn resistance. Rough terrain, strengthened by
intensive Japanese efforts, offered no indirect approaches and exposed attackers to
automatic weapons fire and indirect artillery and mortar fires. The defensive tunnel
complex allowed shifting of reserves in some areas.
The constraining terrain limited Marine options. Each day saw vicious fighting
and mounting casualties. Intensive barrages of 16-inch naval guns, artillery, aerial bombs
and mortars tried to pin defenders inside the caves so that attackers could win the "race
to the parapets." Tank-infantry assaults, usually including flamethrowers and demolitions
teams, burned and blasted their way forward. Depleted units clawed onto the objectives
and as often as not engaged in grenade duels and hand-to-hand fighting with defenders.




Defenders used all available weapons, including some direct 150mm howitzer fire against
tanks. Night saw digging in and consolidation as units brought up more men and
ammunition to continue the brutal killing the next day. An 18 May 1st Marine division
report summed it all up, "gains were measured by yards won, lost, then won again." 194
The Japanese fought on under the terrible pounding. Each night they tried to
repair and recamouflage positions damaged during the day, or build new ones. Heavy
rain fell from 21-30 May, miring supply vehicles and making life generally miserable.
General Ushijima began withdrawing the bulk of his forces to positions further south and
left a rear guard to fight on. This period saw American success on the flanks and some
very successful night assaults as well. In the end, however, Ushijima escaped the
attempted double envelopment and saved most of his forces for later fighting south of the
Shuri line. 195
5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling
No accounts found by this author mention very much concerning intelligence.
Since the defenders occupied caves and dug in positions, most communications went over
wires or by messenger. The excellent concealment and camouflage offered little to
photographic interpreters or observers. Patrolling occurred, but in the constricted terrain
these patrols usually learned of enemy positions by drawing fire.
194
1st MarDiv SAR, pt VII, p. 6, quoted in Frank, Victory , 261.
195 The overall narrative of fighting for the Shuri line is paraphrased from Frank, Victory , 240-
287, 384.
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6. Use of Obscuration/Smoke
Artillery and mortar delivered smoke is rarely mentioned directly, as artillery
fires are repeatedly described as heavy, massive or the like. Authors cite the weight of
shells fired without detailing the type of ordnance. One instance is documented. On 16
May, 1/7 Marines (1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment) used 107mm and 81mm mortars
to smoke the area in front of their positions in conjunction with other artillery fire as a
feint. The defenders did not react and the preparatory fires continued after a pause to
bombard the enemy for a later attack. This author concludes that Marines did use smoke
more than this, or else its use for a feint would not be believable. Given that so much
high explosive did so little damage, firing smoke would have been well worth the effort
to carry it forward if it reduced the accuracy of defensive fires. Smoke grenades saw
very useful service reducing enemy positions. As suppressive fires covered the
demolition team's move forward, a man would throw a smoke grenade into the opening
to blind defenders and detect other openings, air vents and the like. Smoke grenades also
gave concealment as men moved forward to place the satchel charges. 196
Throughout this period, Marine commanders began to use the welcome cloak
of darkness to screen their movements. A total of approximately twenty-one night patrols
and attacks occurred on Okinawa. The Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, perhaps
composed of somewhat more enterprising and homicidal individuals than regular line
units, conducted thirteen of these.





All night operations were...performed in an orthodox manner...In every case surprise
was achieved and the night attack or movement was successful.
A Japanese Colonel Yahara described them as,
...particularly effective, taking the Japanese completely by surprise. The Japanese
had so accustomed themselves to ceasing organized hostilities at nightfall,
and...reorganizing and relaxing during the night that attacks in these hours caught
them both physically and psychologically off-guard. 197
7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation
Throughout the latter stages of the war, Marine tankers and infantry displayed
superb cooperation, motivated by mutual survival. Marines had learned that "processing"
enemy positions paid off. Tanks would blaze away at designated positions to enable
infantry to work up close with demolitions. Of course, since war is unpredictable, results
varied from day to day. At times Japanese would come out in the open and tankers
"...blew them all over the landscape." Protecting infantry might get lucky and directly
hit and detonate the satchel charges carried by suicide teams, with terminally effective
results. Against effective antitank support and if the infantry could not advance, tanks
suffered terribly. One assault on Kakazu village resulted in a tank-pure assault. The
Japanese knocked out twenty-two of thirty tanks. 198 Overall, tank losses by the end of
May reached 221, including 12 of the precious flame tanks. 199
197
Discussion and opinions of night attacks comes from Frank, Victory , 387-388.
198 These accounts of tank-infantry cooperation come from Belote, Typhoon , 199, 250-251.
199 Gordon Warner, The Okinawa War (Okinawa: Ikemiya Shokai, 1985). 117.
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Against the ferocious and skillful resistance of the Japanese, only carefully
combined tank, infantry and engineer assaults stood a chance of advancing. Accounts of
the fighting are a virtually monotonous litany of "...tank fire, flame, and
demolitions...temporarily subdued the Japanese...and enabled companies...to
advance..."200 The tanks always attracted a great deal of direct and indirect fire
attention, so the infantry often covered tankers against suicide demolitions teams with
long range fire when open terrain permitted. To gain an appreciation for the ratio of
tanks to infantry, consider that some attacks saw fifteen tanks, two of them flamethrowers,
supporting one infantry battalion and thirty tanks, four of them flamethrowers, supported
another rifle battalion. That is virtually one half or one complete tank battalion
supporting a rifle battalion for particularly tough defenses.201
Commanders on both sides recognized the criticality of the portable firepower
and protection afforded by the tank. Marine General Sheperd of the 6th Marines singled
out armor as "...having contributed more than any others during the progress of the
campaign...". General Ushijima's Thirty-second Army published a battle lesson noting,
...the enemy's power lies in his tanks. It has become obvious that our general battle




Frank, Victory , 250
201 These examples of specific actions come from Frank, Victory , 259-260.
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Frank, Victory , 386.
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Throughout the long course of the Pacific war, Marines developed most of the
same techniques Army units adopted. Reducing strongpoints called for close artillery-
tank-infantry cooperation at a minimum and often added demolition men and
flamethrowers. This came to be known as "corkscrew and blowtorch." Rapid assaults
on the heels of the last artillery rounds saved lives. Tankers installed field telephones on
their rear fenders so that infantrymen could patch into the vehicle intercom and direct
fires for the buttoned-up crews. Armor crewmen also countered the feared Japanese
magnetic mine by covering vulnerable flat surfaces with oak planking.
On Okinawa, regular and flame tanks tried where possible to roam ahead of
the infantry by hundreds of yards to blast and burn enemy positions at point blank range.
As the terrain worsened into numerous draws and valleys the infantry had to first seize
the high ground to cover engineers clearing mines. Once tanks could move forward, the
tank-infantry teams worked down both sides. "Each cave position is attacked by fire until
neutralized, then burned out with flamethrowers, and eventually sealed by
demolitions."203
8. Engineers
Engineer work consisted mostly of clearing mines to allow the tanks to move
forward as previously mentioned. Besides the normal probing methods, accounts exist
of two innovative clearing techniques. One infantry sergeant crawled into an
203 Major General Pedro A. del Valle, "Cave Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette volume 29, No.
7, (July 1945), 58, quoted in Frank, Victory , 726. For more detail on the cited aspects of tank-
infantry fighting, see Frank, Victory . 720-725.
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antipersonnel minefield to detonate mines with submachine-gun fire. An infantry
battalion laid seven tons of bangalore torpedoes in the ruts a tank tread would go through
and detonated them. If there were mines, the bangalores apparently worked. Some
engineers accompanied infantry platoons to operate the flamethrowers and set
demolitions.204
9. Artillery
Despite prodigious quantities of shells fired, actual killing was limited, perhaps
as litde as one dead Japanese for every one hundred shells. The greatest effect of indirect
fire was to drive exposed troops inside or kill them, which allowed tanks and infantry to
overrun and seal up tunnel entrances and caves. The Japanese had to leave some number
of troops out in trenches and rifle pits to guard the cave mouths and tunnel entrances.
If these men survived the artillery, they tried to hold off the Marines until troops below
could reinforce them. If the artillery and ground units timed the assault correctly, the
artillery would get the infantry close enough to kill those above and trap other defenders
underground. Apparently, only the 8 inch howitzer's 200 pound shell could penetrate the
Japanese caves and pillboxes. Unfortunately, these weapons arrived late in the battle and
with limited ammunition.
Direct fire artillery had much greater effect when the weapons could bear on
a pillbox or similar position. The M-7 self-propelled 105mm gun answered many calls
to move up and use direct lay against positions. Smaller caliber weapons would engage
204
Details of field expedient mine clearing comes from Belote, Typhoon . 179, 256. More
traditional engineer work is described by Frank, Victory , 262.
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the target to identify it for larger guns. In many instances, only the direct fire of the
heaviest artillery weapons available could knock out some Japanese positions.
To add exceptional weight to preattack bombardments and defensive fires,
Marine artillery and naval planners assigned two ships to each frontline regiment
throughout the campaign. One ship provided illumination and the other high explosive
fire. Fire support ships performed the same missions throughout and so fire support
continually improved. During exceptionally tough fighting, some battalions had one
destroyer in direct support. Possibly the ultimate tactical support from naval gunfire came
on 16 May when the battleship USS Colorado destroyed two Japanese antitank guns.205
10. Air Support
Air strikes added weight to the artillery bombardments which tried to soften
up defenders. Whenever weather permitted, aircraft flew close air support, but no clear
effects emerge for two reasons. First, since the strikes augmented artillery fire, assessing
which did what damage was impossible. Secondly, with the Japanese occupying caves
and tunnels, a pilot could rarely pick out a specific target and assess effectiveness.
Aircraft probably helped hit reverse slope positions, but no available sources address the
question in detail. Planes also airdropped supplies to forward troops on occasion as well
as acting as artillery forward observers.
Artillery and naval gunfire information is summarized from, Huber, "Japanese
Counterartillery," 100-101, Belote, Typhoon , 179 and 195, Warner, Okinawa . 93, and Frank,
Victory
. 260, 384-386 and 725.
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11. C2
The close in nature of the fighting, the virtual impossibility of infiltration by
Americans and the aggressive leadership of Marine officers meant that commanders could
usually observe their units and used no exceptional methods for command and control.
Defensive command and control took advantage of the interconnecting tunnels to facilitate
units' internal control, but the incessant American shelling took its toll of wire and
runners. Thus, the higher commanders had trouble coordinating the efforts of all
subordinates. Most tunnels and caves did not interconnect, so the artillery caused
disruption meant hours of delay in passing messages at best. The Thirty-second Army
could not coordinate subordinate actions. Japanese offensive operations had to occur at
night and the difficulty of marshalling forces rapidly enough in sufficient size proved a
major stumbling block.206
12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets
Marines loved their flame weapons, especially the tank mounted variety.
These tanks used a mixture of six percent napalm and gasoline to create an effective
psychological weapon from which even the Japanese sometimes fled. Men carried the
new M2-2 flamethrowers into action on Okinawa. Each Marine division had 243 and
they performed very well throughout. A contemporary account gives a feel for the
Marines' affections for the weapon.
The charge didn't stop the sniping so the portable flame thrower [sic] was
employed. Each entrance was given a two to three second burst and a heavy
206
Huber, "Japanese Counterartillery," 101-103.
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machine gun section 600 yards to the rear of Hill 99 had a field day shooting the
Japs as they came out the top.207
Difficult reverse slope positions inspired one Marine unit to split open drums of napalm,
roll them down the hill and ignite them with white phosphorous grenades.208
13. Historical Lessons
As one Marine General noted,
No new or unusual features of infantry combat were disclosed or developed during
the campaign on Okinawa which would tend to modify or annul current standard
principles or doctrines.209
Stubborn defensive positions required good tank-infantry teamwork, demolitions and
prodigious use of flame weapons to root them out. Artillery killed many of the Japanese
above ground if they stayed up to defend the cave and tunnel entrances. If infantry and
tanks can close on the enemy as indirect fires lift, chances of success are much higher
because the attacker will catch the defender emerging from cover. Strong bunkers and
caves required very large caliber weapons to reduce them, and direct fire worked best for
that.
Mine clearing seemed to take many forms and various field expedient
techniques worked. Night assaults took the enemy by surprise and made much greater
207 McKinney. Flamethrower , 166.
208 The napalm trick did not achieve noticeable results. For this and other narratives of flame
weapons, see McKinney, Flamethrower , 162-169, Belote, Typhoon , 196, and Frank, Victory , 263,
384-387.
209 General Geiger, quoted by Frank, Victory , 387.
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gains than daylight attacks over the same ground. The replacement system helped build
cohesion by training men in certain units and feeding them into those same units as
needed. Telephones mounted on tanks were crucial to allowing infantry to direct tank
fires from covered locations. Smoke played a key role right down at the soldier level in
screening attackers from defenders' observation and by identifying the scope of cave
complexes.
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VI. THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE: THE SCHOOL OF HARD KNOCKS
Thus war, the horseman, turned back to his crimson courts and
dragged brave gallants by their belts, girls by their braids, and hung
small children from his saddle horns in clusters. Behind him the
blind followed, stumbling with long staffs, and some way back the
cripples, the armless, the half-wits, and mothers in long rows who
walked alive toward Hades.
Nikos Kazantzakis: The Modern Odyssey, A Sequel , 1958
A. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE BREAKTHROUGH OF POSITIONAL DEFENSES
An analysis of Soviet doctrine in assaulting fortified positions is extremely fruitful
for two reasons. First, by learning from and against the Germans, the Soviets had to learn
to overcome excellent defenses. Second, the Soviet levee en masse required more
centralized thinking and a doctrine written out in very specific detail. Thus, Soviet
published guidance is very valuable for analysis. In the summer of 1944, the General
Staff of the Red Army published Instructions on the Breakthrough of Positional Defense
to provide detailed guidance to subordinates at various levels on exactly how to assault
fortified positions. Since the contents of this document came from years of practical
experience, the techniques are battle proven and Soviet units used these tactics for the rest
of the war. This chapter will examine Soviet published doctrine and its employment in
two offensives: the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation in October 1944 and AUGUST STORM,
the Soviet offensive in Manchuria, August 1945.
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1. Terrain
The manual applied to all types of terrain because guidance was sufficiently
general. At the same time, the document dwelt on specific terrain factors in chapters
covering tank-infantry tactics and selection of the geographical areas to be attacked and
where friendly units formed up. Considerations used to guide the selection of the
breakthrough sector were broken down by branches (infantry, artillery, etc.) and further
described as requirements which must be met or should be met.210
2. Attacker
Each subordinate component was addressed and direct responsibilities
delineated. The General Staff specified the requirements of each level (army, division,
regiment, etc.) and directed close physical coordination during planning to reduce
confusion. More specific examples will be covered in following sections. The reader
must keep in mind that the techniques used by the Soviets relied on the tremendous
numerical and materiel advantages possessed by the Red Army. The tactics, while those
of a larger force, did incorporate good thinking and did not rely on costly frontal assaults.
The early years of the war taught the Soviets many things.
3. Defender
The document naturally geared its guidance to defeating Germans, and since
thorough knowledge of German tactics by all Soviets officers could not be assured, the
2,0 General Staff of the Red Army, Instructions on the Breakthrough of Positional Defense ,
translated by the Canadian Directorate of Military Intelligence, (Ottawa, Canada: Army
Headquarters, 1955), 14-16.
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first chapter covered German defensive organizations and techniques. The description of
defenses in depth and what considerations would guide the attackers planning applied to
any defense in depth. The tactics prescribed by the General Staff worked well against
both the Germans and later against the Japanese.
4. Narrative
The second part of this chapter will examine the actual employment of this
doctrine in two different battles against two different opponents. Specifics of those battles
will be covered then.
5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling
The General Staff stressed a thorough organization of reconnaissance as the
basic precondition for a successful breakthrough of deeply echeloned continuous positions.
Reconnaissance from a variety of sources overlapped to give a complete and thorough
picture of enemy defenses and constituted every commander's most important duty.
These sources included aerial, direct observation, artillery, armored, engineer, signal
reconnaissance and finally a reconnaissance in force to confirm the knowledge gathered
by other means.
Within aerial means, the Soviets ranked aerial photography as the principle
method and stressed that it must occur at various times during the day. Constant visual
observation, if correctly organized, provided invaluable data. This ground observation had
specific tasks, primarily to find obstacles and antitank weapons. Artillery reconnaissance
sought out defending artillery and mortar groupings and exact locations for all targets.
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The General Staff stressed that all commanders of all arms would conduct joint
observation of the terrain with their subordinates. Armored commanders used aerial
photographs and other sources to study enemy antitank defenses and the best avenues for
their own tanks. Engineers used other branches' information and sent small scouting
teams deep into the enemy positions for first hand information. Signal units gathered data
to plot the locations of enemy command posts for targeting. All arms joined in
supporting the reconnaissance in force, which was conducted in a divisional breakthrough
zone by an infantry battalion, one or two engineer platoons, supporting artillery and tanks
under cover of smoke when practical.2"
6. Use of Obscuration/Smoke
In the assault, attacking forces used two different types of smoke screens.
Blinding smoke fell directly on the enemy and camouflaging smoke was laid between the
attackers and defenders or within the depth of attacking forces. Troops used several
different means to generate the smoke: smoke grenades and pots, artillery and mortar
smoke shells, aircraft mounted smoke dispensers, aerial smoke bombs and by smoke
generators.
Guidance stressed producing smoke along a front two to three times wider than
the attack frontage. A screen of this width would hopefully blind enemy observers and
direct fire weapons, confuse the enemy as to the main thrust, and prevent defenders firing
into the flanks of the assaulting troops. The Staff suggested laying smoke screens on
211 For all the considerations of intelligence gathering, see Red Army Staff, Instructions . 6-14.
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separate sectors of the front with intervals between the screens. Such a method supported
three goals: creating infiltration corridors, degrading defensive interlocking fires, and
economizing assets to allow a wider front to be smoked. The regulation dedicated two
of four appendices to tables of required amounts of various shells to create various
screens.
7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation
The Soviets considered armor to be primarily "close-infantry-support" during
the "breakthrough of positional defense." Later exploitation of the breakthrough used
tanks as the central arm.
In a breakthrough operation, tanks and SP artillery constitute one of the decisive
means...enabling the infantry to push impetuously through the entire depth of the
enemy's main defense zone.212
Commanders ordered tank units to clear lanes through wire obstacles and knock out heavy
weapons blocking the infantry. Orders stressed close cooperation between tanks, infantry
and engineers. Preferably, tanks moved forward in two waves. Medium and
minesweeping tanks led, followed by a second echelon of heavy tanks, SP guns and
flamethrower tanks 100 to 400 meters behind for support. This second echelon also
supported the infantry and stayed within 200 meters of the infantry. If terrain or obstacles
required it, infantry lead with the tanks and SP guns mixed in with them.213
212 Red Army Staff, Instructions , 35-36.
213 Red Army Staff, Instructions , 35-38.
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Leading infantry units formed assault groups, reinforced by tanks or SP guns
and engineers to destroy specific strongpoints.214 While the document mentions assault
groups several times, the composition is very unclear. Later study of the battles will
clarify this important point. Oddly, the instructions do not discuss infiltration into enemy
positions by combat elements, even though this routinely occurred.
For the actual assault, forces were to be entrenched in "jumping-off trenches"
very close to the enemy. As the artillery and air preparation neared a close, direct fire
weapons opened up for 10-15 minutes. The infantry then made final weapons checks,
readied assault ladders, demolition charges and the like and steeled themselves for the
ordeal ahead. Commanders ordered men to fire continuously while advancing under
cover of oblique fire from their direct fire heavy weapons. Tanks fired through gaps
between friendlies to suppress deeper defenses. The General Staff emphasized that
leading elements kept moving rapidly and left stubborn resistance to second echelon units.
Enemy dug-outs and other structures are showered with grenades and bottles filled
with inflammable substances. Their enemy garrison is burned out by jets of flame
projected by portable flame-throwers or flame-thrower tanks.215
Although the Soviets stressed the primacy of infantry during the breakthrough, close work
between all branches was required.216
2,4 For discussion of assault groups, see Red Army Staff, Instructions . 37 and 61.
215 Red Army Staff, Instructions
.
62
2,6 For details of tank-infantry cooperation and the conduct of the attack itself, see Red Army
Staff, Instructions . 57-65.
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8. Engineers
Of all those whose lives which might be nasty, brutish and short, the engineers
rank first. During the preparation phase, some went deep as scouting elements. Planning
staffs also ordered engineers to prepare the jumping-off positions of complexity including
positions for all infantry, tanks, artillery and the like. The jumping-off trench would
include myriad items such as,
...storage places for engineer equipment earmarked for the crossing of obstacles by
the infantry, tanks and artillery as well as for the consolidation of the terrain
(assault ladders and bridges, fascines, mats, knife-rests, sandbags, pointers indicating
the location of passages through obstacles etc.), ladders, ramps and steps for going
over the top when the attack begins.217
Most important of all, the Red Army Staff expected engineers to clear obstacles in the
zone of attack. The actual goal was to lift all mines in the main sectors, and if that could
not be done, two to three passages per attacking rifle or tank company were to be cleared.
The engineers' role did not end when the attack began. Obstacles near key
enemy positions required the engineers to emplace demolitions the night before and set
them off when the artillery fire began. Special assault-sapper units accompanied tanks
and infantry to clear obstacles and assist in reducing strongpoints. These detachments
might carry flamethrowers and have flamethrower tanks and SP guns attached to
them.218 Soviet engineers apparently rarely suffered from boredom.
217 Red Army Staff, Instructions , 43.




Soviet planners believed that a successful assault was "based chiefly on the
neutralization of this defense by artillery and mortar fire."219 Interestingly,
counterbattery fire, while included, was not the highest priority.
The principal tasks.. .are to inflict heavy damage on enemy personnel and fire
weapons located in the main defense zone...neutralize artillery and mortar batteries
and blast passages through anti-personnel and anti-tank obstacles. It is most
important in this connection that enemy fire weapons and personnel...should be
neutralized simultaneously throughout that position's entire depth.220
Guidance to artillery units was quite specific and lengthy so only some salient points will
be examined here.
The Soviets believed that artillery groups should stay as close as possible to
the combined arms formations and units they supported, since the sole purpose of the
artillery was to facilitate the advance of those units. Towards that end, a portion of all
available guns was detailed for direct fire to destroy enemy pill-boxes, dug-outs,
strongpoints and buildings and clear lanes in wire obstacles. A battery of guns reinforced
each rifle battalion and accompanied it throughout the depth of the defenses.
Indirect fire concentrated on destroying key parts of the defensive fortifications
and obstacles. Soviet artillery also sought to clear sectors of minefields. A creeping
barrage led the attacking units when possible. Such a barrage required five to six
batteries for every one kilometer of front width. The barrage would pause for
2,9 Red Army Staff, Instructions
.
21.
220 Red Army Staff, Instructions , 25.
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concentrated effort on known positions before the infantry and tanks conducted a close
assault.
221
Regulations required artillery forward observers to accompany units within
the battle formation, riding in armored vehicles equipped with radios. Air liaison officers
co-located with ground unit headquarters.222 Apparently air controllers did not conduct
any terminal guidance for pilots.
10. Air Support
The air role in assaulting a fortified position was straightforward. During the
preparatory phase, Soviet air units tried to gain air superiority over friendly and enemy
positions. During the assault, the Red Air Force emphasized close support by attacking
defensive positions and artillery units, especially those on reverse slopes. Aircraft also
sought to prevent reserves from joining the battle and fought to maintain aerial
supremacy. The Red Army General Staff believed,
The most important conditions for the successful employment of the air force in
battle are: the concentration of the air effort in a narrow sector on the most
important targets defined with exactitude on the terrain and the uninterruptedness
of that effort.223
11. C2
Extremely centralized planning characterized Soviet breakthrough planning.
While this exceptionally rigid structure had many defects, the writing out of all required
221
For details of the artillery role, see Red Army Staff, Instructions . 21-30.
222 Red Army Staff, Instructions , 54.
223 For more information concerning air missions, see Red Army Staff, Instructions , 31-35.
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tasks in this manual brings out several excellent points any attacker must consider. First,
the commander defined the general aim and intention of the battle. Second, he organized
all his subordinate units, defined their zones and planned their employment. For his own
command and control of the battle, he planned,
...organization of tactical control (selection of command and observation posts in
the jumping-off place and their displacement in the course of the battle,
organization of communications, working out of uniform orienting points and
signals etc.
224
Planning covered an exhaustive list which serves as a useful checklist to any commander.
Throughout all planning, the Soviets kept in mind that their goal was a breakthrough, and
tailored all work towards the overall objective.225
Since the Red Army had far fewer radios than other armies, signal flares and
other visual signals assumed great importance. Visual signals coordinated action between
units at lower levels and marked locations of front lines for air strikes. Written guidance
repeatedly emphasized that commanders had to ensure units possessed adequate amounts
of signal flares and that designated men knew and watched for signals.226
12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets
Soviet staff guidance placed exceptional emphasis on reconnaissance gathering
by all possible means. By ordering all the various branches to conduct their own types
224 Red Army Staff, Instructions . 17.
225 Command and control considerations are scattered throughout the document. For the major
ones cited here, see Red Army Staff, Instructions . 16-17.




of reconnaissance, or to interpret existing information from their perspective, the General
Staff did its best to insure that nothing "fell through the cracks." Long range engineer
scouting, if done well, would give valuable data on rearward enemy positions and general
trafficability. This might influence where a commander wanted to get his forces, and thus
from where they would start.
Artillery was employed in various unique ways to conform to these regulations.
A very large percentage of total guns available were deployed in the direct fire role,
where their accuracy is much greater. Also, one sees the concept of a dedicated battery
in use here, one battery per rifle battalion. One of the key roles for artillery operating in
the indirect mode was to blast paths through obstacles, such as minefields and wire. Note
the heavy concentrations of fire this would require.
The Soviets attached great importance to flame weapons of all types, both
man-portable and tank mounted. The amount of space devoted to emphasizing flame
weapons shows that these weapons obviously made a significant impression on certain
participants, such as bunker occupants.
B. THEORY INTO PRACTICE
When put to the acid test of combat, the General Staff instructions came out well.
Soviet units followed the overall instructions with some changes and met success fighting
both Germans and Japanese.
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1. Terrain
The two battles examined occurred in the very different terrain of eastern
Manchuria and near the Norwegian-Soviet border above the Arctic Circle.
a. Manchuria
Fighting in Manchuria occurred in Japanese fortified areas astride
relatively open terrain of river valleys and the like. These areas formed the most
accessible routes for movement, since other areas on the flanks consisted of dense forests
and mountainous areas. The areas used by the Japanese for defensive fortifications
consisted of hills covered with vegetation ranging from sparse to heavily wooded. The
rivers themselves played no real role in the fighting.227
b. Petsamo-Kirkenes
Fighting here took place 200 miles above the Arctic Circle. The coastal
region consisted of tundra and a few bare moss covered hills. Further inland, ground
becomes rock-strewn and very hilly. During the October fighting, temperatures ranged
between 23 and 41 degrees Fahrenheit. Daylight went from thirteen hours each day to
ten within thirty days as winter approached. Streams, swamps and lakes made movement
difficult and heavy fog coupled with frequent precipitation reduced visibility and took a
227 LTC David M. Glantz, August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in
Manchuria. 1945. Leavenworth Papers No. 8. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute,
1983), 7, 11, 19. For the specific passages describing the Hutou fortified region, see Dr. Edward
Drea, "Reduction of a Fortified Region", chap, in August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational
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Both of these operations, occurring late in the war, included attacking
commanders with wartime experience. Staff work also showed the lessons of a long and
bloody war.
a. Manchuria
The Soviet 5th Army deployed from East Prussia in overwhelming
strength. A complete listing of forces takes several pages, but the force included all arms
in great quantity. Units deployed in secret, practiced with weapons and studied Japanese
defenses. Officers with experience assaulting German positions briefed officers of forces
already facing the Japanese. When allocating attack frontages, General Krylov could
assign frontages in breakthrough sectors as small as 1.1 kilometers for a rifle division.
This allowed massing 250 guns/mortars per kilometer and thirty tanks or SP guns in that
same kilometer.229
The Soviet 35th Army faced the defenders of Hutou, the most complex
strongpoint in Manchuria. The Soviets here needed to get through the deeply echeloned
defenses quickly to make the Japanese fail in their goal of delaying and interdicting the
228 Major James F. Gebhardt, The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and
Pursuit in the Arctic. October 1944. Leavenworth Paper No. 17, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat
Studies Institute, 1989), 4-5.
229 Glantz, August Storm . 13-16.
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attackers. Soviet numerical superiority allowed them to send mobile detachments around
the fortress while other units reduced the defenses.230
b. Petsamo-Kirkenes
The remoteness of the area, especially the sparse road net, dictated rather
unique qualities for these Soviet forces. Instead of trucks, pack animals carried supplies
for most units. Total tank strength of all types came to about 74 T-34s and KV-ls
combined with 34 JSU-152s. The Soviets put in as much artillery as possible to weight
their assaults, finally achieving concentrations of about 150 tubes of artillery and mortars
per kilometer. The mission was to surround and destroy the German XIX Mountain
Corps and open the way into northern Norway.231
3. Defenders
The defenses the Soviets attacked varied greatly. First, those in Manchuria
were Japanese and those in the Petsamo-Kirkenes region were German. Those of the
Japanese were on a much greater scale than those of the Germans, since the Japanese
built theirs over years of peace in a more temperate area with more labor and resources.
a. Manchuria
Throughout Manchuria, the Japanese built Fortified Regions in the same
form. Positions sat on hilltops with wide areas cleared away for unobstructed observation
and fires. This required fortifications of immense strength, since such positions forfeited
230
Drea, "Reduction," 107-109.
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Figure 8: Petsamo-Kirkenes (See Gebhardt, Petsamo , 5)
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advantages of concealment, reverse slope and the like.
Japanese centers of resistance consisted of underground reinforced concrete
fortifications, gun emplacements. ..Many of the reinforced concrete pillboxes had
walls up to one and one-half meters thick, with armor plating or armored gun
turrets...These. ..strongpoints, each occupying 250,000-square meter sectors, up to
two kilometers apart.. .usually located on dominant heights, consisted of reinforced
concrete positions or several timber and earth bunkers, as well as antitank, machine
gun, and artillery firing positions...The outer defenses of each strongpoint and the
defenses of the center as a whole included multiple barbed wire barriers, mines,
antitank ditches, and anti-infantry obstacles, usually covered by interlocking fields
of machine gun fire.232
The Japanese sent most of their forces to fight the Americans and recently fonned, poorly
trained troops comprised the majority of the defensive garrisons. Also, none expected the
Soviet Union to attack them during the relatively rainy month of August. 9 August found
most unit commanders away at 5th Army headquarters for a conference.233
b. Petsamo-Kirkenes
German defenses bore little resemblance to the large scale, if outdated,
Japanese works. The XIX Mountain Corps, almost full strength in men but short in
transport, defended a series of strongpoints. Stationed in this area for over three years,
the relatively combat inexperienced men now defended their front while ships withdrew
stockpiled supplies. The Germans only occupied the first belt of defenses, with the next
two available for a withdrawal. Germans placed strongpoints of steel-reinforced concrete
bunkers, trenches and firing points on hilltops. Infantry companies, sometimes augmented
232
Glantz, August Storm , 1 1
.
For information on Japanese defenses, see Glantz, August Storm , 10-13, and
Drea,"Reduction," 100-106.
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with engineer platoons and artillery observers, garrisoned some of the strongpoints.
Barbed wire, minefields and infantry patrols covered the ground outside the positions.
Some infantry platoons occupied some smaller strongpoints. With no tanks, and not
enough men, the Germans awaited the Soviet attack which they expected and whose main
efforts they accurately predicted.234
4. Narrative
Few participants of either battle doubted the outcomes. The strategic results,
so much a foregone conclusion, do give a student an excellent look at the tactical fighting
within the fortified positions.
a. Manchuria
Rain and incomplete intelligence caused a last minute change in the plans
of attack in most regions of Manchuria. General Krylov called off the artillery
bombardment and air missions. Infiltrating infantry battalions supported by tanks and
facing totally surprised defenders moved deep into Japanese positions before those
defenders could muster an effective resistance. Night assaults, the rapid tempo and
effective use of combined arms brought a breakthrough in a few days with few casualties.
At Hutou, where the attackers hopefully had better intelligence, the
preparatory fires fell as planned and wreaked havoc with communications. A hesitant
Japanese commander refused to order his artillery to reply until 1100 hrs, ten hours after
the start of fighting. The rapid movement of assault teams deep into rear areas insured
234 For details of the German defenders of the XIX Mountain Corps, see Gebhardt, Petsamo ,
6-10.
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a rapid breakthrough. The Soviets, frugal with the lives of their soldiers, combined
massive firepower and skillful maneuver to reduce individual defensive positions. The
Japanese 4th Border Guard Unit fought to the last throughout the defensive complex and
assault teams blasted positions repeatedly while artillery and air strikes piled on.
Engineers burned or buried those elements still fighting.235
b. Petsamo-Kirkenes
On 7 October, Soviet gunners hurled 97,000 rounds of artillery and
mortars towards German positions. Assault teams moved forward to grapple with
remaining defenders. To their surprise, the heavy fog caused inaccuracy in the
preparatory fires and most strongpoints remained precisely that. The 2d Mountain
Division, unable to cover all the ground in its sector, found the numbers of infantrymen
attacking and infiltrating too much and gave ground over the next few days. Light
infantry forces circled around through terrible terrain to attempt an encirclement of the
Germans and, on 9 October, Naval Infantry landed behind the defenders. Overall,
however, the attackers could not move fast enough to pin the 2d Mountain Division down,
except for some bypassed strongpoints which interdicted Soviet resupply. Ultimately,
XLX German Corps pulled back into Norway in one piece, and the Soviet Union gained
control of part of Norway.236
235 For details of the combat in Manchuria that rainy August, see Glantz, August Storm . 21-
32, and Drea, "Reduction," 107-120.
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For details of the fighting in this remote region, see Gebhardt, Petsamo , 31-38 and back
cover. The German view of Operation NORDLICHT, their delay and withdrawal, is presented by
Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945 , Department of the Army
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5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling
Intelligence, specifically the denial of much of it to the Japanese, tremendously
aided the Soviet strike into Manchuria. With terrain and weather the dominant factors
in the far north, intelligence had much less effect.
a. Manchuria
Elaborate deception and security measures enabled the Soviet 5th and
35th Armies to achieve total surprise when they attacked. Units moved almost
exclusively at night into positions prepared in advance by engineers. Higher level staff
officers manned the traffic control points, all as dictated in General Staff Instructions .
Engineers erected massive amounts of camouflage screens and netting. Artillery,
performing final training in their rear assembly areas, got the Japanese used to constant
artillery fire and delayed defensive reaction when the attack went in. No mention exists
of deep patrolling or aerial reconnaissance. Since no state of war existed, and such
activity, if detected, would alert the Japanese, planners probably decided the added
surprise would offset limited intelligence. Since the rain and great success of the
infiltrating infantry made artillery fire unnecessary in most sectors, the choice was sound.
6. Use of Obscuration/Smoke
Both offensives saw much of the fighting occur in limited visibility. In
Manchuria, almost all combat or tactical movement preparing for combat occurred at
night. This concealed the attackers from the Japanese defenders and also greatly surprised
Pamphlet No. 20-271. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 15 December 1959), 301-311.
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the defenders. In the Petsamo-Kirkenes fighting, the first assault occurred in the morning
under very foggy conditions. The frequent precipitation offered concealment at various
times throughout the offensive. No accounts mention the use of smoke.
7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation
The strongpointed nature of the defenses faced led both attacking armies to use
assault groups as directed in the Red Army Staff guidance. Differing factors in each case
influenced the make up of these groups. Both operations provide superb examples of
close synchronization of all available assets.
a. Manchuria
Japanese defenders called the Soviet tactics "infiltration tactics" and they
picked exactly the right phrase. Under the protective cloak of darkness, infiltrating
infantry battalions, with supporting armor following behind, began to slip into Manchuria
proper, occupy empty Japanese positions and subdue those defenders who could organize
some resistance. By dawn, after breaking down into assault units and surrounding many
major positions, attackers called down artillery, suppressed the defenders with heavy fire
from the armor and closed in with infantry and engineers. By the first night, lead
elements found themselves as far as twenty-two kilometers deep into Japanese territory.
Follow on units took three days to subdue stubborn defenders. Direct fire from 152mm
guns on the JSU-152s covered infantry and engineers armed with explosives and
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flamethrowers as they seared out and sealed up the defenders.237 The following passage
describes Soviet organization in the Hutou area.
To reduce the Japanese fortifications the Soviets formed assault groups from the
attached combat engineer battalion and the forward rifle companies of the division's
first echelon battalions...These assault groups would infiltrate and reduce the
Japanese positions. The division assault groups consisted of a rifle platoon with a
field engineer unit and an antitank squad, one or two tanks or self-propelled artillery
mounts, two machine gun squads, and two manpack flamethrower crews...238
b. Petsamo-Kirkenes
This front used much smaller assault teams, possibly because of the
narrower frontage, the smaller size of German strongpoints and the more difficult supply
situation.
To remove German obstacles and destroy reinforced positions, the Soviets created
assault groups and obstacle detachments within first-echelon infantry units. An
assault group usually consisted of a specially trained rifle platoon reinforced with
a heavy machine gun or two engineer squads. A rifle battalion would have one
such composite platoon.239
8. Engineers
Red Army engineers performed yeoman service in these fights. The first part
of this chapter listed the vast array of tasks demanded of engineers. The sappers did all
that others expected of them.
237 For good descriptions of the tactical coordination and the highly exciting life of combat
troops in this fighting, see Glantz, August Storm . 20-29, and Drea, "Reduction," 122-123.
238
Drea, "Reduction", 116.
239 Gebhardt, Petsamo . 22.
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a. Manchuria
Engineer-sapper units formed key components of the more than one
hundred assault groups of the Soviet 5th Army reducing fortified positions. Every first
echelon rifle company had two obstacle clearing detachments to speed its movement.
One rifle battalion, with from one to three engineer platoons, followed each rifle regiment
to insure routes could carry artillery, supplies and reinforcements forward. Some engineer
battalions, with tank support, fought by themselves to clear minefields and destroy
Japanese pillboxes and other positions.240 Further eastward around Hutou,
Obstacle clearing groups included three or four machine gunners and three or four
combat engineers equipped with mine detectors, prodders, two bangalore torpedoes,
clippers, and compasses. Each first echelon rifle company had two such
groups.
b. Petsamo-Kirkenes
With terrain and weather as the toughest defenders, engineering efforts
in the far north mainly comprised road repair and building, river crossing and similar
efforts aimed at supporting the logistical efforts needed to keep the fighting going. The
long range engineer elements won praise from the Karelian Front commander, who noted
that,
...sappers controlled the roads, blew up bridges, and destroyed telephone lines,
causing disorder in the work of German rear services. Finally, on more than one




occasion, they directed our close air and bomber aviation to concentrations of
enemy troops.242
9. Artillery
Artillery planning closely followed General Staff guidance. Several factors
kept the gunners from playing as great a role as usual, but indirect fires still made critical
contributions.
a. Manchuria
Since the declaration of war closely coincided with the first infiltration
of Manchuria proper, little patrolling or aerial reconnaissance took place. This gave less
than adequate precision for an intelligence product capable of driving good preparatory
fires, and the Soviets chose not to fire artillery, except in Hutou. Surprise paid as good
or better dividends than the use of artillery. This is especially true considering that the
Japanese, not expecting an attack, only manned about one third of their positions at night.
If the defenders expected an attack and pulled back most of their forces to escape artillery
fires, the same result would probably have occurred. Heavy rains in western Manchuria,
which cloaked the infiltrating infantry and accompanying tanks, also softened the ground
and made artillery less effective.
In the Hutou area, artillery fired as planned. The artillery did not cause
many casualties, but unprotected means of communications suffered severely. This
precluded the higher headquarters from understanding the situation and thus influencing
it. Overall, fighting in this area became primarily a methodical reduction of the
242 Marshal Meretskov, quoted by Gebhardt, Petsamo . 107.
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individual fortifications. Remember that the 4th BGU was understrength and very
inexperienced. Troops of this type inside strong concrete and steel pillboxes took counsel
of their fears. Heavy shelling pinned them inside the pillboxes while assault teams moved
in close. As the artillery lifted, the Japanese could not "win the race to the parapets"
because the Soviet attackers had crept up and now had tanks and SP guns firing onto the
trenches and firing apertures of the positions.243
b. Petsamo-Kirkenes
The poor road network and relatively narrow strip of land providing any
decent trafficability at all limited the amount of armor used and made artillery more
important to both sides. This prompted typically detailed planning which included
counterbattery fires.
...Counterbattery fires were planned on the basis of "instrumental reconnaissance"
conducted during the preparatory period. Forty-three Soviet batteries were targeted
on the twenty-one German batteries that were plotted in this manner, a ratio of 2
to 1. A counterbattery mission would be 3 to 5 minutes of fire, achieving a density
of 25 to 30 rounds per hectare (an area 100 meters square) or 2,500 to 3,000 rounds
per square kilometer. Counterbattery fires-a combination of mortar and artillery
units firing 200 rounds per German battery-were to suppress German mortar
batteries in the zone of the main attack.244
Planning directed at least 8200 rounds of Katyusha rocket projectiles hit selected German
strongpoints. The terrain restrictions also meant that most artillery fired in the indirect
mode and fewer than normal guns used direct fire to support advancing infantry.
243
For details relevant to artillery in Manchurian fighting, see Drea, "Reduction," 110-121,
and Glantz, August Storm , 17-19.
244
Gebhardt, Petsamo , 18-19.
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Counterbattery fire ranked first in priority, followed by suppression of
positions and then the blasting open of lanes through obstacles. Following the preparation
fires, a quick transition followed to successive concentrations of fire to support the
infantry advance.
Under this system, the direct support indirect-fire assets were to concentrate their
fires on successive lines immediately in front of the attacking troops, shifting their
fires forward as the attack advanced. The 82-mm and 120-mm mortars were to fire
successive volleys, each 150 meters beyond the previous volley.243
Unfortunately, the ground fog and inaccuracies of "instrumental reconnaissance" degraded
the artillery's effectiveness and attacking troops did not make as rapid an advance as
hoped for. On the second day, forward troops moved beyond the range of artillery and
close air took over as the primary source of portable firepower.246
10. Air Support
Aviation units performed the roles that the Red Army Staff set down for them.
For different reasons, their activities in these battles did not amount to nearly as much as
any planners expected. Weather kept aircraft grounded in western Manchuria and in the
northern USSR. Only in the Hutou area of Manchuria did the air assets have much effect,
and there they just added weight to artillery fire that was already probably heavy enough.
The first meaningful air attacks above the Arctic Circle happened days after the fighting
31.
245 Gebhardt, Petsamo . 19.
246 For discussions of Soviet artillery planning and execution, see Gebhardt, Petsamo , 17-19,
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began and did cut much of the German wire communication. Few other examples of air
support exist.
11. C2
Lower level tactical Soviet units did not have the plethora of radios used by
modem forces nor even numbers close to those of their opponents. With forward
elements making different rates of progress forward and defensive positions holding on
throughout the battlefield, communicating to other units, headquarters and supporting arms
was a key problem. Visual signals such as flares, while having some drawbacks, held
several advantages as well. In the confusion of close quarter fighting, flares indicated
friendly positions with certainty and avoided any map reading errors. Flares fired at the
enemy assisted supporting guns or tanks to bring fire to bear quickly.
The control of artillery fires was critical to assaults of this nature. With so
many missions, the Soviet answer was to mass enough guns to perform all the missions,
and to prioritize those missions. No solution surfaced for controlling fires to avoid
friendly infiltrating troops. The streamlined infantry-artillery relationships coupled with
direct fire simplified artillery support.
Long periods of training gave units time to iron out problems face to face.
This working out was necessary for units such as Soviet which use individual
replacements or have high turnover for various reasons including the taking of casualties.
The huge numbers of engineers required puts far more engineer units into the equation
than other operations would and requires changes to higher unit organizations to adjust
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to this. Such changes have many effects on command relationships, communications nets
and the like. These must be ironed out and rehearsed for smooth operations.
12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets
No new weapons saw their genesis during the fighting. Several interesting
pieces of information came to light concerning innovative measures taken by various units
to solve problems or gain an advantage in unique ways. Study of some of these proves
illuminating and supports the old adage, "If you ain't cheatin', you ain't tryin'."
a. Manchuria
Soviet border guard detachments spent the entire period from 1941-1945
watching the Japanese across the border and knew the terrain intimately. Lieutenant
General Zakhatayev, commanding the Soviet 35th Army took full advantage of this asset
and used it well. Border guards crossed the Ussuri River first and occupied empty
positions or subdued any defenders before regular combat elements moved through. They
also guided combat units through the unfamiliar terrain.247
b. Petsamo-Kirkenes
In the far north, with troops and supplies taking up all available space as
units advanced, medical units needed to be very creative. Knowing that many wounded
men would be lying in the many folds of the rocky grounds and especially low ground
that could be wet and freezing cold, quick evacuation was a problem needing a solution.
247 Discussion of air asset utilization is scattered. For one good passage, see Drea,
"Reduction," 109.
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Planners decided to use dogs to detect the wounded. Sleds, litters, and some aircraft
evacuated wounded but the Soviets also used reindeer as pack animals on occasion for
equipment and wounded men.248
13. Historical Lessons
Studying Soviet methods yields many very useful lessons for the military
student. The first is the value of one single document covering the special kind of
planning needed to assault a fortified position. The document was by no means perfect,
but heavily stressed key issues such as reconnaissance and close cooperation of tactical
units. When intelligence could not give an exact picture, commanders did not hesitate
to cancel artillery fires, demonstrating the degree to which intelligence should "drive the
train." Without good intelligence, a force cannot, by definition, conduct a truly deliberate
attack.
Tying in with that thought, one sees the value of infantry infiltration under
cover of darkness. Surprise is probably the most sought after advantage a commander can
hope to attain. Good defenders usually lightly garrison the forward outpost areas and let
attackers expend their sound and fury there before the main event. Infiltration allows
assaulting forces to take terrain at low cost and save artillery and other assets for when
they will be needed more. Remember the need for portable firepower, though, and insure
that tanks or at least flamethrowers and similar weapons are up front for the infantry.
248
Gebhardt, Petsamo , 27.
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Almost all defensive positions have pillboxes, dug-outs, or some kind of
shelter for the troops to hide in under artillery fire. Artillery there is best used to keep
troops inside these structures instead of out in their trenches or firing pits. This means
artillery must fire extremely close to friendly troops and must provide close assaulting
fires while tanks, infantry and engineers clear their objectives.
Assaulting fortified positions takes enormous numbers of engineers. Even if
infantry takes over all tasks of manning flamethrowers and using demolition charges on
strongpoints, the continuous obstacle clearing and then the repair or creation of routes
through the devastated areas will require massive amounts of engineer labor. The
enormous amounts of materiel, especially the artillery displacing forward, will require
routes and cleared areas.
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VII. THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER EXPERIENCE: DO WE TRAIN AS
WE SHALL FIGHT?
I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies'
designs.
Pericles: Speech to the Athenians, 432 B.C.
I am not sorry that I went, not understanding what has happened.
One may pick up something useful from the most fatal errors.
James Wolfe: Of the Rochefort expedition, 1757
A. BACKGROUND
Armor, mechanized infantry, and occasionally cavalry and light infantry units rotate
through the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California to
undergo the most realistic training currently available in peacetime. Units conduct
battalion and brigade sized simulated battles against excellent, full time opposing force
units universally known as the OPFOR. Both sides in these mock battles use the Multiple
Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) to register kills on vehicles and personnel.
Units also conduct live-fire exercises at battalion level, normally consisting of two
defenses and one attack. During the live fire phase units use live ammunition against
mechanical targets and controllers assess kills on the units through the MILES system.
Realism comes from avoiding most of the simulations used in previous maneuvers.
For example, engineers actually dig tank ditches and troops dig fighting positions When
maneuvering in other training areas and especially in Germany, ditches are most often
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replicated by engineer tape and time delays imposed on attacking units to replicate the
time required to breach the obstacle. Units training at NTC, and other Combat Training
Centers, must actually breach ditches, minefields of inert mines and wire obstacles.
Codified Rules Of Engagement guide Observer/Controllers in replicating the actual
capabilities of weapons such as artillery and chemical agents as closely as possible. This
author will use the written results of selected training rotations, other studies which came
from direct observations, interviews with the head of the NTC Observation Division and
direct observations during this author's research trip to compare current training with
historical lessons to see if training may be improved.
One factor the reader must keep in mind is that until very recently, training units
did not face an actual fortified position of large size. Units did perform missions calling
for deliberate attacks where defenders used mines, wire and entrenchments, but these
varied in size and could not be compared with positions such as those at Kursk and El
Alamein. However, attacking units did face defenders who had used obstacles to
strengthen the defense, so training can be analyzed in the context of this thesis as long
as the mentioned factors are considered. Now, a new "Samarian" style of defense is used
by the OPFOR to defend against training units attacking in brigade strength.249 This
defense consists of large scale linear obstacles defended by dug-in infantry in depth
behind the obstacles. Armor is normally held in reserve or dug in behind the
249 Most brigades go through rotations with only two battalions rather than the full three.
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infantry 250 One example of this doctrine in practice saw 5200 meters of tank ditch and
three layers of wire and mines behind this ditch, for a total of twenty linear kilometers
of obstacles. Defenders, comprising approximately 500 men and ten tanks, occupied
entrenchments in depth behind the obstacle complex.
1. Terrain
The training area of Fort Irwin consists of open, desert terrain divided up by
mountains to form several large valleys. Some of these valleys merge at narrow gaps and
some merge in fairly wide areas. The ground is predominately hard packed and devoid
of any but sparse, ankle high vegetation. The bare, rocky mountains rise up sharply out
of the desert floor. Large scale unit movement occurs in the wide valleys and through
the gaps in the mountains.
2. Defenders
As noted, troop units stationed at Fort Irwin provide most of the Opposing
Force. National Guard, Reserve and some Regular Army units sometimes come to the
NTC, receive special training, and augment the OPFOR. Most of these units are
engineers and infantry. The OPFOR has an excellent reputation, plays to win and usually
does.
250
Captain David R. Hogg and Captain Kristian P. Thompson, "Doctrine and Tactics for the
Samaran Army," NTC Special Text 91-2, (Fort Irwin, CA: National Training Center, 1990), 2-1
through 2-13.
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3. Attackers: Process over Product?
Most training units are armored or mechanized, with an occasional cavalry or
light infantry unit training on desert terrain. As mentioned, these units train in live-fire
and "force-on-force" maneuver against the dedicated OPFOR. Unfortunately, current
trends indicate a high number of units suffer from a "trade unionism" such as afflicted
the British. Each of the training units comes with a "slice" element of supporting
elements from the other branches. These support elements are not always familiar with
the maneuver units they are assigned to support, and most often the maneuver unit
commander is not the actual commander of these supporting elements.251 A more
fundamental aspect of American units to bear in mind, especially as compared to the
Germans of WWII, is the tendency to become focused on the details of execution to far
too great a degree. As described by Lieutenant Colonel Quirk, head of the NTC's
Observation Division, "We worry about how we are going to do something rather than
what we are going to do."252
251 The supporting elements' leaders receive their fitness ratings, critical to promotion, from
their own parent commander and not the maneuver commander. Also, most units of all branches
are 'plussed up' to make a full strength unit to go through an NTC rotation. These factors, along
with the individual replacement system used by the U.S. Army, all work against the building of
cohesion such as done in the British or German armies. Such factors should be noted, but full
discussion is far beyond the scope and focus of this thesis.
232 LTC Michael Quirk, NTC Observation Division, interview by author, 21 November, 1990.
Hereafter cited as Quirk Interview.
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4. Narrative
A unit will receive a mission, plan and execute that mission and then discuss
the results with the Observer/ Controllers (O/Cs) in an After Action Review (AAR) to
help it learn and improve as rapidly as possible. These AARs use "discovery learning"
to draw out learning points from the "players" using observations from the O/Cs who
accompany the units and instrumented data which compile vehicle kills, exact vehicle
locations at critical times and other relevant data. O/Cs guide the discussions in a manner
which helps players themselves discover the mistakes made and how those impacted upon
battle outcome. Each combat vehicle, along with certain dismounted personnel, carries
equipment that sends data on current location and firing to a complex known as the "Star
Wars" building that shows vehicles, minefields, graphic control measures or whatever is
requested as the battle progresses. With this technology, an AAR done in a mobile van
a few hours after the battle for key unit leaders, can show actual positions and kills at key
moments in the battle. This discussion also draws out lessons concerning artillery,
engineers, electronic warfare, and anything else that effected the battle.253 These
discussions are useful because there is no predetermined event listing. Both sides are
given a mission, an area and as little interference as possible. The battle outcome
primarily depends on the players' actions. Following the review, the units continue
preparing for the next mission for which the order has already been given.
253 Verbal AARs are done at platoon and company level immediately after a battle. The more
technical AAR in the van is for company commanders and battalion level leaders.
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5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling
The experiences of units training at the National Training Center proves the
need for good intelligence if an attack is to succeed. Overall, units that conduct good
reconnaissance and develop a good intelligence picture do well and units that do not do
these things well fail.254 Good dismounted reconnaissance enhances the flow of
intelligence that is the key to forming a good picture to drive planning. In eleven battles
examined, this author found four of the five assaults with good intelligence
succeeded.255
Where intelligence is concerned, the NTC reinforces valuable proven lessons.
Scouting is stressed and lessons proven on the training ground have driven changes in
equipment ~ to improve survivability of reconnaissance elements ~ and tactics, both in
scouting the enemy and fighting enemy scouts. One major lesson is that training units
usually do not conduct quality dismounted reconnaissance and the OPFOR does. One
point recently brought out is the effectiveness of an attacker jamming defenders' radio
254 Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance experience at the NTC have had a major effect
on the Army. In fact, battalion level scout platoons are being reconfigured to use wheeled vehicles
instead of M3 Bradleys ~ a large tracked vehicle — to improve the stealth capability of scouts.
For the primary force behind this move, see Martin Goldsmith with James Hodges, Applying the
National Training Center Experience: Tactical Reconnaissance. RAND Report No. N-2628-A,
(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1987). Several units tested Goldsmith's suggestions
and proved their validity. Conclusions regarding the importance of intelligence at NTC also come
from research of battle records at Army Research Institute, Monterey, CA and the Quirk Interview.
255 Success and winning are very relative terms, and as such are best left to the eye of the
beholder. The author chose the battles examined primarily based upon very high OPFOR losses
or fairly low maneuver unit (BLUEFOR) losses. Each fight also must be viewed in the context
of mission accomplishment. Again, the thrust of this study is to see if units are subscribing to
historical lessons in their attacks.
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nets dedicated to intelligence gathering. This tactic deprives the defending commander
of knowledge he needs to guide him in meeting the main attack.256 This jamming should
occur as attackers approach the fortified position and jamming can then switch to enemy
command nets. Overall, NTC teaches the great value of radio intercepts, just as a study
of the British 'Y' service does.
One of the major assets for learning at the NTC is the OPFOR itself. These
soldiers use published Soviet doctrine to guide their actions. Earlier examination of the
Soviet experience illustrated the Soviet fetish for thorough reconnaissance. The thorough
OPFOR intelligence gathering, its use in driving planning and decision making, and the
success of wheeled vehicles played a key role in focusing attention on the subject and
forcing improvements. Dismounted reconnaissance is the key. Wheeled vehicles allow
scouts to live and get into position for dismounted observation. Armored scout vehicles
are usually detected and destroyed. "Gamesmanship" to some degree always exists and
many soldiers stress the artificialities that may allow things to occur in training and not
war. This author gives some of these arguments great credence, but good soldiers always
work for any possible advantage. If some artificiality brings forth the germ of a sound
idea, it should be "followed to its logical conclusion."257
256 This idea comes from Colonel Jordan, an officer currently with the NTC OPFOR. He
noted its effectiveness in a unit AAR on 20 November, 1990.
257
"Karl, a wink from a pretty girl at a party rarely results in climax, but a man would be a
fool not to follow the possibility to its logical conclusion." Robert Duvall, in the movie "The
Eagle Has Landed."
163
6. Use of Obscuration/Smoke
Overall, the use of smoke ranges from nonexistent to only marginally effective.
Units rarely use smoke at all and when it is used it is in amounts too small to be of use
and not in a useful position. For example, one unit which fired more smoke than most
still only fired an average of two smoke missions each battle. Of the eleven assaults
studied, smoke played a role of any kind in only two of them. Once it fell so near to
attacking forces that its use merely confused the unit's command and control and
hampered movement. The second time, smoke fell late and far out of sector. When
finally shifted thirty minutes later, it fell directly on the defenders in excellent quantity
and blocked from the defenders all view of the soldiers working on the breach.
Unfortunately, the delay allowed the defending commander to identify the main effort and
shift reserves. The artillery stopped firing smoke rounds just as the breaching force broke
through and the attack failed.258 This did illustrate a critical point, however. Smoke
placed directly on defenders, given proper atmospheric conditions, will block almost all
of the defenders' observation of the attackers but the attackers will have a clear view of
themselves and the leading portions of the initial obstacles. This point appears to directly
contradict current published doctrine that tells units to lift smoke so that they can suppress
defenders with direct and indirect fire.
Other observers note similar trends. Smoke routinely falls only on the friendly
side of obstacles and is not shifted as required. Engineers do not call for smoke, claiming
258
Personal observation of the author.
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that the maneuver units held that responsibility.259 Smoke is not sufficiently planned
throughout the operation. Artillery planners underestimate the quantity of smoke rounds
required for smokescreens of required density or duration. For example, a screen 1,000
meters long for 30 minutes duration delivered by a battalion mortar platoon would require
500 rounds. This platoon carries a total basic load of 528 rounds.260 Meteorological
messages from artillery channels are apparently under utilized in planning smoke
missions.261 One other problem in training is failure to request adequate amounts of
smoke pots and similar portable smoke producing devices. Units then do not have
enough on hand to properly train262 and so training does not drive home the value of
good smoke to soldiers. A key point to reemphasize is that smoke operations are
doctrinally covered by Chemical Corps officers and even appear in structured operations
orders under the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical section. None of these factors give
smoke operations real world emphasis.
While rotating player units rarely use smoke, the OPFOR has purchased stock
in the corporation. Deliberate attacks often see heavy smoke placed as closely on top of
259 Captain Joe Kopiness, "Combined Arms Assessment Team Report 88-2," (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1988), Observation Number 18. Hereafter
all such team reports will be cited as CAAT, followed by the report number and observation
number, so that this reference would read as Captain Joe Kopiness, CAAT 88-2-18.
260 Captain Andrew Sandoy, "Minefield Breaching," Center for Army Lessons Learned
Newsletter 88-2, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Training Activity, 1988),
11.
261
Captain S.R. Robinson, CAAT 88-2-5.
262 Captain McClearn, CAAT 88-2-10. This deficiency probably stems from limited
coordination of artillery, engineer and chemical staff officers at home station.
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defenders as possible. This negates the 'stand-off' range advantage of some weapons and
adds shock effect when a mass of infantry or armored vehicles emerges from a wall of
smoke with its weapons on 'rock and roll.'263
7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation
Of eleven attacks studied, only one showed excellent tank-infantry cooperation.
One company broke its tank platoon up to work under direction of the two infantry
platoons. The infantry, armed with antitank Dragon missiles, would flush out or destroy
OPFOR armored vehicles. If the defenders displaced, the infantry directed the tanks
using colored smoke and radio so that the tanks could easily kill the repositioning
vehicles. Other factors also contributed to this victory where; "The enemy's flank was
now opened and excellent long range tank fires working in concert with aggressive
infantry action destroyed the enemy piece by piece."264 In this attack, tanks lead the
attack and their long range fires killed many defenders, especially scouts. The close in
tank-infantry teamwork came in clearing the actual defensive positions. This again proves
the value of the lessons learned in the Bocage fighting in 1944. Presently, however, such
breaking down of units below platoon level is very uncommon.
263 This term means that machine guns are set to full automatic fire and a unit or individual
is putting out a heavy volume of bullets.
264
This quote comes from the Unit Take Home Package for this unit's rotation. Permission
to use this material comes with the provision that no published performance data will be linked
with a specific unit. The National Training Center exists for units to train, make mistakes and
learn. To preserve that freedom to err, results of training are not published as such. Since
knowledge of the training rotation number would enable the unit to be identified, traditional
citations of quotes cannot be given.
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In four of the eleven assaults, dismounted infantry went in the night before to
breach obstacles, pinpoint defenders and attack defenders in depth when the main attack
started. This use of dismounted infantry is stressed in training, and this is a correct
emphasis, considering the proven value of such operations by the Germans at Kursk and
the Soviets in Manchuria.
8. Engineers
The most common obstacle used by defenders is a combination of surface laid
mines and barbed wire, with buried mines coming into play recently. All mines, but
especially buried ones, deserve the following description; "Everything that is shot or
thrown at you or dropped on you in war is most unpleasant but, of all horrible devices,
the most terrifying.. .is the land mine."265 Of the eleven assaults examined, seven
encountered obstacles, normally of the standard pattern but occasionally including a tank
ditch. One of the seven assaulting forces chose to move through bad terrain to avoid all
the obstacles, fell upon the enemy flank and met with success. The other six units all did
some breaching. Two assaults had engineers go forward the night before with scouts and
these elements did make gaps through obstacles. The OPFOR very often gets its
engineers in early to attempt breaches as well. The small group could not widen these
gaps or mark them well and the assaulting units met with the same problems the British
did in the Highland Division minefield gaps during GOODWOOD. Only one assault
showed good breaching from close integration of engineers and other arms. Most attacks
265
Sir William Slim, Unofficial History , vi, quoted by Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. Dictionary of
Military and Naval Quotations
,
(Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1967), 193.
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spend at least an hour breaching obstacles and usually suffer severe casualties across the
force. Another study did cite a well done breach that still took thirty minutes using
manual techniques.266
Mechanical breaching shows varied success. The new tank mounted plow for
the Ml tank proved itself during a recent rotation. The Army's Mine Clearing Line
Charge (MICLIC) system failed to perform well.267 Also, under perfect conditions a
MICLIC only breaches 100 meters and mechanized engineer companies have only two
MICLICs with two reloads each.268
Another problem common to every breach was the inadequacy of current
marking techniques. These techniques are virtually identical to the ones designed by the
British at El Alamein. Engineer tape, white in color and about two inches wide, is the
universally used boundary marker. This tape is very hard to see in dust and smoke when
both the driver and vehicle commander are "buttoned up" going through the lane.269
Colored smoke is only effective at marking the entrance to lanes as long as someone stays
there to continue throwing the smoke grenades.270
266 Captain David J. Capp, CAAT 87-11-4.
267
Personal observation by the author.
268 Sandoy, "Minefield Breaching", 11.
269 Captain David J. Capp, 87-11-4.
270
Lieutenant Colonel Heimgartner, CAAT 88-2, Executive Summary.
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9. Artillery: The Emperor Has No Clothes
A common saying among artillerymen is that artillery is the "King of Battle"
because it puts the [cannon] balls where the Queen [infantry] wants them. Sadly,
National Training Center evidence shows that artillery rarely puts support where and when
anyone wants it.271 Some of this lack of effect comes from peacetime limitations. For
instance, nothing can truly replicate the concussion, noise and obscuration of rounds
impacting nearby. This limitation does at least "cut both ways", since neither side in the
battle necessarily gains an advantage and no one has come up with a better way. Flares
and simulators do indicate where fires land and casualties are assessed, so the many
limitations do not invalidate the lessons. The most disturbing trends are the repeated
failures stemming from inflexible thinking and a variety of frankly inexplicable omissions.
Out of eleven assaults, only three had artillery support described as good, and
that sobriquet is a relative one taken from the unit Take Home Package write-ups. Every
unit is different and individual errors should not tar an entire branch with the same brush.
However, the following single examples are fairly indicative of the norm, and suggest that
artillery employment overall has some serious problems. Maneuver units do not
communicate their plans fully to artillery elements and the Fire Support Officer, usually
an inexperienced officer, does not fully understand the maneuver elements. Artillerymen
are not the only soldiers who have learned hard lessons, but the critical role of artillery
271
For discussion of artillery accuracy, see Martin Goldsmith, James Hodges, Marion L. Bums
HI, Applying the National Training Center Experience: Artillery Targeting Accuracy . RAND
Report No. N-2984-A, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1990), pp. 9,27,39.
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in assaulting fortified positions calls for a close look at the recurring problems both
internally and in coordination with maneuver units.
Artillery preparatory bombardments occurred in each deliberate attack studied
to some extent. For various reasons, these fires are rarely driven by intelligence, either
templated or confirmed, of exact enemy locations. One glaring example was a fire plan
which consciously chose not to adjust fires onto known enemy locations and then fired
only a few targets of those planned. Those fired often missed the intended target area
anyway. The Battalion Fire Support Officer attempted to explain that the spread of shells,
or sheaf, from the firing battery would blanket the known grid since the estimated
position was so close. Since the guns fired a linear sheaf spread north to south, it could
not cover the targets, which were all offset to the east or west of the estimated positions.
Another recurring action is the changing of target numbers or group names within the
artillery chain. This requires fire direction center personnel to "translate" the requests for
fire and slows the process down or causes the wrong targets to be fired. Also, artillery
in the battles studied never fired close assaulting fires to help maneuver elements clear
objectives. Not enough emphasis is placed on such fires by either maneuver units or
artillery elements. One simple solution is to tie H-Hour to arrival at an assault line or
similar graphic control measure, rather than the original Line of Departure (LD) time.272
Another point which surfaces is the number of artillery pieces a unit gets for support in
training compared to historical numbers used by various armies.
272 This idea as well as several other helpful comments throughout this chapter come from
Major Beacon of the NTC Observation Division.
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...A point of genuine concern is whether our battalion task forces are supported by
sufficient artillery to provide the necessary level of responsive support in that
role.
273
Smoke is rarely ever fired by artillery. A previous section of this chapter
described the slow shifting of smoke rounds during a battle and the excellent benefits
smoke gives the attacker. During the After Action Review of this battle, no clear
explanation for the delay could be found. The artillery officers up front radioed the
corrections back to the fire direction center but for some reason either there or within the
batteries, adjustments took far too long.
Counterfire, the doctrinally correct term for counterbartery fires, is done well
when that counterfire is part of the preparatory fires preceding a deliberate attack. This
counterfire is much less effective when ground forces are breaching obstacles.274
Counterfire is the most critical role for artillery delivered indirect fires and must continue
throughout the assault, as demonstrated at El Alamein. A common artillery mindset is
that counterfire does not directly support maneuver elements. In fact, it allows ground
units freer movement without suffering from defensive artillery which causes the highest
percentage of casualties. Defending OPFOR artillery plays havoc with engineers and
other exposed elements at obstacles. Artillery units in Direct Support (DS) of a certain
ground combat unit count on other artillery controlled by higher headquarters to fight the
273 Goldsmith, Tactical Reconnaissance , 124.
274
S.R. Robinson, 88-2-3 and 88-2-7.
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counterfire battle.275 This author contends that counterfire is not adequately stressed or
trained in peacetime.
Bearing in mind that only recently has a major fortified position come into
play at the NTC and that artillery pieces do not have MILES transmitters, a researcher
can only look at the live-fire exercises to study artillery in the direct fire role. Since
American, German and Soviet experience against bunkers, pillboxes and the like showed
the necessity of using 155mm and larger guns for direct fire, this is a required skill to
practice. A typical attack during the movement to contact phase of live-fire training also
might include a large obstacle such as a log crib blocking a defile and offers a suitable
direct fire target. Direct fire artillery should also have quite a psychological effect on
attacker and defender alike. As far as this author could determine, no unit has ever used
artillery in the direct fire mode during training at the NTC. Only the 3d Armored Cavalry
Regiment (ACR) planned to experiment with this and deployment to the Gulf War
precluded further training at the NTC.276
10. Air Support
Aircraft come in small numbers and Air Liaison Officers normally direct them
toward enemy armored reserves. The difficulties of assessing losses from air strikes are
more formidable than from other means and thus not enough facts exist to draw
worthwhile conclusions from the NTC experience in this category. Since OPFOR artillery
275 The critical role of counterfire is echoed by Major Beacon, based on observation of
eighteen unit rotations to the NTC.
276 Quirk Interview, Major Beacon's comments and all records examined.
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units are not physically there for the pilots to see,277 the worth of close air strikes on
artillery units cannot be examined.
11. C2
A majority of the lessons learned by soldiers training at the NTC could be
described as Command and Control. This study concentrates on those lessons relative to
synchronizing all available assets in deliberate attacks and breaching.
The major points that stand out relate to the actions surrounding obstacle
breaching. Maneuver forces tend to sit back and wait for the engineers to announce that
the breach is made. The resulting piecemealing means poor suppression of defenders by
direct and indirect fires, poor obscuration of defenders' vision by smoke, and no violent
assault passing through rapidly to overwhelm defenders with close assaults. Units tend
to focus on the breach itself, rather than recognizing breaching as one of the necessary
steps in destroying the defenders.
12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets278
Special weapons, as discussed in previous chapters include such equipment as
flamethrowers, various mechanical mineclearing devices and others. Unique employment
of assets covered such things as using walking wounded to escort prisoners, military
police to man obstacle gaps and artillery in the direct fire mode. Almost none of these
277 The OPFOR artillery units are played on the computers in the "Star Wars" building and
electronic means of target detection are replicated so that artillery can use its own equipment and
tactics for counterfire.
278 Readers should note that the term Special Weapons in this thesis is not synonymous with
the U.S. Army's artillery term for nuclear weapons.
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things are done at the NTC for several reasons. Flamethrowers are not in the U.S. Army
inventory anymore. A weapon known as the M202 Flash is apparently a replacement,
however, this author has never seen one of those fired and no records exist of its use at
the NTC. Units of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) fire this weapon twice annually. It
has a very large backblast area which will cause problems when used within trench
systems.
279
Prisoners are not played during battles and military police are deployed in
very small numbers, but still could be used as the British did. Artillery and mechanical
mineclearing means were previously discussed. The amount of mine plows and rollers
is unknown to this author, but none have been deployed to units this author has served
in during past years. As this is written, open press film shows many plows mounted on
Ml and M60 tanks deployed to the Gulf War.
13. Learning Points
Several points gleaned from historical lessons are being trained at Fort Irwin.
The need for units to get the most value from this valuable training time leads to training
units doing as many operations as they can in the time available. Regular deliberate
attacks have a "prep" day beforehand to allow scouting and rehearsals. The new, larger
obstacle complex facing brigades calls for much more thorough scouting. If two "prep"
days precede an attack, the training benefits may prove worthwhile. A longer preparatory
time would also open up the possibility of a surprise attack, done without artillery the
night after the first day when the defenders do not expect it.
279
Information concerning the use of the M202 by the 7th Division comes from CPT Pete
Blaber, an infantry company commander in that unit.
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Scouting and infantry infiltration are topics addressed by all units with varying
success, which is natural in training. The lack of smoke and generally weak artillery
efforts both indirect and direct is disquieting. Units do not train with flamethrowers or
other flame weapons in amounts anywhere near what previous armies used in combat.
Tank-infantry cooperation below platoon level is rarely in evidence.
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VDI: SUMMARY, UNIFORMITIES AND CONCLUSIONS
The smallest detail, taken from an actual incident in war, is more
instructive for me, a soldier, than all the Thiers and Jominis in the
world. They speak, no doubt, for the heads of states and armies
but they never show me what I wish to know-a battalion, a
company, a squad, in action.
Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies
A. SUMMARY/UNIFORMITIES
This section will summarize the relevant information in each of the subsections.
The reader should bear in mind that almost all the historical battles studied contained
defenses in depth consisting of several belts of obstacles or defensive positions, or both.
Most of the actual defensive positions were strongpoints of some type rather than linear
trenchlines manned equally throughout. All the defenses had outposts nearest to the
attackers to wear down those attackers before they reached the main defensive positions.
These historical battles were on a much larger scale than the National Training Center
exercises covered can be, and thus drawing direct comparisons must be done carefully.
The overall focus of this chapter is to identify the critical factors that commanders and
staffs must consider in planning any attack on any kind of fortified position. The
summary portion will refresh the reader on certain critical areas.
1. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling
The role of intelligence on planning directly reflected national characteristics.
The more technologically oriented Americans and British had excellent signal and aerial
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intelligence and did not aggressively patrol on the ground to confirm this.280 The
Gennans and Soviets used any intelligence available but put great emphasis on ground
patrolling. This continued on into planning. American and British planning did not rely
heavily on the intelligence itself. Allied planning certainly did not ignore it, but it did
not always "drive the train" until later in Europe at the Siegfried Line. The Soviets,
considering intelligence to be the "...basic precondition for a successful breakthrough of
deeply echeloned positions", used it when possible and actually called off artillery fire in
Manchuria because the intelligence was not firm enough to guide it. The Germans at
Kursk had the best opportunity to gather intelligence and made the most of it. Basically,
the American and British style was to gather intelligence, while the Soviets and Germans
fought for it.
Not surprisingly, when an army did not have unchallenged air supremacy, part
of the intelligence effort was devoted to concealment and deception. The British devoted
tremendous energy to BERTRAM at Alamein. The Germans and Soviets at Kursk both
took countermeasures. The Manchurian campaign started off with Soviet troops
marshalling and moving under miles of netting and at night to avoid chance Japanese
observation. Overt actions, such as artillery practice, lulled the Japanese into
complacency and reinforced what they already wanted to believe.
280
This comment relates only to these battles. The Australians defending Tobruk patrolled
very aggressively. Vigorous patrolling is also considered a British trademark as was proven again
in the Falklands War.
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NTC experience shows that American characteristics remain unchanged.
Signal and other intelligence is gathered as much as possible. Units have also learned the
absolute necessity of ground patrolling and are improving in that area. Units that gather
intelligence well and use it to "drive the train" do well and others do not. American force
structure emphasizes stealth and gathering information, rather than fighting for it.
2. Use of Obscuration/Smoke
Use of smoke and obscuration initially differed along the same lines as did
using intelligence. The Americans in Europe and the British used little smoke. The
British at Alamein did choose a night attack for concealment. The Germans and Soviets
loved smoke and used it as much as possible. American Marines, and the Army later in
Europe, also used smoke extensively at lower tactical levels. Only the Soviets and
Germans tried to use it in very large quantities and across large frontages. On this point,
as well as others, the reader should recall that the Soviets studied under German tutors
early in the war and imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.
Americans, with air supremacy, overwhelming firepower and a desire to keep
casualties to a minimum, chose not to do many attacks at night. The Germans and
Soviets used the hours of darkness as much as possible for infiltrating infantry and for
doing engineer work. Both of these armies met with a great deal of success with such
tactics.
Besides just using smoke, Germans and Soviets used it very well and in
different ways. Germans placed smoke on top of defenders and thus retained their own
good visibility. The Soviets, at least in their doctrine, used smoke on top of defenders
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and between attackers and defenders for screening. They also screened wider fronts by
laying smoke in intervals to create infiltration lanes, degrade interlocking fires and stretch
their supply of smoke.
Current Army training does not utilize smoke as heavily as past armies did.
The OPFOR uses it extensively and gets good results. U.S. technical capabilities do
allow and encourage U.S. Army units to fight at night, where enemy systems are
degraded far more than American systems are.
3. Tank/Infantry Cooperation
In this area, the British stand out as the only army to consistently have serious
problems coordinating efforts. The Americans in Normandy initially had the same
problems but learned rapidly. All other forces relied on close cooperation for success.
Another point for the reader to recall is that the battles chosen mostly occurred later in
the war, after soldiers learned what worked. Since all armies stressed this point after
combat experience, the argument carries considerable weight.
Germans and Soviets sent infantry and engineers forward under cover of
darkness to begin prying apart the defensive systems. Then, other units attacked across
a narrow front. Germans, Soviets and Americans all attacked in waves, with tanks
leading if possible. These armies settled upon a ratio of roughly one tank for every one
infantry squad (with or without its carrier) as their mix of choice. All these forces also
used some sort of "processing" or "marching fire" to pin defenders and gain fire
superiority. The German units equipped with well armed SPWs could do this with a
portion of their force and continue the mission with the rest.
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The infiltrating units, and many other attacking units organized themselves
into assault teams. These small groups were the very best way to take on pillboxes,
bunkers and strongpoints. With flamethrowers, automatic weapons, explosives, tanks
where possible and high testesterone levels, these small groupings had enough portable
firepower to reduce defenses. These assault teams varied in size from roughly squad to
platoon size and showed the value of breaking down units into very small and
decentralized elements. Units training at NTC do not often use such groupings. The
compressed training time available, compared with the build-up time before historical
battles works against the cohesion and training necessary for such groups to fully work.
4. Engineers
Engineer utilization fell out into a pattern similar to the other areas analyzed.
British utilization fell on the low side. American utilization fell in the middle and the
Germans and Soviets used engineers for a variety of missions. British engineers
concentrated on clearing lanes through obstacles. Although certain mechanical means,
such as the Flail tank came out, breaching remained primarily a risky, slow, manual job.
The engineers tended to operate alone, in keeping with British style. The British
continued to have problems with clearing enough lanes through obstacles and with
echeloning their engineer effort throughout the depth of the attack.
American engineers mostly emulated their British counterparts. They did,
however, play roles in assault teams and assisted in bunker reduction and sealing. Some
units also went into action during COBRA prepared to clear routes through the
devastation to keep supplies moving forward. Such planning recognized the need for
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engineer work throughout the depth of the battle. The very decentralized nature of
fighting against the Japanese saw engineers working closely with infantry and armor in
reducing positions.
The Germans put forth much effort in training their engineers. These soldiers
played a key combat role during infiltration attacks and in reducing strongpoints.
Flamethrowers of many types saw use along with demolitions. Other engineers cleared
mines manually and also used the "Goliath" as a mechanical means. When possible,
engineers simply marked mines and troops went around them. Training given by
engineers to infantrymen in spotting mines paid off well.
Soviet engineers closely emulated the Germans and appeared in greater
numbers (a common Soviet trait). Soviet engineers went deep for reconnaissance as well
as working throughout the depth of the attack. The Soviets, recognizing the destruction
implicit in such combat, detailed infantry units to follow attacking units to add manpower
to engineers clearing supply routes.
No army ever came up with a fully satisfactory mechanical breaching means.
NTC observations show that the mine plow is still the best available mechanical device.
However, most breaching is still done by the slow, dangerous manual method. The recent
Gulf War did show one technological leap in manual breaching, though. Engineers now
probe with plastic rods rather than metal ones.
5. Artillery
Artillery is the most critical factor in assaults of this type and different armies
used it in a variety of ways. Artillery is the main weapon available to the attacker to
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degrade defensive capabilities by hitting weapons and troops, obscuring their observation,
or degrading command, control and communication.
The British used artillery in a very rigid, WWI style. At Alamein the artillery
schedule, eerily reminiscent of the Somme, proceeded forward on a time schedule with
the infantry "leaning-on" the barrage to get at defenders immediately. The British guns
fired counterbattery missions first, but then fired only the rolling barrage. In
GOODWOOD, artillery could not range to most of the defenses and so played a less
significant role. All British shelling started at H-Hour and carried the troops through the
first kilometer or so of the defenses. Gunner officers did not tailor their barrage to the
differing tactical realities as well as required.
American artillery earned a good reputation based on sheer weight of fire and
efficient control. Problems certainly existed in combining efforts with ground forces.
Infantry usually did not "lean-on" the barrage and so lost the effects of most of the fire.
Units did learn that artillery could pin defenders in their shelters and enable attackers to
win the "race to the parapets" if attacking ground troops moved rapidly enough. "Time
fire" worked well there and this advantage seems to have lain mostly with the Americans.
During attacks upon concrete pillboxes and similar reinforced bunkers, soldiers learned
that only shells of 155mm or larger could do serious damage. Direct fire with such
weapons was the only sure way to destroy such positions without resorting to direct
ground assault. Artillery could aid deception efforts by firing across a broad front before
attacks. Such fires usually fell in the following order; antiaircraft gun suppression,
counterbattery, and finally on the defenses themselves.
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German techniques differed for several reasons; less sophisticated fire control,
fewer self-propelled guns and different organization. German infantry units had artillery
pieces known as "infantry guns" of up to 152mm for direct fire support. When
supporting good infantry who used infiltration, artillery would wait until called to fire,
thus maintaining surprise. In keeping with the decentralized fighting style, many units
in breakthrough zones received artillery batteries dedicated to them for support. The unit
VB would speak directly to this battery for support. In keeping with German emphasis
on surprise and morale considerations, flak weapons pouring out tracer rounds in direct
fire made a significant contribution. In contrast to the American and British sequence of
fires, German gunners would sometimes fire at defensive positions, covering troop
movements, and then shifting to counterbattery fires after defenders opened fire.
Soviets always placed great faith in artillery and especially in assaulting
fortified positions. Some techniques paralleled German ones. Soviets used a large
amount of direct fire and also used dedicated batteries. Soviet artillery, along with
German guns, fired on obstacles such as wire and minefields to blast paths through for
advancing ground forces. With greater numbers of guns available, Red Army gunners
could use creeping barrages of five to six batteries firing on one kilometer of attack
frontage. Soviet engagement priorities differed slighdy form others. Barrages first hit
defensive works, then fired counterbattery and finally blasted obstacles. The two battles
studied illustrated two worthwhile points concerning the value of intelligence. In
Manchuria, when intelligence could not give enough information, the commander canceled
the bombardment and relied on surprise. If the shelling could not do its job, it would
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only alert the enemy. In the Arctic, the barrage failed to achieve the desired effects
because German positions could not be located accurately enough.
Current American training does not include most of the techniques mentioned
here. Units do not use artillery in direct fire. NTC rarely sees close assaulting fires.
Artillery units do not feel they are supporting maneuver units by firing counterbattery and
that mission is doctrinally done by higher echelons. Artillery does fire on likely enemy
antiaircraft positions as Americans did during the Siegfried Line Campaign. U.S. artillery
doctrine only mentions a dedicated battery as a possibility during a movement to contact.
6. Air Support
Utilization of air assets saw many similarities between the nations studied.
The primary mission of all air forces was to achieve air superiority to keep defensive air
away from attacking ground forces. Different forces met with varying success in this
endeavor.
The British had no workable system to control close air support at the time
of Alamein. British air concentrated on hammering the Luftwaffe to protect British and
Commonwealth ground units. Aircraft engaged in battlefield interdiction by attacking
defenders' armored concentrations and hitting supply lines. In GOODWOOD, the song
remained basically the same. By then, however, rocket firing Typhoons of the RAF flew
close support as much as possible. Of course, GOODWOOD also saw heavy bombing
intended to blast a path through the defenders for the armor to dash through.
Americans always enjoyed air supremacy over their enemies. American air
devastated units trying to move up to the battlefield. Resupply became a chancy affair
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with fighter-bombers prowling over the roads. Airborne artillery forward observers
performed yeoman service in calling fires to assist ground forces. Less stellar was the
carpet bombing for COBRA. Although it struck the Germans with great force, it also
killed many Americans. The technology of the day could not effectively control so much
firepower so close to friendly troops.
The Luftwaffe sought air superiority, or at least parity, over Kursk. Since the
Germans had Stuka dive bombers, their pilots could support them much more directly
than other pilots could support their ground troops. Stukas concentrated on enemy
artillery and armored reinforcements. In this manner, they helped immensely because
defensive artillery was the greatest threat attackers faced. By placing forward air control
personnel down at company level in breakthrough sectors, the Germans had more control
and flexibility over their tactical air support.
Soviet pilots had three priorities to support a breakthrough. First, they were
to gain air supremacy, then hit defenses. Lastly, they performed battlefield interdiction
to hinder defensive repositioning or reinforcement. Bad weather degraded the capabilities
of the air units in the battles studied, so definite conclusions of their effectiveness cannot
be drawn.
7. C2
Preparation for most battles included some form of rehearsals. The British
conducted the most in terms of both quantity and quality. This grew from two factors:
the rigid timing of the barrage and the proven lack of cooperation between branches.
This emphasis on rehearsals paid off in soldier confidence throughout the battle. Other
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detailed techniques of command and control stemmed from both the British style and
Montgomery's personality. Control began far behind the lines as units moved up under
cover of darkness. Lighted symbols (Diamond, Double Bar, Square) marked routes with
clarity and simplicity. Naming strongpoints and minefields made similar contributions.
Tracers firing along unit boundaries and searchlights wagging as the barrage shifted all
helped coordinate the movements and actions of men and weapons. The traffic control
begun behind the lines continued through the obstacles as Military Police directed traffic
at minefield gaps.
In GOODWOOD, preparations did not include such thoroughness. Much of
this stemmed from the much shorter planning time. Planners did not seem to fully
consider the German defenders in the planning and the lack of well thought out control
measures, coupled with a large number of burning command tanks, meant that little could
be done to meet a situation different than the one planned for.
For the Germans, the C2 considerations at Kursk included many of those
found at Alamein from the standpoint of higher level control. Tracers and searchlights
saw some use as navigation aids. Very centralized planning and tightly controlled
execution ensured smooth movement forward in the nights before the battle. Simple
measures such as lighted symbols marking routes made the task more manageable. Most
other C2 factors grew from the entirely different organization and mentality of the
German's tactically. Supporting arms answered to combat unit commanders at a lower
level than that which other armies' supporting arms did. This worked only because of
the more thorough training and longevity in position of German officers. Such longevity
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and cohesion meant that German units did not always need the thorough rehearsals others
did. Germans often just talked the plan over while looking at the ground or a map. Flare
signals could convey much information to another soldier well versed in the unit's
procedures. This must be understood by the reader in drawing conclusions.
Americans adopted the technique of rehearsals after much bitter experience.
Such training built trust and allowed units to work through problems and find solutions
(such as field telephones attached to tanks for infantry coordination). American strengths
in C2 came at higher levels in coordinating the abundant firepower available. This
overwhelming firepower had a great effect on defending units' C3. Disruption of
communications degraded the ability to mass counterattack forces or gather an accurate
intelligence picture.
The Soviets possessed neither the radios and technological predilection of the
Americans, nor the training and cohesion of the Germans. In light of this, their command
and control procedures were different, but no less valid. Red Army forces conducted
thorough rehearsals by participants before large scale operations. This did not promote
flexibility, but the simplification and clarity of understanding attained offset drawbacks.
Streamlined supporting-to-supported relationships (dedicated artillery batteries, for
example) eliminated the need for a large amount of communication. Simple means of
signalling, such as flares, transmitted information quickly and as well as possible under
the circumstances.
In this area, comparisons with current U.S. training at NTC must be drawn
carefully. NTC maneuvers are at battalion and brigade level and do not have the plethora
187
of other units around the battlefield. One area this paper examined was the focus on the
actual breaching. Since other armies had a deep objective, they seemed to breach
obstacles and then get on with the mission. Americans in training get fixated on the
breach itself and do not seem to break through as others did. This author is uncertain if
the many differences between training and reality (small things such as real bullets, real
blood and the like) are the reason or if our fixation on the details keeps us from doing
it as well as we should be able to.
8. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets
In this area, no truly marked differences existed between the forces examined.
One universality was that new weapons never worked as well as hoped, but that truism
is not confined to assaults upon fortified positions. One other constant was the primacy
of flamethrowers, both vehicle mounted and manpacked. Other factors come up more
often than not. Attacking bunkers, pillboxes and similar positions requires bangalore
torpedoes to breach wire and pole charges to get explosives right where they are needed.
The heavier the firepower available (such as strategic bombers), the better. Such use
must consider two things, however. If precision cannot be guaranteed, then ordnance must
be removed from friendly troops. If the ordnance is to be delivered close to friendly
troops, then precision must be achieved by some technique. DESERT STORM validated
the concept that, "fire-power...could be concentrated to such a degree that it was possible
to burst through any purely static defensive system and then keep on attacking and
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advancing." 281 German and Red Army experience refuted beliefs that artillery could not
clear a significant percentage of mines in a small area. All forces tried various
mechanical techniques for breaching obstacles. These included Flail tanks, mine rollers,
fascine carriers, "Ark" tanks, and explosive breaching devices such as the "Goliath" and
the "Snake."
B. CONCLUSIONS
This study examined myriad factors, techniques and ideas to find the absolutely
critical few points a good commander and his staff must consider so that an assault by
American soldiers upon a fortified position does not become "...a scene of sickening and
ghastly horror."282 This section will list the factors that planners must at least consider
seriously before attempting such an attack.
In 19th Century warfare, defenders usually surrendered after attackers achieved a
successful breach of the town walls. This breach defeated the soldiers of the garrison "in
their own minds." If the defenders chose to fight, a group of volunteers known as the
"Forlorn Hope" led the assault. These men clawed their way over the rubbled, obstacled
and mined approach to seize a foothold. Their "...suicidal task was to draw the defenders'





282 Captain Edward S. Godfrey in a personal letter describing Custer's battlefield. Quoted by
Francis B. Taunton, Custer's Field: "A Scene of Sickening and Ghastly Horror" (London: Johnson-
Taunton Military Press, 1987), 1.
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battalion that followed."283 The historical studies in the preceding chapters present
modem commanders with many ideas. Careful use of weapons and tactics available will
allow an attacker to defeat a defender "in his own mind." Proper employment of men and
weapons will nullify rather than draw defenders' fire and ensure that an assault is not
suicidal task. Better technical measures will overcome the carefully prepared traps.
When contemplating the assault of a large fortified position one must first ask what
actually causes casualties to attackers. Defenders' artillery fires cause the large majority
of casualties among attackers. The second leading casualty producer is direct fire from
heavy weapons. Mines cause some losses, but mainly help artillery and direct fire do the
killing. The reader must bear in mind that almost all defenders in the battles studied did
not succumb to what John Keegan referred to as "the loneliness of the battlefield" and
give up or hide. Instead, they offered fierce resistance because they did not believe
themselves beaten.
The next task is to find out what, if anything, prevented breakthroughs of the
fortified positions. Previous chapters show that if the attacker has overwhelming strength,
especially in the air, then eventual breakthrough is almost certain no matter how well or
how poorly the attack may be conducted tactically. Where the attacks did actually fail,
283 Bernard Comwell, Sharpe's Company: The Siege of Badaioz (New York: Penguin Books,
1982), 12. Comwell's novel captures the essence of the action. The actual "Forlorn Hope" at
Badajoz met spikes, water filled barriers, smashed wagons, a chevaux de frise (sword blades
emplanted in wooden beams), fougasse, mines and powder barrels. When the defenders fired
these, they slew, scorched or disabled almost every one of the 500 volunteers. See Charles Oman,
A History of the Peninsular War . Vol V. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 246-248.
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GOODWOOD and CITADEL, reserves stopped the penetration after the fortified
positions had levied a heavy toll in men, material and the most critical asset of time.
This analysis indicates that to win such a battle the attacker must put the greatest
emphasis on getting through the position rapidly and cleverly enough so that the
defending commander cannot commit reserves at the right time and place. To achieve
the actual penetration, the attacker must defeat or nullify the defenders' artillery and
direct fire. If that can be accomplished, then obstacles can be breached or avoided with
limited casualties. Since such nullification cannot be counted upon, rapid means of
mechanical breaching assets should be available. A key point to remember is that there
is some objective of the operation to remain focused upon. Actually breaking through the
position is merely a means to an end. Assaulting a fortified position, while a deliberate
attack as defined by the U.S. doctrine, is a unique entity and requires very unique task
organization and equipment. The considerations and techniques discussed in the
remainder of this chapter are situationally dependent and some are mutually exclusive.
The author believes that all must at least be considered in order to give the operation as
full a chance of success as possible.
1. Intelligence/Patrolling
A detailed, accurate intelligence picture of the actual enemy defenses must
"drive the train." The nature of the defenses must prescribe the manner of attack.
(Assault teams using infiltration is excellent to take out outposts, but less effective against
a main defensive belt.) All possible technical means should be pressed into service to
paint this intelligence portrait, but the final arbiter is always ground reconnaissance.
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Aggressive patrolling acquires the best intelligence and helps achieve moral dominance
over the enemy.
Bearing in mind the continual attack upon the enemy commanders' minds,
deception must also play a key role. Camouflage and other means must mask friendly
deployments, strengths and intentions. Let maskirovka (masking) and khitrost (cunning)
be the watchwords. Electronic jamming of defensive intelligence radio nets will help to
blind defending commanders and delay decisions. When the battle is joined, jamming
artillery nets will be worth one or more batteries devoted to counterbattery. Recall that
one major effect of artillery fire was to degrade defensive C3. Jamming will play a
significant role in such activities and make artillery available for other missions.
2. Air Support
With good intelligence in hand, the commander now examines his resources
in order of their importance to him. Aircraft delivered ordnance is, more than ever, the
heaviest, most portable firepower available. Precision guided munitions (PGM) and other
technological advances in radar and the like ensure that fire effectiveness is achieved,
rather than the more indiscriminate application of firepower across the landscape.
In support of the actual assault of a position, the first priority for air assets
is battlefield air interdiction (BAI) to keep large reserves from influencing the
fighting.
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Herein lies one of the initial trade-offs at which some breakpoint level must
be determined. The size of available defensive reserves in relation to the size of the
284 This discussion assumes that the Air Force can achieve at least air parity over the fighting.
Air assets discussed by the author are those devoted to tactical air support missions (TACATR).
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attacking force must dictate how much air support is sent after them. At some point,
aircraft will become more valuable if allocated towards the second priority of air support -
attacking defensive artillery. Only so much friendly artillery will be available and it will
have many missions. Aircraft giving "close enough" air support hunting for offending
batteries will have a very direct effect on the health and longevity of friendly ground
troops.
Another form of air support should not be forgotten. Airborne forward
observers should be employed if possible to maximize the effectiveness of artillery fires.
These aircraft and other scouting flights provide valuable updated intelligence which will
continue to guide the proverbial locomotive throughout the battle.
3. Artillery
Indirect fire assets will be the most heavily tasked asset the commander has.
Indeed, if he asks for nothing else, the commander should ask for more artillery support.
The first priority for guns and rocket launchers is counterbattery fire. This fire must
continue throughout the entire battle, although it should not always be the very first
mission fired.
The second priority of artillery fire is smoke missions. A key decision for the
commander to make is how many tubes should be allocated towards smoke missions and
how many to other missions. Smoke will play a key role in degrading the direct fires that
are the second greatest killer of attackers. This smoke should almost always be fired
directly onto the defenders if possible. Such missions should be fired on call when
attackers are in their assault positions. Once the smoke is built up, then attackers should
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approach and begin assaulting the main defensive positions.285 Smoke should be fired
across a wide front in the Soviet style. It will create lanes for the attacker and break up
defensive fires. It also contributes to a sense of isolation on the part of the defender.
The third priority to consider is that of direct fire artillery. Assaults should
always be initiated by the greatest mass casualty producing weapon available. A volley
of 155mm gunfire presaging a dark and stormy dawn would be a truly significant
emotional event for the occupants of the bunkers targeted. Such fire would also motivate
attackers and cover the last movements of those attackers as they closed on the positions.
Recall that steel-reinforced concrete bunkers are impervious to shells less than 155mm.
This could be one role, although not necessarily the primary one, for a dedicated battery
of guns in a key breakthrough area. The concept of a dedicated battery greatly simplifies
command and control as well.286
A fourth priority is the potential for artillery fires massed on a small area to
detonate the mines within that area and rapidly clear a path for assaulting forces. While
much current thinking derides the effectiveness of this technique, both Soviets and
Germans used it in combat, so there must be something to it. Massed fire on obstacles
should significantly cut barbed wire and perhaps fill in portions of antitank ditches.
285 Current U.S. Army publications prescribe a technique known as SOSR: suppress, obscure,
secure and reduce. This author contends that obscuration should be the first task. Note also that
this passage is not intended to apply to infiltrating assault teams, but rather to the main forces.
286 Current U.S. Army techniques only mention the dedicated battery in a Movement to
Contact mission and do not encourage its routine use in that role.
194
The indirect fire asset at the maneuver battalion level is the mortar platoon.
Mortars will play a key role in an assault in two ways. First, mortars deliver the most
rapid smoke available and should be able to shift their fires more rapidly than cannon
artillery assets can. Most of a mortar platoon's basic load should be white phosphorous
rounds to support the assault of a fortified position. Mortar smoke builds up faster, while
artillery delivered smoke lasts much longer. The second key role for mortars will be to
fire air bursts on top of defenders to provide close assaulting fires for ground forces.
Such fires will pin defenders inside shelters while attackers win the "race to the parapets."
A commander should consider massing several mortar platoons together to support the
initial attacking unit as it achieves a penetration.
Artillery also has a more reactive role to play in this operation. Commanders
should prioritize breaching sites for designation as Critical Friendly Zones (CFZ).
Artillery acquisition radars will cover those areas to detect enemy batteries firing at those
targets. Such batteries then move to the top of the counterbattery hit parade.
4. Engineers
Engineers play several key roles throughout the total depth of the assault. A
portion of the available engineers must accompany assault teams infiltrating into the
defenses. These engineers will assist in reducing strongpoints and will breach as many
obstacles as possible. The most important factor in employing sappers is to do so
throughout the depth of the entire attack. While dismounted engineers go in with the
assault teams, others with their MICLICs (Mine Clearing Line Charge), Combat Engineer
Vehicles (CEVs), and the like will accompany other attacking units.
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Engineer work must widen the initial lanes through obstacles and clear areas
off to the side of those lanes. Units need room to deploy artillery pieces, aid stations,
command posts and such. Battles of this nature always have long columns of vehicles
moving nose to tail along the few cleared lanes which invites disaster. Fresh engineer
units should be attached to follow on units to clear fresh lanes. The existing lanes, if not
blocked by exploding vehicles, will be needed for the initial units to send wounded back
and receive supplies. These fresh engineers will also seal up bypassed bunkers to prevent
enemy infiltrators from reoccupying them.
5. Tank/Infantry Cooperation
While other assets available to the commander are more critical to the overall
outcome, tank-infantry teamwork is the absolute cornerstone of the entire attack. If this
linkage is weak, excessive casualties will result and the attack might even fail from
excessive losses in men, equipment and time. The actual defensive disposition will
determine how the commander will best organize his armor and infantry for the assault.
If the defense is in depth, with outposts protecting the main obstacles and
defensive positions, then a substantial portion of infantry should infiltrate into the
defenses. These troops may destroy outposts or try to get deep to engage defenders
throughout the entire fortified position when the rest of the attacking force begins its
assault. These units must carry a mix of weapons, especially flame weapons. Engineers
will accompany these troops as well as tanks if the defenses are dispersed enough to
allow this.
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The main body of the attack will be comprised of roughly equal numbers of
tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) with their infantry squads. Tanks should
lead the assault utilizing "marching fire" and with indirect fire air bursts close in front of
them. If mines are expected, several tanks with mine plows should lead abreast, clearing
a large lane as they go. With proper smoke to offer concealment, these plows should
break out near defenders followed by several other tanks and APCs which are all laying
down suppressive fires. A high volume of fire by tanks of the supporting elements and
the plow tanks themselves must be maintained. The basic ammunition loads of the tanks
must be modified to include far more high explosive rounds than are normally carried.
If obstacles can be breached or bypassed, a mounted assault is faster and less costly than
a dismounted one. Some combat units also must be positioned to guard the flanks and
to engage the bypassed units that continue to fight on or counterattack out of their
positions.
6. Special Weapons
The U.S. Army does not currently possess enough proper equipment to ensure
a rapid mechanical breach of obstacles. Specifically, better mine plows must be
developed, fielded and tested in training. A armored variation of the Vietnam-era "Rome
Plow" may be the answer to finding a powerful enough plow with a large enough blade.
Fuel-Air Explosives (FAE) can be delivered by aircraft or surface launched. These
devices first spray out a cloud of fuel and then ignite it with a small explosive. The
resulting detonation, aside from being relatively spectacular to observers a safe distance
away, causes a sudden increase in pressure which will detonate mines. The technology
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exists, but until recently development and acquisition had been discontinued. Press
coverage of the Gulf War showed that such devices were used to some extent against
Iraqi positions during DESERT STORM.
The MICLIC does not breach a large enough lane. The British Giant Viper
is more capable. Both of these designs are flawed because the devices are trailer
mounted. The best design would be a variant of the Polish T-55 mounted "Snake." This
vehicle incorporates two line charges in coffin-like boxes on the rear fenders of a tank.
Such a design gives protection, portable firepower and mobility in one package.
The British also have bundled plastic fascines available. These can be
mounted on APCs and dropped off by firing explosive bolts. The bundles drop into
ditches to enable vehicles to cross.287 Special devices such as these are fairly simple
in design and employment. Their development and acquisition need emphasis in
peacetime. In wartime, logistics planners need to consider the time and cargo carrying
requirements to get these devices up to the units when needed. Tactical planners need
to know to request all the special weapons necessary.
Flamethrowers saw great amounts of usage during WWII, mainly for their
psychological effect. They also provide some short term screening for attackers. While
such devices did possess obvious drawbacks, their continued use in combat argues well
for their use today.
287 Quirk, Interview, 21 Nov 1990.
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7. C2
The goal of each commander is to effectively use command and control to
maximize effective combat power. The complexity of assaulting a fortified position
requires decentralized C2 procedures and simplicity in command relationships. Most of
the solutions and procedures are simple, while some are more technical.
The greatest difficulty lies in the attackers knowing where they themselves are
in relation to other attackers and known defenders. Several simple control measures exist.
First, attackers could use a "thrust line" such as Rommel's 7th Panzer Division first used
in 1940. A single arrow, with no more than one change of direction in it, would delineate
the main effort of the attack. With the line graduated in certain increments, positions
could be given as right or left of whichever hash mark on the line was closest.
Another system is to name obstacles, strongpoints and such, especially in
some familiar pattern. With known minefields named M2, M4, and so on, new ones
encountered could be named Ml, M3 and so on. This would make locations clearer to
all interested parties. Strongpoints and known defensive positions named for towns local
to a unit's home station would help keep all positions in their proper relationship.
Tracers fired from Vulcans or other weapons will mark unit boundaries (at
least until tracer burnout). These tracers should include another color to enable observers
to differentiate between these controlling fires and actual engagements. Along the same
line of thought as tracers is the use of illumination rounds fired deep behind the enemy
to guide attackers.
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The most significant problem in locating friendly troops arises when
infiltrating units operate across a wide area and artillery preparatory fires are planned.
No-Fire Areas (NFAs) are normally used but the confusion of combat may prevent units
from reaching these areas. The Global Positioning System (GPS) now has small portable
sets. If infiltrating units have such a device and the data can be sent to the artillery units,
fratricide can be avoided. As the chapter on the NTC showed, all such techniques need
to proofed in training before units actually try this technique in combat.
Tanks provide the best portable firepower to help infantry subdue stubborn
positions. The Ml series of tanks do not have infantry telephones to facilitate control of
fires. The armor and infantry FM radios are fully compatible, but phones would be more
effective, accessible and would alleviate overcrowding on radio nets.
Traffic control throughout the operation is a critical action. A massive
number of vehicles will be channeled into a finite number of gaps in obstacles. Simple
techniques such as lighted symbols designating routes named Star, Diamond and the like
will help simplify movement at night. On the battlefield itself, traffic control points
(TCPs) will control the forward movement of vehicles close to the lanes to lessen the
danger of losses from enemy fire. Combat units should man such points when they are
fighting just ahead. Military police (MP) units should assist to insure continuity as units
move forward.
Overall, delegating control of most assets to lower units will increase chances
of success. Forward air control personnel should be pushed forward in greater numbers
than the current one per battalion to insure no loss of control of critical assets. Task
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organization will probably be very different from normal unit configuration. Americans
organize into breach, support and assault elements and such a breakdown may
amalgamate two maneuver battalions into those three elements under brigade control,
rather than having one battalion do the breach and support while the other waits to assault
through. The decision to radically change task organization should be considered, but too
many situational factors exist for this author to try to dictate a certain task organization.
This study examined a range of battles, armies and time periods to find the
critical factors involved in successfully assaulting a fortified position. This primarily
historical examination, coupled with lessons from the various Combat Training Centers
in the Army and now with experience from the so recently completed DESERT STORM,
may contribute to an increased capability to conduct such operations. With the
considerations mentioned in this paper and a good amount of luck commanders will
hopefully have a better chance of success. In peacetime, soldiers must always bear in
mind the words of Appius Claudius the Blind to the Roman Senate- "If you value peace,
be then prepared for war."
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c.1 If you don't like this,
you may resign and go
home : commanders' consi-
derations in assaulting a
fortified position.

